Logic and Reason

Currently, one of the objections on the table to a demonstration on how certain structural and quantitative entities are implicit in there being a distinct possible world is the rejection, dismissal or doubting of certainty of conclusions. This again reflects one of the many problems with thought in our day. Let’s add a quip, for those who doubt that warranted (as opposed to ill-advised) certainty is possible: are you CERTAIN that we cannot be justifiably certain? Accordingly, I took the opportunity to comment in the fallacies discussion thread: [KF, FDT 304:] One of the themes that keeps surfacing is “certainty,” which sets up the issues: warrant, knowledge, reliability, credibility, and responsibility. Given that we ever so often use knowledge in Read More ›

In order to conceptually bridge the Wigner MATH-PHYSICS GAP, it is helpful to see how deeply embedded quantitative and structural properties are in the physical world. The phase space approach is helpful, and a vid on how colliding blocks compute digits of pi (under ideal circumstances) will help. The vid: It helps to look at some screenshots: In this first shot (from a part 1 vid) we see a setup where we have a frictionless plane with a rigid wall to the left and two masses that collide. On the first hitting the second, it will hit and bounce back (elastically) from the wall. A second collision with the first block follows and rebound from the wall. This will continue Read More ›

In the fallacy thread, Scuzzaman has raised the issue of the slippery slope argument, which he argues is not necessarily fallacious. Let’s pause for a vid (without necessarily endorsing all that is said, this is food for thought): Benjamin McLean here connects the issue to the principle of induction and so also to the post-Hume challenge to inductive reasoning. In short, a slippery slope argument is an inductive causal inference from present and past experiences, trends and dynamics to a possible future, inviting us to turn away before it is too late. As in: When we cast the argument in this form, we can then see some of the force in SM’s point: [SM, 77:] The OP [on fallacies] is Read More ›

When we deal with deeply polarised topics such as ID, we face the problem of well-grounded reasoning vs fallacies. A fallacy being a significantly persuasive but fundamentally misleading argument, often as an error of reasoning. (Cf. a classic collection here.) However, too often, fallacies are deliberately used by clever rhetors to mislead the unwary. Likewise we face the challenge of how much warrant is needed for an argument to be credible. All of these are logical challenges. Let us note IEP, as just linked: A fallacy is a kind of error in reasoning. The list of fallacies below contains 224 names of the most common fallacies, and it provides brief explanations and examples of each of them. Fallacies should not be Read More ›

One of the common presumptions of our day is that facts and values are utterly, irreconcilably distinct. That is, that IS and OUGHT are irreconcilably separated by an ugly gulch that cannot be bridged. But, this is again one of those little errors in the beginning that have ruinous consequences as they spread out into our thinking and living in community. Let’s start with Hume’s Guillotine argument from his A Treatise of Human Nature: “In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I Read More ›

Edward Feser has presented a lecture on the immateriality of the mind, which is worth listening to: The papers here and here will flesh out details. The core logic of the argument pivots on the principle of distinct identity, turned to how distinguishable entities are inherently different. Syllogistically: 1: Formal thought processes can have an exact or unambiguous conceptual content. However, 2: Nothing material can have an exact or unambiguous conceptual content. So, 3: Formal thought processes are not material. Worth pondering as we reflect on this season. Enjoy the Christmas season. END

As we continue to explore the significance of logic, the pivotal importance of Mathematics (and of the mathemat-ICAL ordering of reality) has come up. Where, we can best understand mathematics in two frames by using a definition with a bracket: Mathematics is [the study of] the logic of structure and quantity. The study part is cultural, the logic part speaks to an intelligible rational framework inextricably embedded in the existence of a world with distinct identity and then with structures amenable to quantification. So, let us headline a comment from the thread on no 4: 87: >>Let us take a key observation: There is order in the universe and we are good at modelling it mathematically. But that doesn’t mean Read More ›

We live as beings in a world full of other concrete entities, and to do science we must routinely rely on mathematics and so on numbers and other abstract objects. We observe how — as just one example — a fire demonstrates causality (and see that across time causality has been the subject of hot dispute). We note that across science, there are many “effects.” Such puts the logic of being and causality on the table for discussion as part 4 of this series [ cf. 1, 2, 3] — and yes, again, the question arises: why are these themes not a routine part of our education? The logic of being (ontology) speaks to possible vs impossible entities, contingent ones Read More ›

Why is this topic important? (Why a series, now on no 3 (see 1 and 2)?) Here at UD, the phrase “first principles of right reason” and similar ones (e.g. “reason’s rules”) have often come up. Others talk about “the laws of thought,” which in a post-Kant world hints of “the ugly gulch” between the inner world of mental, conscious phenomena and the outer world of things in themselves. In that context, we have often highlighted that evolutionary materialistic scientism is irretrievably self-referentially incoherent and have pointed out how this means it is necessarily false. We have also pointed to “self-evident” first truths and principles, including the principle of distinct identity and its immediate corollaries, non-contradiction and the excluded middle. Read More ›

In a day when first principles of reason are at a steep discount, it is unsurprising to see that inductive reasoning is doubted or dismissed in some quarters. And yet, there is still a huge cultural investment in science, which is generally understood to pivot on inductive reasoning. Where, as the Stanford Enc of Phil notes, in the modern sense, Induction ” includes all inferential processes that “expand knowledge in the face of uncertainty” (Holland et al. 1986: 1), including abductive inference.” That is, inductive reasoning is argument by more or less credible but not certain support, especially empirical support. How could it ever work? A: Surprise — NOT: by being an application of the principle of (stable) distinct identity. Read More ›

One of the commonest objections we meet when we discuss design inferences — especially concerning the genetic code, is that a claim is “just an analogy” (with implied conclusion that analogies are weak or fallacious). This then extends to inductive arguments used. This common error must be corrected and (as will be shown) the principle of distinct identity helps us to do so. Before we show that, let us pause to note from the Stanford Enc of Phil, just to counter-weight the tendency of many objectors to be quickly dismissive of anything said by “one of those IDiots” without bothering to actually address the substantial issue at stake: >>An analogy is a comparison between two objects, or systems of objects, Read More ›

Let us soberly ponder, reading between the lines: Food for thought. END PS: By way of sharpest contrast:

The imposition of evolutionary materialistic scientism (aka naturalism) is one of the key issues driving the march of folly in our civilisation. It is also very difficult to discuss as there are some very powerful rhetorical deflectors at work. Sometimes, then, the best thing we can do is to clip from one of UD’s exchanges and headline it so we can see what is going on from the horse’s mouth: _________________________ It is amusing at first (then on deeper reflection, quite saddening) to trace some of the onward discussion in the thread from which the OP comes: JDK, 94: >>Hi JAD. I don’t think there has been anything in this thread about purposelessness. The OP has been about teleological explanations Read More ›

is our ruinous nightmare. This can be seen through a game, from the conspiracism thread: KF, 86: >> . . . there is a silly little mental game we can consider. [The Crooked Yardstick Effect:] Step one, define that a certain crooked yardstick, S, is the standard of straight, accurate and upright. Once that is done, no stick I that is genuinely so can ever conform to S: I != S. So on the S-standard I will always be rejected. This seems silly, until it is in place on an ideologically tainted matter, ask, how can we move from S to the incommensurable I. Only, by interposing a plumbline P that you are willing to accept is naturally upright and Read More ›

Recently, President Duterte of the Philippines issued a challenge to prove the existence of God. About a week ago, I showed that to believe in God is reasonable and responsible; indeed, he credibly exists.  (BTW, the hits:comments ratio was interesting.) Today, I will explore a bit on what it means for God to be the necessary being at the root of reality. Classically, a necessary being would exist in any possible world, while a contingent one (such as we are) exists in at least one possible world, but would not exist in at least one possible world. This is because contingent beings are causally dependent on external enabling factors. For example, ponder the fire tetrahedron: A fire, being contingent, has Read More ›