What is knowledge?

_{kairosfocus

November 26, 2017

Food for thought, Logic and Reason, Philosophy, Sciences and Theology, Selective Hyperskepticism}

Share: Facebook; Twitter; LinkedIn; Flipboard; Print; Email

Sometimes, exchanges at UD come down to truly basic (and hard) issues.

This is one such time, where Origenes has challenged prolific objector Critical Rationalist in the Personal Incredulity thread:

>>100 Origenes November 25, 2017 at 7:01 pm

CR

What is your definition of valid knowledge?>>

I have thought this worthy of responding to and of headlining:

KF, 106: >> Origines,

Generally, I would argue that “knowledge” is used in a weak form sense: warranted, credibly true (and reliable) belief.

Drawing out, slightly:

Warranted —

there is an available account (as opposed to internal to the given knower, who may simply accept a message from reliable sources . . . ) that, properly understood, would justify accepting or treating belief x as true in serious contexts.

Credibly true —

the warrant for and circumstances of belief x are such that we can have good confidence that the belief is likely to be true or capture enough truth that we are entitled to trust it.

Reliable —

the warrant for x is such that if we act on the belief that-x in a consequential situation, we are unlikely to be let down.

Belief —

that which is accepted, perceived, or held to be so; often in this context, for good reason.

Of course in today’s day and age, “faith” and “belief” are often despised and dismissively contrasted with “science,” “reason/rationality” and “knowledge,” etc. as though acknowledged faith/trust/belief is invariably ill-warranted.

Such reflects dominance of radical secularism and evolutionary materialistic scientism, which, ironically are not well warranted, are not trustworthy (being fallaciously rooted, esp. through self-referential incoherence and/or the fostering of ill-advised cognitive biases) and should not be permitted to act as gate-keepers on what we regard as knowledge.>>

So, arguably, knowledge is well-warranted, credibly true (and reliable) belief.

Many will find that unpalatable, but I confidently predict that they will have difficulty proposing another succinct account that answers to issues ranging from the classical “justified, true belief” definition of epistemology, to the fact that scientific knowledge is not utterly certain, to the challenge of Gettier counter-examples, to the Grue issue, to the Agrippa trilemma challenge and more. END

Comments

You cannot doubt your own existence. You cannot be wrong about the fact that you exist. Nothing and no one is capable of deluding you on that issue. Hence, you cannot be completely deluded.
Yet, this has already been addressed.
I must now apologize for trying to trick you earlier: All the ideas that I suggested we might know infallibly are in fact falsehoods. “Two plus two” of course isn’t “four” as you’d discover if you wrote “2+2” in an arithmetic test when asked to add two and two. If we were infallible about matters of pure logic, no one would ever fail a logic test either. Stubbing your toe does not always hurt if you are focused on some overriding priority like rescuing a comrade in battle. And as for knowing that “I” exist because I think—note that your knowledge that you think is only a memory of what you did think, a second or so ago, and that can easily be a false memory. (For discussions of some fascinating experiments demonstrating this, see Daniel Dennett’s book Brainstorms.) Moreover, if you think you are Napoleon, the person you think must exist because you think, doesn’t exist.
critical rationalist_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
02:29 PM
2
02
29
PM
PDT}

Origenes,
Of course we may all be deluded in many ways, yet, given that we strive for truth, we have no choice but to assume that we are free rational agents.
Yes, clearly we have to make such an assumption when we strive for truth. Edit: deleted last sentence; got my wires crossed.daveS_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
12:19 PM
12
12
19
PM
PDT}

DaveS @84
DaveS: I suppose it makes sense to assume this person is sane or rational to some degree, even if they are radically “deluded” in other ways.
Of course we may all be deluded in many ways, yet, given that we strive for truth, we have no choice but to assume that we are free rational agents. Slagle explains why:
The naturalist or determinist cannot accept her own irrationality and remain rational. In fact, she cannot accept her own irrationality at all: even in positing one’s own irrationality, even in merely considering it as a bare possibility, she must presuppose that she is rational. The claim here is not that she must consider herself perfectly or even generally rational; rather, it is that any attempt to deny that she is ever rational could get off the ground only if that attempt were rational, which entails that she is, at least sometimes, rational. There is no alternative: our own rationality is our starting point. It is the presupposition with which we must begin any inquiry, including an inquiry into whether we are rational. ...... The critic who denies free will is appealing to the advocate of free will to change her mind. He is challenging the advocate to take control of her character by using reason to accept determinism. Yet in order for this to work, the critic must presuppose that the advocate is responsible for her character, and thus is capable of controlling her character, and this capability presupposes that she has free will. As such, in appealing to reason—which is what makes it an argument—the critic is presupposing that determinism is false in order to argue that determinism is true. This is self-defeating.
Origenes_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
12:13 PM
12
12
13
PM
PDT}

Origenes, I suppose it makes sense to assume this person is sane or rational to some degree, even if they are radically "deluded" in other ways. For example, a person in a Matrix-type scenario, where all their senses are being manipulated, could still be behaving rationally in the world they are experiencing.daveS_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
11:54 AM
11
11
54
AM
PDT}

DaveS @79
Yes, if this person possesses a semblance of sanity, anyway.
You are correct of course. Insanity makes all things possible: - believing that one does not exist. - believing that the universe came from nothing. - believing that atoms spontaneously rearrange themselves into high-speed computers, libraries full of science texts and novels, cars and trucks and airplanes.Origenes_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
11:32 AM
11
11
32
AM
PDT}

DS, yes, as I am conscious is self evident, undeniable and incorrigible, so one can be certain that subjects capable of reason are not 100% deluded. KFkairosfocus_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
11:26 AM
11
11
26
AM
PDT}

KF, Yes, one cannot correctly reason that one is completely deluded. That much is clear. My question is whether one can correctly reason that one is not completely* deluded. Or, related, can own know (weak sense) that one is not completely* deluded? *Well, completely except for the fact that one exists, as in Origenes' example.daveS_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
11:23 AM
11
11
23
AM
PDT}

Kairosfocus: ... indeed conscious self-awareness is self-evident and undeniable. As in, who is denying this? Oops.
The Critical "Rationalist" may very well the one who (attempts to) deny this. Or else, if he cannot criticize it, it is not valid or whatever.Origenes_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
11:22 AM
11
11
22
AM
PDT}

Origenes,
Not if one realizes that each act — including the act of believing that one does not exist — presupposes one’s existence. “I (attempt to) doubt my existence. But in order to doubt my existence I have to exist.”
Yes, if this person possesses a semblance of sanity, anyway. I don't know that there are limitations on what crazy ideas people can believe.daveS_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
11:19 AM
11
11
19
AM
PDT}

Origines, yes, indeed conscious self-awareness is self-evident and undeniable. As in, who is denying this? Oops. KFkairosfocus_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
11:03 AM
11
11
03
AM
PDT}

DS, I am speaking of reductio ad absurdum, which is of course broader than self-evidence. In order to arrive at the notion of grand delusion, we rely on the validity of argument and we rely on the validity of communication of ideas and that people are moved to the true and reasonable. If yo then set up a frame that ends up implying that the whole frame is a delusion, that becomes an absurdity. I Take it as a first principle of argument tied to distinct identity, that the worldview equivalent of a square circle cannot exist. KF PS: By believing that one's nature is grossly disparate from what it is one in effect believes that one is not.kairosfocus_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
10:59 AM
10
10
59
AM
PDT}

DaveS: ... couldn’t one be so irrational and deluded that one believes that one doesn’t exist?
Not if one realizes that each act — including the act of believing that one does not exist — presupposes one's existence. "I (attempt to) doubt my existence. But in order to doubt my existence I have to exist." ---- edit: a person who holds that she/he does not exist is a prime example of being self-referentially incoherent.Origenes_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
10:56 AM
10
10
56
AM
PDT}

Origenes, Interesting point. But couldn't one be so irrational and deluded that one believes that one doesn't exist?daveS_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
10:47 AM
10
10
47
AM
PDT}

DaveS: That doesn’t imply that we can support with reason (or evidence) the proposition that we are not completely deluded.
You cannot doubt your own existence. You cannot be wrong about the fact that you exist. Nothing and no one is capable of deluding you on that issue. Hence, you cannot be completely deluded.Origenes_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
10:42 AM
10
10
42
AM
PDT}

KF,
DS, given the self referential incoherence that undermines responsible discourse, we can safely hold that any scheme of thought that entails grand delusion has arrived at absurd self-referential incoherence. Thus, it falsifies itself. KF
I agree that you cannot support with reason (or evidence) the proposition that we are completely deluded. That doesn't imply that we can support with reason (or evidence) the proposition that we are not completely deluded.daveS_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
10:00 AM
10
10
00
AM
PDT}

CR, I only have a moment to speak to the issue of correctly and fairly understanding what words mean and what they refer to when people use them. Arrogating the power to redefine arbitrarily is grossly disrespectful and undermining of serious discussion. Not least, it creates undue confusion as words are the tools of thought and communication so their precision and proper use must needs be respected if we are to progress. I also detect an underlining kantian ugly gap between the inner world and the outer one of things in themselves peeking out from under your remarks. That approach rests on a self-referentially incoherent claim as F H Bradley long since exposed. Next, the issue in the end is not Dyke or whoever, regarding induction. The key point is, do we have a distinct, identifiable, intelligible world that manifests consistent core characteristics in the course of events? I put it to you that for cause the vast majority of humanity and scholarship alike would say yes. Once that holds, the scientific and general project of recognising and studying reliable patterns and using them to understand the world is valid. the alternative is a chaos, and it is quite evident that we do not live in a chaos. KF PS: I think you have hung up on a word Dykes used, foundations, speaking of idea sources accepted in key part by Popper. Where it is blatant from your own statements that you deride inductive reasoning; so an answer that addresses inductive reasoning and points out its roots and legitimacy is highly relevant. You have wrenched that into an attempt to dismiss foundationalism. I suggest to you that warrant -- good answers to why should I accept some X, even provisionally? -- comes in chains and that such chains cannot regress to infinity for many reasons. So, we have finitely remote start points that need to be compared on factual adequacy, coherence (including not being question beggingly circular) and explanatory power and balance. that some choose to use a foundations metaphor for the phenomenon in answer to Agrippa's Trilemma, is a label that stands for a real issue. Let us see your solution that is neither incoherent nor question-begging nor factually inadequate. KFkairosfocus_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
09:52 AM
9
09
52
AM
PDT}

PS: Let me add, that in part key self evident truths serve as plumblines that allow us to correct our errors, e.g. the triple first principles of right reason, LOI, LNC, LEM that are direct outflows of distinct identity. As an example, are you SURE that "There are no sources that are guaranteed not to lead us into error" is in fact true and reliable? How so, if you hold it true? As in, do you see the self referential incoherence and linked regress beginning to emerge and undermining the edifice you are trying to build?kairosfocus_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
09:45 AM
9
09
45
AM
PDT}

In regards to identity....
Section 2 Dykes tries to refute Popper’s arguments against inductivism. Inductivism is the belief that there is a method called induction by which people can get new ideas from sense information and then confirm those ideas.
Popper built his philosophy on foundations borrowed from Hume and Kant.
No he didn’t. Popper argued that knowledge doesn’t have foundations (see in particular “Realism and the Aim of Science” Chapter I), and Dykes hasn’t refuted that argument, nor does he do so anywhere in the essay.
Hume, said Popper, had shown that: “there is no argument of reason which permits an inference from one case to another… and I completely agree” [OKN 96]. Elsewhere he referred to induction as “a myth” which had been “exploded” by Hume [UNQ 80]. He further asserted that “There is no rule of inductive inference – inference leading to theories or universal laws – ever proposed which can be taken seriously even for a minute” [UNQ 146-7; see also RASC 31].”
There then follows a lot of stuff on Hume’s position on induction, not Popper’s. Popper had many arguments against induction that Hume didn’t give him and took those arguments more seriously than Hume. Dykes does not address most of the arguments Popper provided. What argument does Dykes attempt to address?
Hume stated, in essence, that since all ideas are derived from experience we cannot have any valid ideas about future events – which have yet to be experienced. He therefore denied that the past can give us any information about the future. He further denied that there is any necessary connection between cause and effect. We experience only repeated instances, we cannot experience any “power” that actually causes events to take place. Events are entirely “loose and separate…. conjoined but never connected.” According to Hume, then, one has no guarantee that the hawthorn in an English hedge will not bear grapes next autumn, nor that the thistles in a nearby field won’t produce figs. The expectation that the thorn will produce red berries, and the thistles purple flowers, is merely the result of “regular conjunction” which induces an “inference of the understanding.” In Hume’s view, there is no such thing as objective identity, there is only subjective “custom” or “habit.
Dykes then goes on to argue as follows:
The crux of the case against Hume was stated in 1916 by H.W.B. Joseph in An Introduction to Logic: “A thing, to be at all, must be something, and can only be what it is. To assert a causal connexion between a and x implies that a acts as it does because it is what it is; because, in fact, it is a. So long therefore as it is a, it must act thus; and to assert that it may act otherwise on a subsequent occasion is to assert that what is a is something else than the a which it is declared to be.” Hume’s whole argument – persuasive though it may be – is, to borrow Joseph’s words, “in flat conflict with the Law of Identity.” Existence implies identity. It is not possible to exist without being something, and a thing can only be what it is: A is A. Any actions of that thing form part of its identity: “the way in which it acts must be regarded as a partial expression of what it is.” Thus to deny any connection between a thing, its actions, and their consequences, is to assert that the thing is not what it is; it is to defy the Law of Identity. It is not necessary to prolong this discussion. Entities exist. They possess identity. By careful observation – free from preconception – we are able to discover the identities of the entities we observe. Thereafter, we are fully entitled to assume that like entities will cause like events, the form of inference we call induction. And, because it rests on the axiom of the Law of Identity, correct induction – free from contradiction – is a valid route to knowledge. The first premise of CR is therefore false.
This argument doesn’t solve the problem at all. The problem of induction as stated by Hume is that our expectations of the future don’t follow from what we have observed in the past. To see why let’s take Dykes’ example of the hawthorn, which he claims will not produce grapes. How does he know it won’t produce grapes? Perhaps some scientist will genetically engineer hawthorns to produce grapes. And even if he doesn’t the fact that it won’t produce grapes doesn’t follow merely from the fact that it hasn’t in the past. To put this in Dykes’ language, if we were to accept that existence implies identity that would not tell us the identity of any specific entity. And indeed characterising the issue as being about the identity of the object in question is a bad way to think about it. Whatever the thing in question is we need an explanation of how it works to say what it will do next and why. And we won’t be able to tell what we can predict about the entity in question without such an account. Why do hawthorn bushes not produce grapes? That has to do with a complicated set of circumstances in its evolutionary past that selected against hawthorns producing relatively large fleshy fruit and refers to lots of things that are not hawthorn bushes, like human beings who did not selectively breed hawthorn bushes to get them to grow grapes. Stating this theory in terms of definitions would make it less clear because the explanation involves tying together many different entities and so the whole explanation would have to be repeated many times in slightly different ways. Note also that Dykes’ approach to creating knowledge amounts to defining terms in the right way: that is, to the idea of methodological essentialism that I criticised in my comments on Section 1.
critical rationalist_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
09:35 AM
9
09
35
AM
PDT}

@KF #48
So, [unintentional] tests of knowledge via the environment is a kind of criticism.

CR, nope. Let us look at a reputable dictionary:
From the article….
A word is shorthand for an idea not for some imaginary perfect definition. As such, we should be willing to change terminology to talk in ways that other people understand. That is, we should be willing to use their definitions. Furthermore, we should never try to be more precise than is necessary to address the problem we are dealing with since this will lead to loss of clarity. The best summary of [Popper’s] position on this issue is (Unended Quest, p. 24):
You seem to share Dyke’s conception of trying to understand the world by defining words correctly.
This is a false description of Popper’s position on definitions, see Section 7 of Unended Quest. His actual position is that words can’t be defined with perfect accuracy since all definitions have to employ undefined words. Suppose I say that a tiger is “a big cat”. If all the terms are defined then there is a definition of “a” and “big” and “cat” and these definitions refer to other words and if those definitions are defined then they lead to still more definitions with still more words… So either we use undefined words or we have an infinite regress. As a result of this problem the habit of trying to understand the world by coming up with the right definitions, which Popper calls “methodological essentialism”, is untenable. growth of knowledge.
Criticism of an idea need not be intentional. The crew of the Titanic did not intentionally decided to run into an iceberg. Yet that collision repented criticism of the idea that the Titanic was unsinkable. Most importantly, would the outcome had any more impact on that idea had the crew intentionally decided to hit the iceberg? Fault was found, even if that fault finding was not intentional.
Likewise, critical failure of a program or hardware is a crash. The associated work to find and fix the problem is not criticism. Debugging and troubleshooting are perfectly good and apt words, there is no good reason to kidnap criticism and stretch it on a rack to make it fit your fancies.
Most users do not intentionally set out to find errors in the software. Nor do most end users need to have a clue as to how to debug software. They just want to solve their problem. “It doesn’t upload my photos” is a criticism of that software. A critical failure results in the problem it that it purports to solve not actually getting solved. Unless the bug is fixed, why would I use it? Why would I keep it installed on my iPhone, as opposed to some other software that actually does solve that same problem? The program that does solve that problem plays a causal role in being retained when installed on my iPhone. It is knowledge. It will get backed up. It will be restored when I upgrade to a new device. It will attract users that will help offset of the cost of maintaining it, by purchasing it or though the presentation of in-app advertising. Or it will connect to a service that people subscribed to increase its value, etc.critical rationalist_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
09:30 AM
9
09
30
AM
PDT}

CR, democracy and choosing slavery is a distraction. The core issue is, knowledge and how it is attained, and in particular inductive reasoning. We know from many threads that you dismiss inductive reasoning. We have challenged that dismissal, and above you will find a discussion of one reason why. Likewise, how do you know that there are NO sources that are not going to lead us into error? Isn't that a massive inductive generalisation and a rather hasty one as there are several things that are guaranteed error free as they are self evidently true. KFkairosfocus_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
09:00 AM
9
09
00
AM
PDT}

DS, given the self referential incoherence that undermines responsible discourse, we can safely hold that any scheme of thought that entails grand delusion has arrived at absurd self-referential incoherence. Thus, it falsifies itself. KFkairosfocus_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
08:56 AM
8
08
56
AM
PDT}

Did you guys actually read the entire article? I’m asking because you keep asking questions that represent the same mistakes that Dyke makes. For example, what if democracy chooses slavery? Democracy is a tradition of criticism, not a source. Governments are sources. There are no sources that are guaranteed not to lead us into error, including government. If we stop criticizing ideas, then we will fail. So, you’re still making the same mistake. The question is not to ask what sources should rule, such as labor or some other group. The question is how can we discover errors in our ideas.critical rationalist_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
08:03 AM
8
08
03
AM
PDT}

KF,
We have a choice and the reason to reject grand delusion is clear.
Most of us find the notion that were are completely deluded unattractive, to be sure. Do you think it's possible to know (in the weak sense) that we are not completely deluded?daveS_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
06:44 AM
6
06
44
AM
PDT}

F/N: Okay, let's try again. We face a choice. First, that we live in a world with a distinct identity of being with at least partly rationally intelligible, discernible core ordering characteristics tied to its distinct identity as a cosmos. Things that we can infer based on observed reliable patterns and/or inference to the best explanation. A world in which we may err but may also know in part and even through a glass darkly by inductive reasoning and other rational inference and judgement. Or else . . . Second, we are by and large utterly deluded about the above as we actually inhabit an utterly irrational chaos that by chance seems orderly and/or that apparent order is imposed by the happenstance programming of our brains/minds that imposes apparent order on the world we perceive as external to ourselves. Whereby, inter-subjective consensus and claimed bodies of knowledge are little more than collective delusion. That is, we are part of a grand, Plato's cave delusion in which thanks to the grue paradox, nothing can be held as a stable characteristic. Whether the delusion is in the outer apparent world or imposed through our inner programming makes but little difference: grand delusion. But, BTW, how do we know we actually inhabit such a chaos? That is, the infinite regress of self-referential delusions has been triggered, landing in absurdity. We have a choice and the reason to reject grand delusion is clear. KFkairosfocus_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
12:35 AM
12
12
35
AM
PDT}

Weird loss of a comment claiming not logged inkairosfocus_{November 28, 2017
November
11
Nov
28
28
2017
12:22 AM
12
12
22
AM
PDT}

PP: I suspect, it is self-aware, self-moved consciousness that separates us as en-souled. Such entities are capable of belief, rational judgement, being morally governed by considerations such as the compelling force of moral evidence and moral certainty, etc. so that they become full-orbed knowers in the relevant sense. (I suggest that many animals are capable of limited learning and knowledge, e.g. the dog that knows the master's voice and commands, the donkey here that would carry its sleeping owner home from market in Plymouth, across many miles, the other one that when angered would make its rider brush against "kusha" [Hmm: Balaam's Ass that more than brayed?] and so forth . . . they too have souls and are in a limited sense self-moved but seem mostly guided by built-in instincts -- cf. how birds build nests and navigate across oceans and continents.) And yes, that consciousness is self evident and incorrigibly true . . . a rock has no dreams and a hypothetical deceived brain in a vat or Boltzmann Brain perceiving itself as in a world of delusion will still be conscious though deluded. A rock cannot be deluded that it is conscious as it cannot contemplate. Those who hope to refine and so arrange rocks that they get not just blind GIGO-limited processing and programmed zombie-like robots but self-aware, self-moved entities need to resolve how they get to unified consciousness -- and to moral government. AI programmed by the wicked to soul-lessly and efficiently carry out great evils will be a major and possibly fatal challenge to our civilisation. For instance in top level war gaming, they discovered that humans, recognising the horror and evil, will hardly ever pull the trigger for nuclear exchanges. So, to simulate such wars they resorted to computers. The implied warning should give us grave pause. KFkairosfocus_{November 27, 2017
November
11
Nov
27
27
2017
10:36 PM
10
10
36
PM
PDT}

Knowledge separates animate subjects from inanimate objects?ppolish_{November 27, 2017
November
11
Nov
27
27
2017
03:51 PM
3
03
51
PM
PDT}

CR, you have not engaged the core matter, the dismissal of induction, which is manifestly at the centre of your own arguments. The critique cited is quite right that a world with a distinct identity will have distinct properties which will manifest themselves, indeed characteristic features. The above discussions of distinct identity and its immediate consequences such as the natural numbers and the triple first principles of right reason LOI, LNC and LEM are only a beginning. So, by reasonable observations we may discern to some degree that order as it manifests itself. Inferences from such observations as providing support for attempted summaries of that order will be highly relevant. Second, the Kantian influence is clearly there also . . . it lies in some form behind ever so much of thought over the past 200 or so years -- and the Kantian ugly gulch is indeed a problem, as F H Bradley highlighted over 100 years ago. The self-referentiality is there also and it leads to the exact problems seen. Those are serious problems. KFkairosfocus_{November 27, 2017
November
11
Nov
27
27
2017
01:35 PM
1
01
35
PM
PDT}

KF,
DS, do you know the history? It is precisely the willingness to accept weak form knowledge as valid as knowledge that opened the gates to the scientific revolution. Remember, empirical observation is not certain nor can it grant certain warrant. This is the fire you are playing with.
I will go this far: weak form knowledge is obviously useful. Presumably in many cases it's true, and therefore is also knowledge in the strong sense.daveS_{November 27, 2017
November
11
Nov
27
27
2017
01:14 PM
1
01
14
PM
PDT}

@KF Don't have time to reply in detail, at the moment, but ... https://conjecturesandrefutations.com/2013/07/27/a-refutation-of-nicholas-dykes-on-karl-popper/
Many years ago, Nicholas Dykes wrote a criticism of the philosophy of Karl Popper. His essay not only fails to refute Popper, it also seems to reflect an inability on Dykes’ part even to state Popper’s positions accurately. I will go through the arguments section by section, labelling what section each argument comes from. I have left out references and footnotes in my quotes, the reader can get them from the original article. Where I have put in references I refer to Section numbers rather than page numbers since different versions of Popper’s books have different page numbering.
critical rationalist_{November 27, 2017
November
11
Nov
27
27
2017
12:32 PM
12
12
32
PM
PDT}

Prev 1 … 4 5 6 7 8 Next

You must be logged in to post a comment.

Leave a Reply