What is knowledge?

_{kairosfocus

November 26, 2017

Food for thought, Logic and Reason, Philosophy, Sciences and Theology, Selective Hyperskepticism}

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Sometimes, exchanges at UD come down to truly basic (and hard) issues.

This is one such time, where Origenes has challenged prolific objector Critical Rationalist in the Personal Incredulity thread:

>>100 Origenes November 25, 2017 at 7:01 pm

CR

What is your definition of valid knowledge?>>

I have thought this worthy of responding to and of headlining:

KF, 106: >> Origines,

Generally, I would argue that “knowledge” is used in a weak form sense: warranted, credibly true (and reliable) belief.

Drawing out, slightly:

Warranted —

there is an available account (as opposed to internal to the given knower, who may simply accept a message from reliable sources . . . ) that, properly understood, would justify accepting or treating belief x as true in serious contexts.

Credibly true —

the warrant for and circumstances of belief x are such that we can have good confidence that the belief is likely to be true or capture enough truth that we are entitled to trust it.

Reliable —

the warrant for x is such that if we act on the belief that-x in a consequential situation, we are unlikely to be let down.

Belief —

that which is accepted, perceived, or held to be so; often in this context, for good reason.

Of course in today’s day and age, “faith” and “belief” are often despised and dismissively contrasted with “science,” “reason/rationality” and “knowledge,” etc. as though acknowledged faith/trust/belief is invariably ill-warranted.

Such reflects dominance of radical secularism and evolutionary materialistic scientism, which, ironically are not well warranted, are not trustworthy (being fallaciously rooted, esp. through self-referential incoherence and/or the fostering of ill-advised cognitive biases) and should not be permitted to act as gate-keepers on what we regard as knowledge.>>

So, arguably, knowledge is well-warranted, credibly true (and reliable) belief.

Many will find that unpalatable, but I confidently predict that they will have difficulty proposing another succinct account that answers to issues ranging from the classical “justified, true belief” definition of epistemology, to the fact that scientific knowledge is not utterly certain, to the challenge of Gettier counter-examples, to the Grue issue, to the Agrippa trilemma challenge and more. END

Comments

DS, do you know the history? It is precisely the willingness to accept weak form knowledge as valid as knowledge that opened the gates to the scientific revolution. Remember, empirical observation is not certain nor can it grant certain warrant. This is the fire you are playing with. KFkairosfocus_{November 27, 2017
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KF,
If we do not accept such weak form knowledge and act on it [never mind quibbles about rejecting the general usage of the term], civilisation will collapse.
Whoa. We both agree there is uncertainty, I think we just are locating it in different places. You are uncertain about exactly which beliefs in your store of knowledge (weak form) are true; I am uncertain about which of my beliefs are actually knowledge (strong form). I prefer to reserve the term "knowledge" for beliefs which are true, while you extend it a bit further. We are just using language differently. I am not reluctant in the slightest to act on warranted, credibly true, and reliable beliefs.daveS_{November 27, 2017
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DS, We live forward and know forward on the past that provides the warrant. In all but a few practical cases such knowledge as a body is subject to correction on learning further as Newton knew and advised. That's reality, that is how knowledge is commonly used, in a weak sense. Complaining is not going to change it, or are you willing to cede that almost all of science is only candidate knowledge with the resolution of that candidacy being indefinite. Where, as that resolution is in a similar plight, it too is subject to the same candidacy. Thence, infinite regress and knowledge evaporates save for the few things that are self evident. In short, collapse of the domain of knowledge. The far simpler alternative is to acknowledge that we create bodies of knowledge, where we use a weak sense that embraces what is well warranted, credibly true and reliable, thus believed and freely acted on. If and when a point fails, we adjust. Yes, there is a stricter sense, a subset of this, where some few things are self evident and are utterly and irrevocably certain. Those, we use as ultimate tests in evaluating claims of knowledge. Chief among these are the things that flow from distinct identity, the triple first principles of right reason, LOI, LNC, LEM, and also the natural numbers and what flows from them. At no point can you refute that knowledge is so commonly used, nor that there are cases of revision, e.g. Phlogiston, earth as the sump of the cosmos, the unexpected limitations of Newtonian Dynamics etc. If you have problems here, have a talk with Newton, Locke and even Greenleaf as cited above; which you are also unable to respond to. If we do not accept such weak form knowledge and act on it [never mind quibbles about rejecting the general usage of the term], civilisation will collapse. That alone is sufficient to see that something is wrong with the skeptical challenge to what is common usage. For me, I simply recall my daydream in Chem class at age thirteen, that perhaps one day the class would be interrupted and in would walk a messenger with the update due to some revolution or other. It was disappointing to learn that the reality is a lot more prosaic, and that a new paradigm typically advances one funeral at a time. KFkairosfocus_{November 27, 2017
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KF,
DS, so known after the fact — and even that knowledge-claim is going to be irreducibly uncertain.
That means that knowledge can degrade over time to false belief under your definition, which I find undesirable.
That is the problem, do you really wish to take the abstract possibility of error and use it to assign all but a tiny few self-evident things to a limbo of doubtful or even suspect opinions?
Well, when there is some tiny chance of error, then there is some tiny chance that my belief is not knowledge. For example, I'm almost certain that my beliefs about what I had for dinner are knowledge (in the strong sense), but there is a tiny chance of error, hence there is a tiny chance that my recollections do not constitute knowledge.
For example, would you use the abstract possibility of error on whether food is sound, to do as Locke warned against: ” . . . If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do much what as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly”
No. Well, maybe yes if my wife asked me to go to Chipotle.daveS_{November 27, 2017
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DS, so known after the fact -- and even that knowledge-claim is going to be irreducibly uncertain. That is the problem, do you really wish to take the abstract possibility of error and use it to assign all but a tiny few self-evident things to a limbo of doubtful or even suspect opinions? Is this a reasonable way to treat with knowledge, given that this is an ordinary word that has a meaning much as described established by overwhelming use? This comes close to the problem of idiosyncrasy we see with CR. The philosophical understanding of knowledge must come to reflect its general usage, import and importance, including that there is an irreducible uncertainty in many cases but there is typically sufficient warrant that failure to act on that warrant is ill advised. For example, would you use the abstract possibility of error on whether food is sound, to do as Locke warned against: " . . . If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do muchwhat as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly"? KFkairosfocus_{November 27, 2017
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Eh? Doesn't that mean that my warranted, credibly true (and reliable) belief that the food was untainted was not actually knowledge?daveS_{November 27, 2017
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DS, that is exactly what would not be said after such a fatal collision with reality, at least by a well informed careful thinker. He might say, I THOUGHT I knew but it turns out I didn't. That is, there is a possibility of error that we implicitly recognise but usually do not surface. When it hits us, we admit it and move on. In Physics, c 1870, the Newtonian frame looked solid and no one would call it mere provisional belief. It was a body of centuries deep established scientific knowledge. Then relativity and quantum came along and it is now a limiting but important case. And we acknowledge that. KFkairosfocus_{November 27, 2017
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KF,
PS: The case you cite would be a case where one would be busily revising one’s body of knowledge i/l/o fresh evidence. On this, Newton in Opticks Query 31 has some’at to say.
Maybe it's just an aesthetic thing. I have a problem with a system under which you can truthfully say "I knew X before, but now I know that X is false".daveS_{November 27, 2017
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CR, nope. Let us look at a reputable dictionary:
criticism (?kr?t??s?z?m) n 1. the act or an instance of making an unfavourable or severe judgment, comment, etc 2. (Art Terms) the analysis or evaluation of a work of art, literature, etc 3. (Literary & Literary Critical Terms) the analysis or evaluation of a work of art, literature, etc 4. (Art Terms) the occupation of a critic 5. (Literary & Literary Critical Terms) the occupation of a critic 6. (Literary & Literary Critical Terms) a work that sets out to evaluate or analyse 7. (Literary & Literary Critical Terms) Also called: textual criticism the investigation of a particular text, with related material, in order to establish an authentic text Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged, 12th Edition 2014 © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2014
You are wrenching language into newspeak. A fatal collision of an ideology with reality is NOT a criticism, it is a case of empirical failure. Marxism on values of goods and services was soundly critiqued by von Mises in the 1920's, that was simply brushed aside. Communism and its central planning paradigm did not survive a fatal collision with reality in the 1980's and 90's. Likewise, critical failure of a program or hardware is a crash. The associated work to find and fix the problem is not criticism. Debugging and troubleshooting are perfectly good and apt words, there is no good reason to kidnap criticism and stretch it on a rack to make it fit your fancies. KFkairosfocus_{November 27, 2017
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@KF To use one of your phrases, you are presenting a cardboard-cutout and character of criticism, as it is much more rich than the examples given here. Even Barry gave an example of how our ideas slam into reality, without us even intentionally trying to criticize them. So, unintential tests of knowledge via the environment is a kind of criticism. Definitions are important in the sense that we all refer to the same ideas. If it makes you feel better we can divide criticism into intentional and non-intentional criticism. Just as I divide knowledge into to explanatory and non-explanatory knowledge.critical rationalist_{November 27, 2017
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//follow-up @42// Popper posits the democratic process as the foundational 'self-criticizing-system'. This system is foundational to all criticism and this is where the regress (see Slagle #5, #42) stops. However, as I have argued, no house can house itself, so, this too is self-referentially incoherent and therefor not an escape from the epistemological skyhook.
A Skyhook argument, as I am conceiving it, would apply to any position that posits a closed system, but which can be defined, defended, believed, or known only from a standpoint transcending that system. The transcendent viewpoint is thus the “sky” relative to the system, and the point of contact it must have with the system in order for the system to be defined or defended is the “hook.” . . . . . Naturalism and determinism are universal crane explanations; that is, they take cranes to be the only valid form of explanation, such that everything must be explained without recourse to anything else. If we allow an undetermined or non-naturalistic explanation into court, then we are no longer upholding determinism or naturalism. But whereas the affirmations of determinism and naturalism are universal, their denials are not. Critics do not deny that some things are determined or naturalistic; they merely deny that everything is. So the determinist and naturalist must claim that all things are determined or naturalistic, whereas the critic need claim only that there may be one thing that is not. The argument under consideration is that to take crane explanations universally is ultimately self-defeating: we have to posit a skyhook, by necessity, to avoid this self-defeat. To extend Dennett’s analogy, a crane built from the ground up will eventually collapse under its own weight*.13 Thus our argument is essentially a skyhook. Indeed, the appeal of the argument, its bite (or, perhaps, its hook), is the self-defeating nature of its targets. Therefore, I hereby christen this argument, in all its manifestations, the Epistemological Skyhook, or more succinctly, the Skyhook. [Slagle]
Origenes_{November 27, 2017
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PPPS: Locke also has some wisdom in the Intro, Sec 5 of his Essay on Human Understanding (complete with several Biblical allusions and references):
Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, since he hath given them (as St. Peter says [NB: i.e. 2 Pet 1:2 - 4]) pana pros zoen kaieusebeian, whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their discovery, the comfortable provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge may come of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great concernments [Prov 1: 1 - 7], that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own duties [cf Rom 1 - 2 & 13, Ac 17, Jn 3:19 - 21, Eph 4:17 - 24, Isaiah 5:18 & 20 - 21, Jer. 2:13, Titus 2:11 - 14 etc, etc]. Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution, and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grasp everything . . . It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant [Matt 24:42 - 51], who would not attend his business by candle light, to plead that he had not broad sunshine. The Candle that is set up in us [Prov 20:27] shines bright enough for all our purposes . . . If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do muchwhat as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly. [Text references added to document the sources of Locke's allusions and citations.]
kairosfocus_{November 27, 2017
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PPS: Newton, Opticks Query 31:
As in Mathematicks, so in Natural Philosophy, the Investigation of difficult Things by the Method of Analysis, ought ever to precede the Method of Composition. This Analysis consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general Conclusions from them by Induction, and admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths. For Hypotheses are not to be regarded in experimental Philosophy. And although the arguing from Experiments and Observations by Induction be no Demonstration of general Conclusions; yet it is the best way of arguing which the Nature of Things admits of, and may be looked upon as so much the stronger, by how much the Induction is more general. And if no Exception occur from Phaenomena, the Conclusion may be pronounced generally. But if at any time afterwards any Exception shall occur from Experiments, it may then begin to be pronounced with such Exceptions as occur. By this way of Analysis we may proceed from Compounds to Ingredients, and from Motions to the Forces producing them; and in general, from Effects to their Causes, and from particular Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the most general. This is the Method of Analysis: And the Synthesis consists in assuming the Causes discover'd, and establish'd as Principles, and by them explaining the Phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving the Explanations. [[Emphases added.]
kairosfocus_{November 27, 2017
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DS, Perhaps we all need to listen to Greenleaf:
Evidence, in legal acceptation, includes all the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved . . . None but mathematical truth is susceptible of that high degree of evidence, called demonstration, which excludes all possibility of error [--> Greenleaf wrote almost 100 years before Godel], and which, therefore, may reasonably be required in support of every mathematical deduction. Matters of fact are proved by moral evidence alone; by which is meant, not only that kind of evidence which is employed on subjects connected with moral conduct, but all the evidence which is not obtained either from intuition, or from demonstration. In the ordinary affairs of life, we do not require demonstrative evidence, because it is not consistent with the nature of the subject, and to insist upon it would be unreasonable and absurd. The most that can be affirmed of such things, is, that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them. The true question, therefore, in trials of fact, is not whether it is possible that the testimony may be false, but, whether there is sufficient probability of its truth; that is, whether the facts are shown by competent and satisfactory evidence. Things established by competent and satisfactory evidence are said to be proved. By competent evidence, is meant that which the very-nature of the thing to be proved requires, as the fit and appropriate proof in the particular case, such as the production of a writing, where its contents are the subject of inquiry. By satisfactory evidence, which is sometimes called sufficient evidence, is intended that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind, beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances which will amount to this degree of proof can never be previously defined; the only legal test of which they are susceptible, is their sufficiency to satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man; and so to convince him, that he would venture to act upon that conviction, in matters of the highest concern and importance to his own interest. [A Treatise on Evidence, Vol I, 11th edn. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1888) ch 1., sections 1 and 2. Shorter paragraphs added. (NB: Greenleaf was a founder of the modern Harvard Law School and is regarded as a founding father of the modern Anglophone school of thought on evidence, in large part on the strength of this classic work.)]
KF PS: The case you cite would be a case where one would be busily revising one's body of knowledge i/l/o fresh evidence. On this, Newton in Opticks Query 31 has some'at to say.kairosfocus_{November 27, 2017
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KF,
DS, I spoke in the OP of ANSWERING TO the classic view that knowledge is justified, true belief, raising the topic Gettier counter examples as why I do not subscribe to this formulation. Okay, I am updating, so please pardon.
Point taken.
Bach to the comment: Notice how I carefully worded my remarks on warrant to specifically exclude mere internal justification: “Warranted — there is an available account (as opposed to internal to the given knower, who may simply accept a message from reliable sources . . . ) that, properly understood, would justify accepting or treating belief x as true in serious contexts.” for food, there are reliable sources that we are entitled to trust and we see that ordinary language runs: I know so and so is a good cook and their food does not run the belly, or the like. I seek to capture what we ORDINARILY mean by knowledge, which clearly does embrace less than utterly and irrevocably certain warrant.
Ok, but I'm also not citing utterly certain warrant. In other words, one can know that the food is not tainted if one holds that belief and it happens to be true. And as I said above, there's nothing wrong that I can see with your usage of "weak form knowledge", as long as we are clear. It's probably not a choice I would make, though, e.g., "I knew the food was not tainted (weak form)!", between bouts of projectile vomiting.daveS_{November 27, 2017
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CR: First, I’m a fallibilist about fallibilism.
No house can house itself, so, this is not a solution. In fact, it leads to the infinite regress pointed out by Slagle:
Since the raison d’être of their thesis is that there is no outside of the circle, they do not have the epistemic right to assume a position independent of it, and so their beliefs about the nonveracity of beliefs or reasoning are just as nonveracious as those they criticize. If all of the beliefs inside the circle are suspect, we cannot judge between truth and falsity, since any such judgment would be just as suspect as what it seeks to adjudicate. We would have to seek another argument, another chain of reasoning, another set of beliefs, by which we can judge the judgment—and a third set to judge the judgment of the judgment, ad infinitum. At no point can they step out of the circle to a transcendent standpoint that would allow them to reject some beliefs as tainted while remaining untainted themselves.
IOWs you are standing on quick sand. You cannot ground fallibilism with fallibilism, which in turn is grounded on fallibilism, which in turn is grounded on … and so forth.
CR: A fallibilist cannot claim to be infallible even about fallibilism itself. And so, one is forced to doubt that fallibilism is universally true.
In order to criticize fallibilism the fallibilist needs another chain of reasoning, another set of beliefs, by which he can judge fallibilism. What he cannot do is judge between truth and falsity based on the system (fallibilism) which is under doubt.
CR: Second, a tradition of criticism is itself subject to criticism. Popper’s answer is: We can hope to detect and eliminate error if we set up traditions of criticism—substantive criticism, directed at the content of ideas, not their sources, and directed at whether they solve the problems that they purport to solve.
What are those “traditions of criticism” based on, Popper? IOWs what gives us the epistemic right to assume a position ‘outside the circle’ and judge between truth and falsity? Why should we trust that “traditions of criticism” provide us with tools which improve knowledge?
Popper: Our systems of checks and balances are steeped in traditions—such as freedom of speech and of the press, elections, and parliamentary procedures, the values behind concepts of contract and of tort—that survive not because they are deferred to but precisely because they are not: They themselves are continually criticized, and either survive criticism (which allows them to be adopted without deference) or are improved (for example, when the franchise is extended, or slavery abolished). Democracy, in this conception, is not a system for enforcing obedience to the authority of the majority. In the bigger picture, it is a mechanism for promoting the creation of consent, by creating objectively better ideas, by eliminating errors from existing ones.
That’s it? Criticism comes from some democratic process? And this is the end of the line, where all criticism stops? This democratic process is determined to lead to truth? What if democracy reinstalls slavery? Is that also “improvement”? Are we to hold that reinstalling slavery is an “objectively better idea”? BTW what does Popper mean by “improvement” and “objectively better”? Why is idea A better than idea B? Given that Popper is right, what else can it be than democratic tradition? Which leads to further self-referential incoherence.Origenes_{November 27, 2017
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DS, I spoke in the OP of ANSWERING TO the classic view that knowledge is justified, true belief, raising the topic Gettier counter examples as why I do not subscribe to this formulation. Okay, I am updating, so please pardon. Bach to the comment: Notice how I carefully worded my remarks on warrant to specifically exclude mere internal justification: "Warranted — there is an available account (as opposed to internal to the given knower, who may simply accept a message from reliable sources . . . ) that, properly understood, would justify accepting or treating belief x as true in serious contexts." for food, there are reliable sources that we are entitled to trust and we see that ordinary language runs: I know so and so is a good cook and their food does not run the belly, or the like. I seek to capture what we ORDINARILY mean by knowledge, which clearly does embrace less than utterly and irrevocably certain warrant. That is the sense that is in common sense, in management decisions, in court and in education and science. To suggest that ordinary people hardly know things and are mass deluded in using the claim to know seems highly dubious to me. There are a great many points of knowledge for children or for ordinary people that they could not justify beyond pointing to an authority or else to evident reliability and custom or the like. My Mom was fond of saying that once she heard me say something a bit beyond my years and asked, how do you know that: I read it, i.e. I implied that the sort of substantial books found in our home carried legitimate expertise . . . assertion was backed by facts, responsible reasoning and plausible assumptions. But of course at that age I could never have rebutted a clever and glib hyperskeptic. Many a hyperskeptic, of course, makes a sport out of attacking such people, preening on presumed intellectual superiority and deriding the claimed knowledge of those they mock; while failing to see that there may be a warrant provided for such views by relevant experts that grounds the relevant authorities used such as dictionaries or handbooks or in my family's case in those days Collier's Encyclopedia. Or, for that matter, Sunday or day school teachers and their course materials. Grounds, on much more than blind adherence. KFkairosfocus_{November 27, 2017
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F/N2: Let's take up Dyke on Popper's Kantian error:
Popper described himself as an "unorthodox Kantian" [UNQ 82]; i.e., he accepted part of Kant's epistemology, but not all of it: "Kant was right that it is our intellect which imposes its laws - its ideas, its rules - upon the inarticulate mass of our 'sensations' and thereby brings order to them. Where he was wrong is that he did not see that we rarely succeed with our imposition" [OKN 68n31; c.f. OKN 328, C&R 48-9]. Popper's Kantianism reveals itself most clearly in his view of our senses, which he saw as creative modifiers of incoming data, not as neutral 'windows on the world': "Classical epistemology which takes our sense perceptions as 'given', as the 'data' from which our theories have to be constructed by some process of induction, can only be described as pre-Darwinian. It fails to take account of the fact that the alleged data are ... adaptive reactions, and therefore interpretations which incorporate theories and prejudices and which, like theories, are impregnated with conjectural expectations... there can be no pure perception, no pure datum..." [OKN 145].15 A Fundamental Difficulty Popper's Kantian premise raises enough issues for a book. In this short paper, there is room only for a single objection. Namely, if it is true that our senses are pre-programmed; if it is true that "there is no sense organ in which anticipatory theories are not genetically incorporated" [OKN 72]; then what flows into our minds is determined and what flows out of them is subjective. If our senses are not neutral, if they organise incoming data using pre-set theories built into them by evolution, then they do not provide us with unalloyed information, but only with prescriptions, the content of which is determined by our genetic make up. Whatever is thereafter produced inside our heads - cut off as it is from any objective contact with reality - must be subjective. Popper's Kantian premise thus deprives CR of universality. Since it is ultimately the product of the pre-programmed interpretation of the data which entered Popper's mind, CR is a theory which can only be applied to Popper. According to his own view of his contact with reality, he would not be able to verify the relevance of CR to anybody else. Solipsism looms, yes, but that is a natural consequence of all theories of determinism. For if thought, or the basis of thought, is determined; whether by social class, or the subconscious, or whatever determinant is preferred; then the deterministic theory itself must be determined, according to the theory, and can only be relevant to the person who expounds it. Everybody else is determined by their class, subconscious, genes, material substrate, environment, or whatever it is that is supposed to do the determining. All theories of determinism are, to use Brand Blanshard's term, 'self-stultifying.'16 The objection is analogous to the one raised by Anthony Flew against those philosophers - e.g. Hume and Kant - who claim that we can only have knowledge of our own sense impressions. If sense data are all we can know, solipsism is the inevitable result: "mental images .... are (necessarily) private ... and (logically) cannot be accessible to public observation."17 Objectivity In Unended Quest Popper observed bluntly that "there is no such thing as an unprejudiced observation" [UNQ 51]. Although this appears to rule out the possibility of objectivity, that was not Popper's intention. Rather, again following Kant perhaps, he thought the basis for objectivity lay elsewhere: "the objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested" [LSCD 44]. He later restated this slightly differently: "it is the public character of science... which preserves the objectivity of science" [POH 155-6]. Unfortunately, these assertions do not bear the weight placed upon them. For if Popper's Kantian premise were true (i.e., if anticipatory theories are genetically incorporated into our sense organs and, therefore, there is no such thing as an unprejudiced observation) then senses would not cease to be prejudiced merely by being multiplied. The defective logic could hardly be more clear. One cannot offer as an universal affirmative proposition 'all human senses are prejudiced, i.e. subjective' then ask one's readers to accept that pooling the senses of many persons yields objectivity. If senses are subjective individually they are subjective collectively.18 To conclude under this head, it is plain - even after only a very brief treatment - that Popper's Kantian premise, far from providing CR with a secure footing, leads instead to insuperable problems . . .
Again, a fail. And when Kantianism is in the stakes, I will point to F H Bradley:
We may agree, perhaps, to understand by metaphysics an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole [--> i.e. the focus of Metaphysics is critical studies of worldviews] . . . . The man who is ready to prove that metaphysical knowledge is wholly impossible . . . himself has, perhaps unknowingly, entered the arena . . . To say the reality is such that our knowledge cannot reach it, is a claim to know reality ; to urge that our knowledge is of a kind which must fail to transcend appearance, itself implies that transcendence. For, if we had no idea of a beyond, we should assuredly not know how to talk about failure or success. And the test, by which we distinguish them, must obviously be some acquaintance with the nature of the goal. Nay, the would-be sceptic, who presses on us the contradictions of our thoughts, himself asserts dogmatically. For these contradictions might be ultimate and absolute truth, if the nature of the reality were not known to be otherwise . . . [such] objections . . . are themselves, however unwillingly, metaphysical views, and . . . a little acquaintance with the subject commonly serves to dispel [them]. [Appearance and Reality, 2nd Edn, 1897 (1916 printing), pp. 1 - 2; INTRODUCTION. At Web Archive.]
KFkairosfocus_{November 27, 2017
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KF,
weak form knowledge in science is embedded in bodies of knowledge and linked praxis — paradigms — that are often framed on theories. *** Surely, you are also aware of what “science” itself means: KNOWLEDGE, in Latin.
Well, as long as we're clear that the topic is weak form knowledge, then I have no criticisms. However, in your OP you bring up "true justified belief", Gettier, &c., which suggests this discussion covers territory similar to what one would find in a book on epistemology or this article at the SEoP. And over there, "knowledge" is apparently used in its strong form: "Most epistemologists have found it overwhelmingly plausible that what is false cannot be known". BTW, I take this to mean that none of my false beliefs are knowledge, even if I'm unaware that they are false.
For instance, do you know beyond all possible doubt — utter certainty — that the food on your table for dinner is not tainted? No, but you may have moral certainty, and know also that absent eating for long enough, you will die. So, you act on moral certainty of warrant.
All this is accurate of course. From your point of view, I "know" in a weak sense that the food is not tainted. If I obtain sufficient evidence to the contrary, I revise my store of weak form knowledge. From my point of view, where I don't normally use this weak form of "knowledge", I may have a warranted, credibly true, and reliable belief that the food is not tainted. If the food truly is not tainted, then I know such. If the food actually is tainted, then my belief is not knowledge, it's just a false belief. In your scheme, you are typically not certain that your "knowledge" (weak form) is true, In my scheme, I will typically not be certain which of my beliefs are in fact "knowledge" (strong form).daveS_{November 27, 2017
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ES, yes, you are quite correct as UB also notes. KFkairosfocus_{November 27, 2017
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F/N: As this is in the background, let us highlight a response to the problem of inductive generalisation as posed by Hume and championed by Popper et al. Where, of course, in the modern sense inductive reasoning is reasoning by support, not by entailment. Where, as we will shortly see the stability of the world turns on the presence of distinct identity as integral to any given being, and what flows from it, the triple first principles of right reason. Here, let us follow Nicholas Dykes in a foundational critique of Popper via Hume, that will be helpful as a key point of reference. Pardon necessary length as deeply entrenched fallacies need substantial refutations:
Debunking Popper: A Critique of Karl Popper's Critical Rationalism Nicholas Dykes An occasional publication of the Libertarian Alliance, Suite 35, 2 Lansdowne Row, Mayfair, London W1J 6HL. Philosophical Notes No. 65 [2003] http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/philn/philn065.htm [. . . ] Popper built his philosophy on foundations borrowed from Hume and Kant. His first premise was wholehearted acceptance of Hume's attack on induction. The second, to be addressed in the next section [ --> later . . . ], was agreement with Kant's view that it is our ideas which give form to reality, not reality which gives form to our ideas. Hume, whom Popper called "one of the most rational minds of all ages" [PKP2 1019], is renowned for elaborating the 'problem of induction' - a supposedly logical proof that generalisations from observation are invalid. Most later philosophers have accepted Hume's arguments, and libraries have been filled with attempts to solve his 'problem.' Popper thought he had the answer. "I believed I had solved the problem of induction by the simple discovery that induction by repetition did not exist" [UNQ 52; c.f. OKN 1ff & PKP2 1115]. What really took place, according to Popper, was CR, knowledge advancing by means of conjecture and refutation: "... in my view here is no such thing as induction" [LSCD 40]; "what characterises the empirical method is its manner of exposing to falsification, in every conceivable way, the system to be tested" [LSCD 42]. Hume, said Popper, had shown that: "there is no argument of reason which permits an inference from one case to another... and I completely agree" [OKN 96]. Elsewhere he referred to induction as "a myth" which had been "exploded" by Hume [UNQ 80]. He further asserted that "There is no rule of inductive inference - inference leading to theories or universal laws - ever proposed which can be taken seriously even for a minute" [UNQ 146-7; see also RASC 31]. The Problem with 'The Problem' Popper's solution was certainly correct in one respect. The problem of induction would indeed vanish if there were no such thing as induction. However, the issue would be resolved much more positively were it to turn out that Hume had been wrong, and that there never had been any problem with induction in the first place. And, in point of fact, this is the case. Despite his great skill as a thinker and writer, Hume missed the point. Induction does not depend for its validity on observation, but on the Law of Identity. Hume stated, in essence, that since all ideas are derived from experience we cannot have any valid ideas about future events - which have yet to be experienced. He therefore denied that the past can give us any information about the future. He further denied that there is any necessary connection between cause and effect. We experience only repeated instances, we cannot experience any "power" that actually causes events to take place. Events are entirely "loose and separate.... conjoined but never connected."8 According to Hume, then, one has no guarantee that the hawthorn in an English hedge will not bear grapes next autumn, nor that the thistles in a nearby field won't produce figs. The expectation that the thorn will produce red berries, and the thistles purple flowers, is merely the result of "regular conjunction" which induces an "inference of the understanding."9 In Hume's view, there is no such thing as objective identity, there is only subjective "custom" or "habit." However, Hume also wrote: "When any opinion leads to absurdities, it is certainly false"10 and the idea that one might gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles is surely absurd enough to qualify. And false is what Hume's opinions most certainly are. Left standing, they lead to what he himself called "the flattest of all contradictions, viz. that it is possible for the same thing both to be and not to be."11 The crux of the case against Hume was stated in 1916 by H.W.B. Joseph in An Introduction to Logic: "A thing, to be at all, must be something, and can only be what it is. To assert a causal connexion between a and x implies that a acts as it does because it is what it is; because, in fact, it is a. So long therefore as it is a, it must act thus; and to assert that it may act otherwise on a subsequent occasion is to assert that what is a is something else than the a which it is declared to be."12 Hume's whole argument - persuasive though it may be - is, to borrow Joseph's words, "in flat conflict with the Law of Identity."13 Existence implies identity. It is not possible to exist without being something, and a thing can only be what it is: A is A. Any actions of that thing form part of its identity: "the way in which it acts must be regarded as a partial expression of what it is."14 [--> So, we gather grapes from grape trees and find wicked, needle-like thorns on what we call here "Kusha."] Thus to deny any connection between a thing, its actions, and their consequences, is to assert that the thing is not what it is; it is to defy the Law of Identity. It is not necessary to prolong this discussion. Entities exist. They possess identity. By careful observation - free from preconception - we are able to discover the identities of the entities we observe. Thereafter, we are fully entitled to assume that like entities will cause like events, the form of inference we call induction. And, because it rests on the axiom of the Law of Identity, correct induction - free from contradiction - is a valid route to knowledge. [--> where of course if a thing or its circumstances changes then there may be a different outcome than we expect] The first premise of CR is therefore false . . .
In short, we find lurking again the issue of the logic of being. We live in a world which has a distinct identity with identifiable core characteristics that may come out in observations as reliable consistent patterns and/or statistical distributions. Empirical investigation explores such, to seek to accurately describe it. And while we may and do err in the process, that is because of our fallibility not the want of the world having a distinct identity involving such core characteristics across space and time. Broadening the focus of induction, other means of investigating how given premises may support a given conclusion are also of inductive character. That is, we see how we may find responsible warrant on observation of patterns in the world or the like. Among these approaches, obviously, is inference to the best current explanation, which is where I find that theories get their power from. They unify apparently disparate observations and allow us to draw forth patterns that may then be used in predictions and may then be tested and seen as more or less reliable up to relevant statistical distributions. As for debates on probability, I suggest that plausibility and reliability are good enough to in many cases achieve moral certainty on which we would be irresponsible to act as though something X supported to that degree were false. If numbers can be assigned, fine, but if we can only say more or less highly likely to be reliable, that is good enough for government work. KFkairosfocus_{November 27, 2017
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:)Upright BiPed_{November 27, 2017
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CR "What is knowledge? Knowledge is information that, when embedding in a storage medium, plays a causal role in being retained." Except it does not. Information presupposes an observer in exactly the same way as knowledge presupposes a knower. This is the epistemic cut which you ignore and which must exist in reality for 'information' to be 'information'. The causal role in information being retained is played by the organization of the system of information translation, not by information itself. Organization in this case consists in symbolic boundary conditions on the motion of particles of matter within the system. In order to interpret any material configuration as data, a system must be properly organized. Failing to see that leads to category errors your reasoning exhibits. This organization makes sure that the role of interpreter exists in the system in addition to the material medium itself. The issue you repeatedly fail to acknowledge is that without an interpreter (knower, observer) information is nothing. The real difficulty for one who subscribes to views similar to yours is in explaining the semantic closure that biological information translation must possess to enable self-reproducibility. The biological data must contain a specification of the part of the next-generation system that will interpret the data.EugeneS_{November 27, 2017
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CR, again, no. Knowledge is subject to investigation. Summary of the results of such is not a mere question-begging definition. Knowledge is readily observed to be known, i.e. require knowers. It is easily seen that knowers accept as at least credibly true and reliable, what they claim to know. Similarly, there is a difference between opinion and knowledge, readily seen to be due to warrant that grounds the truth claim to some substantial degree. Further, you are speaking above of information in some sort of processing system. Such systems per observation are created by knowers in the sense described in brief just now. Further to this, to get complex info systems to function requires troubleshooting as a rule, and much further knowledge. Thus the focus on stored information begs the question of knowledge by distractive focus on the fine tuning implicit in complex specified organisation that achieves function, and is info-rich. Moreover, we know that computational substrates blindly process signals under the garbage in garbage out [GIGO] principle, they do not reason as such, they have no common sense they will process rubbish and output gibberish until the system crashes, whether a digital computer or an electromechanical analogue or a neural network array. That is, the unified concept and understanding driving inference and constrained by duty to truth and right etc -- the reasoning -- is not found in the grinding of gears one against the other [as Leibniz put it in Monadology 300+ years ago]. In short, you have been looking at an artifact of knowledge, not knowledge and have tried to put together a failed operational definition that is simply off on a tangent. And this has been pointed out any number of times to you. KF PS: Likewise, to suggest that the blind mechanism of Darwinist chance non-foresighted variation of whatever sort filtered by equally blind and non-foresighted differential reproductive success is to be equated to CRITICISM, is utter violence to language and meaning to the point where it has to be seen to be believed. Let me clip, as afterthought: "Neo-Darwinism is an example of variation and criticism." Astonishing. Similarly, you have tried to use modifiers to inject an idiosyncratic redefinition of knowledge -- explanatory vs non explanatory. This sort of word game seems to be a general problem with your thought, you keep on putting up idiosyncratic usages that you insist be treated as if they were on par with anything else out there. You need to pause and think again on the consequences of doing violence to language by trying to invent a newspeak and trashing consequential meanings. Freedom is slavery comes to mind, as does 2 + 2 = whatever the Party finds useful. In short, you seem to have overlooked how will to power takes over once you sever the concept that in order to convey truth, language . . . vehicle of reasoning . . . must respond to and accurately represent reality, requiring voluntary social collaboration under mutually accepted moral government in service to truth. FYI, to lie is to speak with disregard to truth in hope of profiting by what is said or suggested being taken as true.kairosfocus_{November 27, 2017
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@KF Is the OP a real question directed at myself? Or is it rhetorical because you already know the answer? Arguing that what I presented isn't knowledge because knowledge is defined as X, Y and Z is argument by definition. What Popper did was to present a unification. Just like Newton's unified the motion of orbiting planets and falling apples. This is why epistemology is such a key issue in regards to evolution. It's not that the features of organisms do not represent knowledge. Thats not my position at all. My position is that knowledge isn't only in the realm of knowing subjects. Nor does it only come from intelligent sources. It's not that I'm ignoring what we know about designers. We disagree about how designers create knowledge and the universal explanation of it includes variation and criticisms that are independent of people. Neo-Darwinism is an example of variation and criticism. While only people can create explanatory knowledge, both people and Darwinism can create non-explanatory knowledge. Useful rules of thumb have limited reach, but it still useful.critical rationalist_{November 26, 2017
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@Origenes You seem to think there is a paradox here, or three. First, I'm a fallibilist about fallibilism. From this article....
The trouble is that error is a subject where issues such as logical paradox, self-reference, and the inherent limits of reason rear their ugly heads in practical situations, and bite. Paradoxes seem to appear when one considers the implications of one’s own fallibility: A fallibilist cannot claim to be infallible even about fallibilism itself. And so, one is forced to doubt that fallibilism is universally true. Which is the same as wondering whether one might be somehow infallible—at least about some things. For instance, can it be true that absolutely anything that you think is true, no matter how certain you are, might be false? What? How might we be mistaken that two plus two is four? Or about other matters of pure logic? That stubbing one’s toe hurts? That there is a force of gravity pulling us to earth? Or that, as the philosopher René Descartes argued, “I think, therefore I am”?
Second, a tradition of criticism is itself subject to criticism.
It’s all about error. We used to think that there was a way to organize ourselves that would minimize errors. This is an infallibilist chimera that has been part of every tyranny since time immemorial, from the “divine right of kings” to centralized economic planning. And it is implemented by many patterns of thought that protect misconceptions in individual minds, making someone blind to evidence that he isn’t Napoleon, or making the scientific crank reinterpret peer review as a conspiracy to keep falsehoods in place. Popper’s answer is: We can hope to detect and eliminate error if we set up traditions of criticism—substantive criticism, directed at the content of ideas, not their sources, and directed at whether they solve the problems that they purport to solve. Here is another apparent paradox, for a tradition is a set of ideas that stay the same, while criticism is an attempt to change ideas. But there is no contradiction. Our systems of checks and balances are steeped in traditions—such as freedom of speech and of the press, elections, and parliamentary procedures, the values behind concepts of contract and of tort—that survive not because they are deferred to but precisely because they are not: They themselves are continually criticized, and either survive criticism (which allows them to be adopted without deference) or are improved (for example, when the franchise is extended, or slavery abolished). Democracy, in this conception, is not a system for enforcing obedience to the authority of the majority. In the bigger picture, it is a mechanism for promoting the creation of consent, by creating objectively better ideas, by eliminating errors from existing ones.
Third, criticisms of ideas that we might know infallibly....
I must now apologize for trying to trick you earlier: All the ideas that I suggested we might know infallibly are in fact falsehoods. “Two plus two” of course isn’t “four” as you’d discover if you wrote “2+2” in an arithmetic test when asked to add two and two. If we were infallible about matters of pure logic, no one would ever fail a logic test either. Stubbing your toe does not always hurt if you are focused on some overriding priority like rescuing a comrade in battle. And as for knowing that “I” exist because I think—note that your knowledge that you think is only a memory of what you did think, a second or so ago, and that can easily be a false memory. (For discussions of some fascinating experiments demonstrating this, see Daniel Dennett’s book Brainstorms.) Moreover, if you think you are Napoleon, the person you think must exist because you think, doesn’t exist.
critical rationalist_{November 26, 2017
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CR, you are repeating things that have already been addressed and corrected point by point. The definition you put up fails in many ways, and you seem to misunderstand why knowledge is required to simultaneously meet several criteria, including that a subject having knowledge actually accepts it as being true -- that is, believes it. Belief here is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Warrant (meeting epistemic duties relevant to grounding credible truth to the relevant degree), credible truth and reliability as a facet of both, count too. KFkairosfocus_{November 26, 2017
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What is knowledge? Knowledge is information that, when embedding in a storage medium, plays a causal role in being retained. This is nothing new, as I have presented this at least a dozen times.critical rationalist_{November 26, 2017
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So, arguably, knowledge is well-warranted, credibly true (and reliable) belief.
Warranted in what sense?
there is an available account (as opposed to internal to the given knower, who may simply accept a message from reliable sources . . . ) that, properly understood, would justify accepting or treating belief x as true in serious contexts.
Does the fact that we have no good criticisms of an idea represent warrant? I don't think that would be what you consider knowledge. Specifically, the contents of "available accounts" (explanatory theories) do not come from observations, or any other source. We guess. So, how can such an explanation be warranted when all we can do is criticize our theories in hope of finding errors in them? If not, you must be appealing to induction of some sort... But its unclear how that makes a theory credible.
Credibly true — the warrant for and circumstances of belief x are such that we can have good confidence that the belief is likely to be true or capture enough truth that we are entitled to trust it.
The theory that remains isn't better supported by observations than others. it is merely less wrong and remains because we lack good criticism of it. Even then, we often keep problematic theories because we lack alternatives that not only equally explain as well as the current explanation, but explain the very differences that make the theory problematic. Only in that case does knowledge move forward to explain even more do those observations refute it. From the article....
Deutsch: "A test of a theory is an experiment whose result could make the theory problematic. A crucial test – the centrepiece of scientific experimentation – can, on this view, take place only when there are at least two good explanations of the same explicandum (good, that is, apart from the fact of each other’s existence). Ideally it is an experiment such that every possible result will make all but one of those theories problematic, in which case the others will have been (tentatively) refuted. " Now this is an amazingly important and clear articulation of what experiments are. Experiments test theories. But what can the results do? Well interestingly if the result of an experiment conflicts with a theory it does not necessarily rule out the theory. So take for example the more or less frequent media hype that can surround certain high-energy physics observations that are reported as "Einstein proved false!". Perhaps one of the more famous examples (detailed here) was about an experiment at the Large Hadron Collider where neutrinos apparently exceeded the speed of light in violation of special relativity (it turned out there was a cable incorrectly connected or some such). Now the results were actually false. But even if the results were true and neutrinos exceeded the speed of light this would not "prove" Einstein false or possibly cause us to reject relativity theory. What it would do is make relativity theory "problematic". Relativity theory would still be the best theory about how fast things can move and what happens to things as they move relative to one another. So a test of a theory: an experiment - even if it disagrees with the best theory going - is not a reason to reject that theory. After all, if you reject that theory, then what theory should you use? The second best theory? There is almost never a second best theory. But even if there were: that second best theory is "second best" for some good set of reasons. And if those reasons include things like "it cannot explain phenomena a, b, c, d, e and f while the first best theory can" then there still won't be a reason to turn to that theory in place of the first best. There is only one way an experimental test of a theory can result in us rejecting our best theory. And that is when we actually have an equally best rival theory that explains everything our other best theory does PLUS it explains the outcome of the new experimental test. This kind of experiment is called a "crucial test". It is that rare type of test - like Eddington's observation of the bending of light - that allows us to decide between two theories that make incompatible predictions about the outcome of the test but that otherwise are (until that moment) equally able to account for all other phenomena. As it is now, of course, General Relativity is able to account for far far more than the mere bending of starlight during eclipses over what Newton's theory can. Newton's Universal Gravity, as brilliant as it is (it was able to get man to the moon) is left in the distant dust by Einstein's General Relativity (who could not only get us to the moon if we so wanted but can give us GPS, explain neutron stars and black holes and much more besides - none of which Newton's theory can come close to accomplishing). Deutsch:
"the existence of a problem with a theory has little import besides, as I said, informing research programmes – unless both the new and the old explicanda are well explained by a rival theory. In that case the problem becomes grounds for considering the problematic theory tentatively refuted "
Again: this deemphasises the supposed centrality of the experiment to the whole project of science. Science is a knowledge creation (in the form of bold explanations) machine. The genuinely difficult part is positing grand explanations for what is actually going on in the world. Of course those explanations need to be testable - but if the explanations accounts for the phenomena and survives the tests the explanation is the central concern of civilisation who can then go about actually making practical use of the science (to, for example, create technology, treat disease, solve other problems and so forth). An experiment that disagrees with some great theory just makes the theory problematic. But if we did find some experiment that, for example, could not be explained by quantum theory - or seemed to refute quantum theory - that would be a problem for quantum theory. But not a grounds for rejecting it. The (now problematic) quantum theory would still be used to create technologies and solve problems and, essentially, everyone would carry on more or less as before with respect to the theory and regard it as a genuine description of reality. But there would be an unsolved problem. And, once more as observed below and above - the problem just might be with the apparatus. And if it's not a problem with the apparatus it could be a problem with us not understanding some subtlety of the theory. Or, it could be the theory is genuinely not the best theory because someone, somewhere, has just created something better but is yet to publish it. And when they do, it will do all that quantum theory ever did and explain the problematic result that quantum theory couldn't. And in that case, the test that created the problem in the first place now becomes a crucial test. Deutsch:
"In contrast, the traditional (inductivist) account of what happens when experiments raise a problem is in summary: that from an apparent unexplained regularity, we are supposed to ‘induce’ that the regularity is universal (or, according to ‘Bayesian’ inductivism, to increase our credence for theories predicting that); while from an apparent irregularity, we are supposed to drop the theory that had predicted regularity (or to reduce our credence for it). Such procedures would neither necessitate nor yield any explanation. "
This is crucial. Under the prevailing view of how science works - if an experiment critically wounds a theory such that it is once-and-for-all falsified and so liable to be rejected - then what can we jump to? If we reject our best theory and there is no rival - the process of rejection does not provide any new explanation for us. The negation of a theory is not a new theory.
It's unclear how this fits your credible view of knowledge.
Reliable — the warrant for x is such that if we act on the belief that-x in a consequential situation, we are unlikely to be let down.
Assigning probability to theories isn't actually useful in the vast majority of cases.
And this is the most crucial point to consider. Bayes theorem cannot possibly assign a probability to the truth of a theory we do not yet have. And theories we do not yet have are actually the very business of scientists to create. That’s the function of science: to explain things (and the business of scientists is to find explanations for things not already known). To solve problems. And this requires creativity. The notion that science is about weighing up existing ideas only and assigning to them probabilities (to what end?) is flat out false. It’s never done and nor does it need to be done. Not ever in reality. Even in medicine, where such a thing could conceivably be useful: doctors are not performing calculations using Bayes’ theorem in order to decide on a treatment regime. No. Instead what they actually do (and this mirrors what happens elsewhere in science from oceanography to ornithology) is that experimental tests or observations (evidence!) of some kind rule out theories until a best one is left standing. You might have 10 possible diseases. We do a test. We rule out 9. We treat what’s left. Does that mean you as the patient are certainly suffering from “what’s left”? No! Mistakes can be made and you just might (in a highly unlikely case) have a disease we never thought of in the first place or that we’ve never encountered before. That is: something not in the original list. This of course, is not that uncommon. A doctor is not there putting probabilities next to the 10 and then deciding that we should treat the highest probability one as the most true one. Instead, as I said, some are actually ruled out decisively by experiment. If they are not then the following rare situation can happen: We have 3 diseases a patient might possibly have that we cannot distinguish between given the symptoms. We treat the most dangerous first. If the patient doesn’t respond we try the second worst. Then the third. If no treatment works, we’re in a bind. We need to think creatively. But this is what happens. Probability need not enter into it. It's not what the patient most likely has, but also what the patient is most threatened by. Again, imagine we have 3 possible diseases that are possible diagnoses. And Bayes’ somehow said “It’s a 70% chance you have X, 50% you have Y and 30% you have Z”. Then what? Well surely it depends on exactly what X, Y and Z are. If Z is something that will kill you in 2 days flat if you don’t get the one medicine that will cure it - then it needs to be the priority over X which is relatively harmless. As a way of moving people to action, Bayes’ is also rather useless much of the time. Not all of the time. Sometimes there are important places where it can play a role. But it can never play a role in discovering that the actual answer to our patient who might have been suffering X, Y or Z is that they had condition W the whole time. Bayes' is actually a distraction from even looking in that direction. What Bayes theorem cannot do is actually perform the function that scientists and philosophers who call themselves Bayesian say it can: to be a philosophy of inferring the best explanation. It cannot possibly create new explanations (which is, and should be the focus of science as much as gathering new evidence) and nor can it tell us what we should do. If we have a problem and we have no actual solution to it, Bayes’ theorem cannot possibly help. All it can do is assign probabilities to existing ideas (none of which are regarded as actual solutions). But why would one want to assign probabilities to possible solutions, none of which are known to work? There can be no reason other than if one wanted, to say, wager on which idea is likely to be falsified first, perhaps. But we must know - following Faraday and Popper, and Feynman and Deutsch: we must expect all of them will be falsified eventually. Your theories should be held on the tips of your fingers, so said Faraday, so that the merest breath of fact can blow them away. So no amount of assigning 99% probabilities to the truth of them makes them anymore "certain" or "likely to be true". We need to have a pragmatic approach: take the best theory seriously as an explanation of reality and use it to solve problems and create solutions and technology - but don't pretend that the content is "certain" to any degree. Just useful with some truth more than those other theories that have gone before and fallen to the sword of criticism and testing. When we have actual solutions in science they go by a generic honorific title. We call them “The scientific theory of…”. So for example we have “The scientific theory of gravity” (it’s given name is General Relativity). We don’t need to assign a probability to it being true. We regard it as provisionally true knowing it is superior to all other rivals (insofar as there are any (and there are not!)) and we use it as if it’s true (this is pragmatic). But actually we expect that one day we will find it false. Just as we did with Newton. But this philosophy that our best theories are likely misconceptions in some way has no practical effect on what we do with them. We take them seriously as conditional truths about the world. As David Deutsch has said: it would have been preferable if long ago we'd all just decided to call scientific theories "scientific misconceptions" instead. It would save much in the way of so many of these debates. We'd all know that our best explanations, though better and closer to true than others that went before, are nonetheless able to be superseded by better ideas eventually.

Belief — that which is accepted, perceived, or held to be so; often in this context, for good reason.
As I've illustrated before, if you order the plans for a car, but are accidentally shipped the plans for a boat instead, does your belief that the plan will result in a car cause the outcome to be anything but a boat? No it will not. How about your intent to build a car? No, you will still end up with a boat. Raw materials will only be transformed into a car when the requisite knowledge is actually present there. So, knowledge is independent of anyone's beliefcritical rationalist_{November 26, 2017
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Belfast, if responsibly warranted, credibly true and reliable, yes. That is a reason for honourable courtship and it is one reason why short-circuiting building of relationship through resort to intense physical intimacies is predictably highly counter-productive. KFkairosfocus_{November 26, 2017
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