Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Jay Richards

At Mind Matters News: Why many now reject science… do you really want to know? Part 1

COVID demonstrated — as nothing else could — that the “science” was all over the map and didn’t help people avoid panic. Takehome: As the panic receded, the government started setting up a disinformation board to target NON-government sources of panic, thus deepening loss of trust. Read More ›

At Evolution News: C. S. Lewis and the argument for theism from reason

Jay Richards: Natural selection could conceivably select for survival-enhancing behavior. But it has no tool for selecting only the behaviors caused by true beliefs, and weeding out all the others. So if our reasoning faculties came about as most naturalists assume they have, then we have little reason to assume they are reliable in the sense of giving us true beliefs. And that applies to our belief that naturalism is true. Read More ›

Book by classical philosopher of design in nature is now available after 200 years

At Amazon: The Lectures on Natural Theology were not included in the ten-volume Edinburgh Edition of Reid's collected works. Moreover, while two earlier editions of these lectures exist, both contain serious mistakes of transcription and annotation. For these reasons, this carefully revised edition of this important text fills an important gap in the literature. Read More ›

Jay Richards: New evangelical statement on AI avoids major pitfalls

Including irrelevance. "Although the Statement nowhere distinguishes between “weak” and “strong” AI, the signers are clearly (and rightly) skeptical that computers can become conscious moral agents." Read More ›

Jay Richards: A Short Argument Against the Materialist Account of the Mind

You can picture yourself eating a chocolate ice cream sundae: John Searle’s Chinese Room scenario is the most famous argument against the “strong AI” presumption that computation-writ-large-and-fast will become consciousness: … His argument shows that computers work at the level of syntax, whereas human agents work at the level of meaning: … I still find Searle’s argument persuasive, despite decades of attempts by other philosophers to poke holes in it. But there’s another, shorter and more intuitive argument against a materialist account of the mind. It has to do with intentional states. Michael Egnor and others have offered versions of this argument here at Mind Matters and elsewhere but I’d like to boil it down to its bare bones. Then Read More ›