Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Human Consciousness

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(From In the Beginning … ):

For the layman, it is the last step in evolution that is the most difficult to explain. You may be able to convince him that natural selection can explain the appearance of complicated robots, who walk the Earth and write books and build computers, but you will have a harder time convincing him that a mechanical process such as natural selection could cause those robots to become conscious. Human consciousness is in fact the biggest problem of all for Darwinism, but it is hard to say anything “scientific” about consciousness, since we don’t really know what it is, so it is also perhaps the least discussed.

Nevertheless, one way to appreciate the problem it poses for Darwinism or any other mechanical theory of evolution is to ask the question: is it possible that computers will someday experience consciousness? If you believe that a mechanical process such as natural selection could have produced consciousness once, it seems you can’t say it could never happen again, and it might happen faster now, with intelligent designers helping this time. In fact, most Darwinists probably do believe it could and will happen—not because they have a higher opinion of computers than I do: everyone knows that in their most impressive displays of “intelligence,” computers are just doing exactly what they are told to do, nothing more or less. They believe it will happen because they have a lower opinion of humans: they simply dumb down the definition of consciousness, and say that if a computer can pass a “Turing test,” and fool a human at the keyboard in the next room into thinking he is chatting with another human, then the computer has to be considered to be intelligent, or conscious. With the right software, my laptop may already be able to pass a Turing test, and convince me that I am Instant Messaging another human. If I type in “My cat died last week” and the computer responds “I am saddened by the death of your cat,” I’m pretty gullible, that might convince me that I’m talking to another human. But if I look at the software, I might find something like this:

if (verb == ‘died’)
fprintf(1,’I am saddened by the death of your %s’,noun)
end

I’m pretty sure there is more to human consciousness than this, and even if my laptop answers all my questions intelligently, I will still doubt there is “someone” inside my Intel processor who experiences the same consciousness that I do, and who is really saddened by the death of my cat, though I admit I can’t prove that there isn’t.

I really don’t know how to argue with people who believe computers could be conscious. About all I can say is: what about typewriters? Typewriters also do exactly what they are told to do, and have produced some magnificent works of literature. Do you believe that typewriters can also be conscious?

And if you don’t believe that intelligent engineers could ever cause machines to attain consciousness, how can you believe that random mutations could accomplish this?

Comments
F/N: SAR, to try to act as though 2 + 2 = 4 is not a generally and objectively (even, self evidently) true claim because you can choose -- unannounced -- to write the NUMBER 4 with a different symbol that means the same, whether IV in Latin notation, or 11 in base-3 notation, is to highlight just how diversionary the above arguments are. [And if instead you meant what Spaniards call "once" then you have redefined + to mean nonsense, contradictory nonsense.)kairosfocus
September 19, 2010
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CH@360
That you can’t be gotten to see that it’s Chesterton pointing out that scientists are making an argument from false credulity, that is, an argument from knowledge where there is none, and Chesterton pointing out that there is none, is not a fallacy, astounds me.
I thought we were discussing mathematics. If we're done with that, I'm happy to move on to the errors Chesterton made on the science side of things.BarryR
September 19, 2010
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KF@358
If your machines are giving results as grossly in error as that, their “arithmetic” is wrong, period.
Oh, it's certainly wrong, if your only idea of arithmetic is what you've been taught at grammar school. Seymour Cray had several great ideas, but one of his most lucrative was realizing that people would pay more money for faster machines that gave "wrong" answers. He sold a lot of computers. Similar ideas are now incorporated into every processor (including the one you're using) that makes use of non-integer arithmetic.BarryR
September 19, 2010
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Onlookers: Let us ask ourselves a question: why are the objectors above so desperate to avoid squarely facing the reality of self-evident truths? (So desperate that they are evidently willing to cling to absurdities and to use every distraction they can come up with?) Maybe, because of what such truths entail for their preferred worldviews. For instance, start with SET # 1: "Error exists": 1 --> It is of course a blatant and universally accepted fact of life. 2 --> But it is more than that. If we try to deny SET 1, WE PROVIDE AN EXAMPLE OF AN ERROR, THUS AFFIRMING IT. IT IS UNDENIABLY TRUE. 3 --> Thus, objective and even absolute truth exists, as we here have a live example of a truth. 4 --> It is also a well warranted, credible truth, so it is a case of knowable, known truth: knowledge also exists, even in the strong form of justified, true belief. 5 --> Thus, truth and knowledge rise above the level of perceptions and beliefs. 6 --> So, radical relativism, hyperskepticism and the like are all discredited as being false to the reality of knowable, known truth. 7 --> In addition SET 1 is a very humbling truth, so it pulls the sting from the slander that to claim to know truth is to be arrogant and intolerant. If one of the most easily known truths is the possibility of error, then to claim to know such a truth is not to claim to be omniscient or to be closed minded. 8 --> Also, this is an example of a self-evident truth, i.e self evident truths and knowledge of such truths are also real. Which rips up the neat little attempted dichotomy of analytic and synthetic truths and questions on a priori and a posteriori. 9 --> Through that breach in the radical skeptic's defense lines rush a stream of other SET's: non-contradiction at the head, with the excluded middle and ident5ity close on the heels. 10 --> So,now the whole area of knowledge, learning, reasoning and arguing suddenly have a framework of first principles of right reason that we must account to, or descend into absurdity. ____________ And so, much pivots on that issue. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 19, 2010
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BarryR,
Chesterton’s error lies in thinking ideas are inevitable, that it’s impossible to imagine 1+2 not equaling 3. To the extent that he tries to support this, he does so by appeal to incredulity. I’m saying that neither nature nor mathematics are inevitable, which is simply the Chestertonian idea of nature applied to mathematics.
We, as reasoning and rational people, can understand ideas as logical necessities, I guess you've never seen a logical deduction, you know, major premise, minor premise, conclusion, modus tollens, modus ponens, etc., and I suppose you've never encountered the experience of seeing when one thing logically leads to another. As I asked you before, can I determine how large yellow is? And how far it is from London Bridge to Christmas Day? Can you? What's that you say, these are nonsense? Not logical? How do you determine that? When you remove logic, as with atheism, it's not that nothing will be believed, it's that everything will be believed. As for your contention that there are no universal truths (as if that's not attempting to make one), you have provided no argument except to say that Descartes got one, at least, but no others, and thence argue as if what StephenB and I say is somehow wrong, as if you have guidance to what is right, while arguing that there is no right. Barry, what I'm trying to enlighten you on in a nutshell, is this sort of reasoning: saying that truth is context dependent, is saying that one truth is not context dependent, which is the context dependence on all other truth, and applies to all truth in general, except itself. This is the same issue you ran in to with regard to your skepticism of your skepticism; if you say you cannot know about the cogency of your skepticism, you are saying that you're at least not skeptical of the cogency of the skepticism of your skepticism. Because you make anything one level removed is not a refutation, nor is it a real argument, for you still make a tacit exception for yourself. You cannot argue in this way without self refutation, no matter how many removals you make. This is self evident. That you ought not to contradict yourself is a universal truth. This is why you couldn't validly argue against Lewis's De Futilitate as well without using this exact tactic of a one-removed process of skepticism. But this argument might make a comfortable life for those unwilling to concede ultimate truth, but it is shallow and doesn't really look itself in the mirror and asses itself by its own criteria of skepticism.Clive Hayden
September 19, 2010
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BarryR, That you can't be gotten to see that it's Chesterton pointing out that scientists are making an argument from false credulity, that is, an argument from knowledge where there is none, and Chesterton pointing out that there is none, is not a fallacy, astounds me.Clive Hayden
September 19, 2010
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simply point out that to substitute that 2 + 2 = 11, you have redefined symbols. Which symbol did I change? 2 is still 2, in apples or matchsticks. + still means to add and = still means the result follows. The only thing I changed was the context of a different math system.San Antonio Rose
September 19, 2010
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BR: Re: I work with expensive machines where the arithmetic is far stranger than 1+1=3 If your machines are giving results as grossly in error as that, their "arithmetic" is wrong, period. If what you really are referring to is that you are doing work in different algebras and other similar mathematical structures, then that is very different from trying to make arithmetic say: "1 + 1 = 3." Just go out there with a calculator that makes 1 + 1 = 3 and see what happens when you sell it to customers. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 19, 2010
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CH@353
Agreed, it is an argument from incredulity, as Chesterton admits, and it would be rational and logical if you admitted it too
Oh, it's perfectly rational and logical, and it's also wrong. Pointing out that it's a logical fallacy ends the argument (and yes, argument from incredulity is a logical fallacy). That ends the argument. But just in case, I provided a counterexample that applies not only to what I'm able to imagine, but what every scientist who uses decimal numbers on a computer can also imagine. [Yes, there are contexts where an appeal to incredulity is not a fallacy --- usually when you're talking to an expert about their area of expertise, but even there it's a very weak argument. And yes, I could set up a contextual system where Chesterton is absolutely right. Such a system has no obvious utility or elegance, and so I'm free to ignore it.] Cutting and pasting large blocks of Chesterton is not an effective way to convince me that my argument fails, particularly after I've shown his argument relies on a logical fallacy.BarryR
September 19, 2010
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Stephen: So, tell me SAR, is the law of non-contradiction self evident or not? Since my school doesn't offer courses in philosophy, that is one question I will let you work out with Mr. Oxford.San Antonio Rose
September 19, 2010
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Onlookers: The onward exchanges are just a bit saddening; but are also quite revealing. In particular, it is increasingly clear from the threadbare remarks above, that MF is ignoring what he cannot and/or will not address. (Let us ask: after months, is he able to address the point that "Error exists" is a self-evident truth, one undeniable on pain of self-refutation by counter example? After many days, can he show how, without injecting an irrelevancy by way of arbitrary, contradictory redefinition of "+" -- and let us not forget the one who (unannounced) resorted to stating 4 in base-3 notation, as though that changed the meaning!!!! -- 2 + 2 = 4 is not necessarily true on the ordinary meaning of 2, +, = and 4?) Truly, truly sad. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 19, 2010
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CH@351
I regret that you don’t know any philosophy
Amazing what you can do when you don't know any philosophy: consult textbooks from the philosophy classes you've taken, read the peer-reviewed literature to find evidence and support, read and make arguments using formal notation, define terms, provide counterexamples that aren't trivially refuted... I wish someone else here didn't know any philosophy either. It would make this conversation much more interesting.
If you read ... especially the chapter The Ethics of Elfland
That's what I'm quoting from.
everything in nature was and is perfectly inevitable as ideas
No philosopher I'm aware of holds that nature is inevitable. I certainly don't hold that position. So I'm going to ignore that part of Chesterton's argument. Chesterton's error lies in thinking ideas are inevitable, that it's impossible to imagine 1+2 not equaling 3. To the extent that he tries to support this, he does so by appeal to incredulity. I'm saying that neither nature nor mathematics are inevitable, which is simply the Chestertonian idea of nature applied to mathematics.
The first line of argument contradicts itself, because it presupposes logic and uses it for an argument
At this point I don't know which line you're talking about. I have several logics to chose from, though, and since they're strictly limited to specific contexts contradiction is rarely an issue.
the second argument you attempted to make at first, and abandoned it in short order and deferred to your friends at talk.origins
I deferred to talk.origins on the history of citations in scientific literature and reported back on the results. I may post a summary of this exchange there on Monday, but that requires I read a few more papers on evolutionary epistemology and I don't know that I'll be able to get to that by Monday.
actual reply or argument that sequences in nature are logical necessities.
Sequences? Oh, as Chesterton used it:
It might be stated this way. There are certain sequences or developments (cases of one thing following another), which are, in the true sense of the word, reasonable. They are, in the true sense of the word, necessary. Such are mathematical and merely logical sequences.
I thought this entire conversation had to do with the fact that the sequence 2+2=4 was not necessary and 2+2=147 was possible.
If 1+1=147, or any other number that could be inserted, then nothing means anything, because nothing is anything in particular, and becomes vacuous, thus there is not even an argument to be made that 1+1=147, because none of these properties would actually be anything in particular.
You're repeating yourself. I answered this at least a couple of times and you've not given a response to those answers. So here we go again: You can try to order your worldview so that meaning must be rooted in universals. So long as you don't try to enumerate what these universals are, and you don't bring the ones you do enumerate out for critical scrutiny, you can probably live a pretty happy life. However, once you start asking questions, the set of possible universals seems pretty puny. I can construct mathematical and logical systems, and looking back through history I can see a lot of other people doing the same thing. These are not universally true --- and in fact are very much influenced by the environment they were created in. (And, like religion, an ignorance of the history of mathematics will mislead you into thinking that the mathematics you were raised with is obvious, perfect and universal.) Once you decide to abandon universals, can anything really mean anything? Sure. So we need a way of figuring out which of these systems are interesting and which we should ignore. I like to use a combination of utility and elegance (neither of which are universal). Thus, I have no difficulty saying: 2+2=4 is both useful in most day-to-day situations and incredibly elegant as part of the theory of integers. 2+2=147 is useful in pointing out the contextual nature of truth, but doesn't have much utility or elegance beyond that. 0>x>y>z s.t. x+y=z and y=z has a great deal of practical utility in specific contexts, and doesn't fail to have a certain imperious elegance..... All three statements are true within specific contexts. All three statements may be true universally, but I have no way of determining this. So. At this point you and StephanB have convinced me that you're not going to be able to provide examples of "universal truth" or "universal law" or "self-evident universals". Descartes couldn't do that either, so that's nothing to be ashamed of. You might want to make a different argument: that universals are somehow better, even though we can't know what they are. I think that's going to be a tough point to carry, and I can't give you any advice as to how to get started, but at least it would be less futile than you continuing to repeat the same points that I've answered multiple times.BarryR
September 19, 2010
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BarryR,
That’s a textbook argument from incredulity. I have no difficulty imagining either (and I work with expensive machines where the arithmetic is far stranger than 1+1=3). That is Chesterton’s argument. It is an argument from incredulity. As such, it relies on be having at least as much incredulity as Chesterton. I don’t. Thus, the argument fails.
Agreed, it is an argument from incredulity, as Chesterton admits, and it would be rational and logical if you admitted it too, for some things we do not know, and cannot know in the same way that we know other things that we actually understand, such as logic. This, of course, includes you and everyone else.
"It is not a "law," for we do not understand its general formula. It is not a necessity, for though we can count on it happening practically, we have no right to say that it must always happen. It is no argument for unalterable law (as Huxley fancied) that we count on the ordinary course of things. We do not count on it; we bet on it. We risk the remote possibility of a miracle as we do that of a poisoned pancake or a world-destroying comet. We leave it out of account, not because it is a miracle, and therefore an impossibility, but because it is a miracle, and therefore an exception. All the terms used in the science books, "law," "necessity," "order," "tendency," and so on, are really unintellectual, because they assume an inner synthesis, which we do not possess.
The confusion and actual misunderstanding comes into play when scientists forget their incredulity, and mistake observation of nature as logical explanations of nature, that is, as mental necessities:
I deny altogether that this is fantastic or even mystical. We may have some mysticism later on; but this fairy-tale language about things is simply rational and agnostic. It is the only way I can express in words my clear and definite perception that one thing is quite distinct from another; that there is no logical connection between flying and laying eggs. It is the man who talks about "a law" that he has never seen who is the mystic. Nay, the ordinary scientific man is strictly a sentimentalist. He is a sentimentalist in this essential sense, that he is soaked and swept away by mere associations. He has so often seen birds fly and lay eggs that he feels as if there must be some dreamy, tender connection between the two ideas, whereas there is none. A forlorn lover might be unable to dissociate the moon from lost love; so the materialist is unable to dissociate the moon from the tide. In both cases there is no connection, except that one has seen them together. A sentimentalist might shed tears at the smell of apple-blossom, because, by a dark association of his own, it reminded him of his boyhood. So the materialist professor (though he conceals his tears) is yet a sentimentalist, because, by a dark association of his own, apple-blossoms remind him of apples.
Thus, your argument fails.
This elementary wonder, however, is not a mere fancy derived from the fairy tales; on the contrary, all the fire of the fairy tales is derived from this. Just as we all like love tales because there is an instinct of sex, we all like astonishing tales because they touch the nerve of the ancient instinct of astonishment. This is proved by the fact that when we are very young children we do not need fairy tales: we only need tales. Mere life is interesting enough. A child of seven is excited by being told that Tommy opened a door and saw a dragon. But a child of three is excited by being told that Tommy opened a door. Boys like romantic tales; but babies like realistic tales--because they find them romantic. In fact, a baby is about the only person, I should think, to whom a modern realistic novel could be read without boring him. This proves that even nursery tales only echo an almost pre-natal leap of interest and amazement. These tales say that apples were golden only to refresh the forgotten moment when we found that they were green. They make rivers run with wine only to make us remember, for one wild moment, that they run with water. I have said that this is wholly reasonable and even agnostic. And, indeed, on this point I am all for the higher agnosticism; its better name is Ignorance.
All that we call common sense and rationality and practicality and positivism only means that for certain dead levels of our life we forget that we have forgotten. All that we call spirit and art and ecstasy only means that for one awful instant we remember that we forget.
Clive Hayden
September 19, 2010
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CH@350
I still don’t see an argument
At this point I think it's best if I just cut and paste. Here’s the nub:
You cannot IMAGINE two and one not making three. But you can easily imagine trees not growing fruit;
That’s a textbook argument from incredulity. I have no difficulty imagining either (and I work with expensive machines where the arithmetic is far stranger than 1+1=3). That is Chesterton's argument. It is an argument from incredulity. As such, it relies on be having at least as much incredulity as Chesterton. I don't. Thus, the argument fails.BarryR
September 19, 2010
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BarryR,
The more I think about it, the more I think that I’m more Chestertonian than Chesterton.
That’s a tolerably good definition of mathematics, and I regret that Chesterton didn’t know any or he might have written a much more interesting essay. I’m glad that 1+1=2 because I understand that 1+1 could have been 147, and the decision is not one that can be appealed to the real world, only to the storyteller (the mathematician). If the internal logic of the story (theorem) is sound, the story rings true, and it doesn’t matter if the (real or metaphorical) snow is black or white or plaid. Thank you for reminding me to revisit that.
I regret that you don't know any philosophy, and get Chesterton exactly backwards. If you read the book Orthodoxy, and especially the chapter The Ethics of Elfland, you'll see that the argument he is making is that natural things, physical occurrences, are opaque to our philosophy as to seeing the inner synthesis as we do with something that we can perceive with our intellect, such as mathematics. I still feel like I'm having to drag you out of the mire of materialism here, by repeating the same thing five or six times. You have yet to make an argument against him, except to say that logical sequences don't really exist even in philosophy (apparently there is no such thing as a deductive argument, at all, ever, that was true) and that mathematics doesn't exist, but that everything in nature was and is perfectly inevitable as ideas. The first line of argument contradicts itself, because it presupposes logic and uses it for an argument, albeit a bad one, and the second argument you attempted to make at first, and abandoned it in short order and deferred to your friends at talk.origins, and as yet I've not seen an actual reply or argument that sequences in nature are logical necessities. The confusion being made here is in thinking that the laws of nature are the laws of thought, and that to imagine something in nature as being different than it is, is the same as imagining a logical impossibility. It, of course, isn't, as any philosopher worth his weight knows. If 1+1=147, or any other number that could be inserted, then nothing means anything, because nothing is anything in particular, and becomes vacuous, thus there is not even an argument to be made that 1+1=147, because none of these properties would actually be anything in particular. You might as well say that flim + flam = flum. You're talking confusedly about things that don't exist, even as place holders, assuming your argument.Clive Hayden
September 19, 2010
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BarryR,
Backing up a bit and reading Chesterton in context, I now realize that he’s writing polemic, not philosophy, and the style he has chosen in a perfectly reasonable one for polemic. Here’s the nub:
You cannot IMAGINE two and one not making three. But you can easily imagine trees not growing fruit;
That’s a textbook argument from incredulity. I have no difficulty imagining either (and I work with expensive machines where the arithmetic is far stranger than 1+1=3). This passage may be more telling:
It is a dreadful thing to say that Mr. W.B.Yeats does not understand fairyland. But I do say it. He is an ironical Irishman, full of intellectual reactions. He is not stupid enough to understand fairyland. Fairies prefer people of the yokel type like myself; people who gape and grin and do as they are told.
I don’t believe he’s intending either passage to be read literally, or, perhaps I should say that I don’t think either passage reflects what he actually believes. This is emphatically written for an audience, an audience who wants to be reassured. But no, I don’t think there’s an English professor or philosopher who would mistake this for philosophy.
I do think so, so, where are we now? I still don't see an argument, unless your argument is "Chesterton didn't really mean anything he said, because he was writing to people." Even a surface reading would conclude that he's deadly serious, but it's his way to be humorous at the same time, he can't help but laugh at folks enraptured in scientism, and he pokes fun at himself too, but make no mistake, his jovial attitude is not a dismissal of his intellect. He was known as "The Happy Man" which permeated every inch of his philosophy. When are you going to address the argument itself?Clive Hayden
September 19, 2010
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#340 (cont) I forgot the "little in common" aspect. I sharply disagree with Gpuccio and many others. But at least I understand what they are saying. I really struggle to understand what KF is saying much of the time. I am sort of borderline with you - which is why I keep on asking what you mean. With KF it would be continuous. Must go - I really have run out of time!markf
September 19, 2010
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StephanB@342 Well, now you have me curious: how could you have taken both graduate and undergraduate classes in philosophy that resulted in an appreciation of syllogisms and Adler? I'm sorry your education hasn't served you better than it has. On the one hand, I'm curious about what classes you took and where, but on the other hand there's not much that can be done about it now, so perhaps it's best to let it go. If you'd like to continue discussing this particular topic offline, I can be reached at cartographical at gmail dot com.BarryR
September 19, 2010
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#338 a) KF's posts are usually very time consuming to read - by an order of magnitude compared to most others. They are long, full of references which need following up and often written in dense abstract language. b) I think of responding to a comment as a committment to engage in some kind of dialogue for a bit (with some exceptions for a light-hearted or trival comment). Actually committment is the wrong word - it is psychologically hard to give up an ongoing argument. You get drawn into it. So I have started responding to your posts after a period of not doing so. c) Right at the moment I have a lot of time. I work freelance and I hope this is the exception not the rule! KF is not the only one I avoid. They may all, including KF, have great points to make. I just think this thing would dominate your life if you got into a debate with everyone. Surely you have people you avoid being drawn into discussion with?markf
September 19, 2010
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StephanB Non-contradiction is a property of systems, not a universal law. In some contexts it's useful. In other contexts, it's not. It's not useful for your computer, which implement (non-modular) arithmetic as follows: ExEyEx | 0<x<y<z s.t. x+y=z and y=z. Spelled out, there exists positive values for x, y and z such that y=z and x+y=z. On your computer, that's not a contradiction, that's a feature (it allows your computer to work with numbers other than integers). In your grammar school arithmetic, that's a contradiction.BarryR
September 19, 2010
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---Markf: "Rather it is nonsensical thing to say [Jupiter can exist and not exist at the same time] and I do not know what it would be like to believe it. Why is it nonsensical?StephenB
September 19, 2010
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---Markf: "I can’t read everyone’s response to everything. It is nothing personal against KF – I just think we have so little in common that there is no basis for an interesting discussion . . ." Mark, in all honesty, it really is difficult to make the case that you are ignoring KF's correctives, arguments, and refutations of arguments on the grounds that you are short on time and have "little in common" with him. On this thread alone, you have probably invested fifty-fold the amount of time necessary to read one of KFs posts. On the other hand, the purpose of debate is to pair contrasting views from advocates who, by definition, are likely to have little "in common."StephenB
September 19, 2010
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#333 Stephenb I keep on meaning to come back to the law of non-contradiction. I don't know what others have been saying, but I do not hold that Jupiter can exist and not exist at the same time. But this is not because of a law. That suggests that if the law were changed then I could belief it. Rather it is nonsensical thing to say and I do not know what it would be like to believe it.markf
September 19, 2010
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---BarryR: "I’m not quite sure what you meant to communicate, but what came across was: 1. No undergraduate philosophy classes, 2. No graduate philosophy classes, and 3. No graduate degree." Yes, I have a graduate degree. It is a bit difficult to graduate with high honors without actually graduating. There is that law of non-contradiction rearing its ugly head again. Yes, I have taken numerous philosophy courses both at the undergraduate and graduate level. On the other hand, credential checking is your gig, not mine. I would prefer to address substantive points on the table, such as all those unattended hanging chads of yours that I listed @323.StephenB
September 19, 2010
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PS: I will ignore the personalities, and simply point out that to substitute that 2 + 2 = 11, you have redefined symbols.kairosfocus
September 19, 2010
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SAR: Not at all. The point of a self evident truth is that we are intelligent, experienced minded creatures who routinely UNDERSTAND meanings and contexts. Which is a basic fact of life you imply every time you post a message here: you expect to be understood without giving the full context of your remarks -- from the definition of alphabetic glyphs and English words and grammar on up -- without text in the first intance. In short, the objection is based on an exercise in self-referentially inconsistent selective hyperskepticism. And, in the case in view, 2 + 2 = 4, that meaning and context is the property of just about every 5 year old who has had the privilege of schooling. So, the objection is specious and self-defeating. Indeed, it aptly illustrates how those who choose to object to a self-evident truth are forced to resort to absurdity. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 19, 2010
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---San Antonio Rose: "If you fail to completely state the context, then the truth is hardly self-evident." So, tell me SAR, is the law of non-contradiction self evident or not? Your friends on this thread say that it is not self evident. They believe that, in principle, the planet Jupiter could exist and not exist at the same time and under the same formal circumstances. For them, there is no logical law to prevent us from saying otherwise. Do you agree with them?StephenB
September 19, 2010
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once we use the relevant symbols in their usual ways [and as not one of those reading misunderstands!], the claim 2 + 2 = 4 is both true and necessarily true, on pain of absurdity. Nope. I have not changed the meaning of 2 or + or =. And I provided other cases where on different interpretations of the glyphs we do get different results, but that is about a different context. Which is strictly irrelevant to the self-evident nature of the truth that 2 + 2 = 4. If you fail to completely state the context, then the truth is hardly self-evident. Just think of the alien who only understands base 3. If the first thing he heard when he got off his spaceship was you saying "2 + 2 = 4 is self-evidently true," he would think you were the one laboring under the pain of absurdity. So, until you fully explain your context, you aren't being nearly as self evident as you seem to think. The willful injection of distractive red herrings and strawmen to try to undermine a simple and well-warranted point, is therefore not a sign of good intellectual health Is that your way of saying you think I am not smart enough to comment? Pardon, finally, but I must object to your taking unwarranted offense at my pointing out a simple matter. You came across as haughty in your comment to me at 327. If that wasn't your intent, then I accept your apology.San Antonio Rose
September 19, 2010
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SAR: Again, one last time for now: once we use the relevant symbols in their usual ways [and as not one of those reading misunderstands!], the claim 2 + 2 = 4 is both true and necessarily true, on pain of absurdity. (And I provided other cases where on different interpretations of the glyphs we do get different results, but that is about a different context. Which is strictly irrelevant to the self-evident nature of the truth that 2 + 2 = 4.) The willful injection of distractive red herrings and strawmen to try to undermine a simple and well-warranted point, is therefore not a sign of good intellectual health on the part of evolutionary materialists, radical relativists and fellow travelers, as may be seen above. Pardon, finally, but I must object to your taking unwarranted offense at my pointing out a simple matter. At no point have I said or implied anything denigratory. To correct is not to denigrate. G'day GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 19, 2010
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Whoopsie! That should have read "self evidently true when talking to an alien (who is only familiar with geometry) about right angles."San Antonio Rose
September 19, 2010
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