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A Simple Argument For Intelligent Design

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When I come across a new idea, I like to see if there are any relatively simple and obvious arguments that can be levied for or against it.  When I first came across ID, this is the simple argument I used that validated it – IMO – as a real phenomenon and a valid scientific concept.

Simply put, I know intelligent design exists – humans (at least, if not other animals) employ it.  I use it directly.   I know that intelligent design as humans employ it can (but not always) generate phenomena that are easily discernible as products of intelligent design.  Anyone who argues that a battleship’s combination of directed specificity and/or complexity is not discernible from the complexity found in the materials after an avalanche is either committing intellectual dishonesty or willful self-delusion – even if the avalanche was deliberately caused, and even if the rocks were afterward deliberately rearranged to maintain their haphazard distribution.

Some have argued that we only “recognize” human design, and that such recognition may not translate to the intelligent design of non-human intelligence.  The easy answer to that is that first, we do not always recognize the product of human design. In fact, we often design things to have a natural appearance. That we may not recognize all intelligent design is a given and simply skirts the issue of that which we can recognize.

Second, it is again either delusion or dishonesty to ignore a simple hypothetical exercise: in some cases, were we to find certain kinds of objects/phenomena [edited for clarity] on distant,  uninhabited and otherwise desolate planets, would we be able to infer that such  were most likely specifically designed by intelligent creatures of some sort for some purpose?

Again, the obvious answer to this except in cases of delusion or or dishonesty is “yes”.   Then the question becomes: without a scientifically valid means of making such a determination, how would one be made? Intuition? Common sense? Is the recognizable difference between such artifacts and those that appear to be natural not a quantifiable commodity? If not, how do we go about making the case that something we find on such a planet is not a naturally-occurring phenomena, especially in cases that are not so obvious?  There must be some scientifically-acceptable means of making such a determination – after all, resources committed to research depend upon a proper categorical determination; it would quite wasteful attempting to explain a derelict alien spacecraft in terms of natural processes – time and money better spent trying to reverse engineer the design for practical use and attempting to discern the purpose of its features.

Thus, after we make the determination that said object/phenomenon is the product of intelligent design, our investigatory heuristic is different from what it would be were we to assume the artifact is not intelligently designed.  A scientific, categorical distinction is obviously important in future research.

The idea that there is no discernible or quantifiable difference between some products of ID and what nature produces without it, or that such a determination is irrelevant, is absurd. One might argue that the method by which ID proponents make the differential evaluation between natural and product of ID (FSCI, dFSCI, Irreducible Complexity, Semiotic System) is incorrect or insufficient, but one can hardly argue such a difference doesn’t exist or is not quantifiable in some way, nor can they argue that it makes no difference to the investigation.  One can hardly argue, IMO, that those attempts to scientifically describe that difference are unreasonable, because they obviously point at least in spirit to that which obviously marks the difference.  IMO, the argument cannot be against ID in spirit, but rather only about the best way to scientifically account for the obvious difference between some cases of ID and otherwise naturally-occurring phenomena, whether or not that “best accounting” indicts some phenomena as “product of design” that many would prefer not to be the case.

The only intellectually honest position is to admit ID exists; that there is some way to describe the differential in a scientific sense to make useful categorical distinctions (as “best explanation”), and then to accept without ideological preference when that differential is used to make such a determination.  If the best explanation for biological life is that it was intelligently designed, then so be it; this should be of no more concern to any true scientist than if a determination is made that some object found on a distant planet was intelligently designed, or if a feature on Mars is best explained as the product of water erosion.  To categorically deny ID as a valid, scientific explanatory category (arrowheads?  geometric patterns found via Google Earth? battleships? crop circles? space shuttle? potential alien artifacts?) is ideological absurdity.

Comments
someone please give me the definitions of: TE = ? FSCO/I Functionally Specified Complex - O =? and I =? not in the Glossary here. thansalan
January 21, 2013
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LT, the issue is, whether you are at all willing to entertain the possibility that on the quite evident signs in such a ship or instrument, we may infer to design. So far, you seem to be trying hard to duck what would be obvious. So, so far I have little confidence that any quantification of the obvious difference will ever satisfy you, which in turn points to an ideological a priori at work. For, I am highly confident that if a ship were found like that, it would become major news. KFkairosfocus
January 21, 2013
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F/N: We should all be aware that first, in Ch 2 of his book, Paley highlighted a self replicating watch as a thought exercise, and pointed out that the additional functionality gives a FURTHER reason to confidently infer design. When we look at the self replicating technology in the cell and its use of codes, algorithms, and complex, functionally specific executing machinery, that is underscored. The first problem then is to explain OOL on observed chance and necessity processes capable of getting the result in some warm little pond, and onward of explaining the origin of major body plans, where the info gaps in question for the genome run like 100 k - 1 M bits, and up to 10 - 100 M bits for the two cases. Changing a few bits at a time within an existing functional body plan is one thing, extrapolating to try to suggest that his accounts for the origin of the complex systems for OOL and onward OO novel body plans is entirely another. There has been enough getting away with that sort of extrapolation without adequate empirical warrant. Hence, of course the now all but four month old unanswered challenge of Sept 23. KFkairosfocus
January 21, 2013
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Artificial or synthetic life would show that these categories aren't fixed-for-all-time but can be revised as science and technology progress. I suppose that from an ID perspective, all biology is technology already. So whereas I'd draw the distinction between natural life and synthetic life, a design theorist might draw the distinction between non-anthrogenic biotechnology and anthropogenic biotechnology (?).Kantian Naturalist
January 21, 2013
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KN @ 86: >to argue that systems that reproduce with mutations and >therefore vary by generation are different from things >constructed according to a plan. So, if the scientists who claim they are creating their own versions of life (self replication, mutation) ever succeed, then you'd change your position?es58
January 21, 2013
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In re: Timaeus @ 73: I like your point about the serious difficulties of appealing to any sort of general rule! In particular, I deeply appreciate this way of putting things:
They [theistic evolutionists] could stress, for example, the difference between organic systems and sculptures, machines, etc. That line of argument would be much more productive for them. And it’s really where they want to head anyway — to argue that systems that reproduce with mutations and therefore vary by generation are different from things constructed according to a plan.
That's where I also want to hang my hat, though I'm not a theistic evolutionist. Among the usual theistic evolutionists, the only book I've read is Miller's Finding Darwin's God, which I enjoyed but I thought the appeal to quantum mechanics was where it jumped the shark. I thought Plantinga's critique of atheistic evolutionists in Where the Conflict Really Lies was exactly right, though I have reasons of my own for not being persuaded by the EAAN. Hans Jonas, in both The Phenomenon of Life and Mortality and Morality, has made a deep and permanent impact on my thinking about these issues, especially his distinction between "the need of reason" (grounding ethics in the ontology of life) and "the luxury of reason" (cosmogonic speculation).Kantian Naturalist
January 21, 2013
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Timeaus @ 73 > Right! You would; I would; and so would any TE, if the TE >was being honest, and not trying to score points in a >debate with ID people Thank you! Totally missed that concession. A similar idea is, that audiences all over the world watched the movie 2001: A Space Odyssey (there's a website about this - I saw the authors present this in 1980) and, when they found the black box on the moon, they called earth and said this is the first evidence for extraterestrial life; Do you think anyone in the theatre stood up and said: Wait! No. We need to analyze to probabilities! ? Not when there was no debate/challenge in the way. It was natural. Even these [incredibly] simple things{the whole point of this thread}] don't occur without intent. How much more so a living thing?es58
January 21, 2013
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There's something very comical about what you have just written, William. I mean it's not really funny at all. It's a valiant effort to explain the limits of your patience and the reason for imposing them, in the face of the absolutely surreal. Despite your patience, it cannot but read a little peremptorily. Do you get my drift. How does one explain the obvious reason for not explaining the obvious, without seeming just a little bit terse!!!!Axel
January 21, 2013
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LT: I appreciate your candor, but I'm not interested in demonstrating the obvious. If we cannot agree that a battleship obviously requires ID in its explanation, we have no common grounds upon which to build a meaningful dialogue, much less debate, about ID.William J Murray
January 21, 2013
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WJM, 80 and 81: I understand you'll say I'm avoiding the questions. I am. And I am because these questions are best answered by an ID theorist, which I am not. It doesn't matter what I agree to, either in principle or otherwise. It only matters what can be demonstrated. So, while I'm avoiding your questions, I think you are avoiding the prior and more significant questions. Can you demonstrate 1? Can you demonstrate 2? Can you demonstrate 3? This is the job of ID theory, and what's more, surely it is one of the great lessons of both philosophy and science that very little in this world is "obvious."LarTanner
January 21, 2013
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Edit for clarity: Third, if you agree to (1) and (2), and excluding biological examples, do you agree that it is reasonable to expect that the commodity necessary to generate the battleship (and other such phenomena), but is not necessary to generate naturally-occurring formations, is in principle a quantifiable commodity?William J Murray
January 21, 2013
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LT said @73:
So, is ID an explanation of a battleship? Yes, no dispute there. Is ID the best explanation of a battleship?
The argument is about the general categories of "ID" vs "natural" explanations. I didn't say that "ID" was a complete explanation of the battleship, only that between the two categories of explanation in question, ID is the best explanation of how it came to be. IOW, is the existence of the battleship better explained through unintelligent, natural processes, or through intelligent, purposeful design and manufacturing? LT said:
But I still think “battleship” is to vague to be really useful in showing the power of ID. What I would like to know, and I imagine many onlookers would too, is what specifically in the battleship or about the battleship has been defined in the ID sense.
The argument isn't about any specific means of evaluating particular objects or phenomena according to any proposed method of evaluation, but only whether or not (1)you are willing to agree that the process of generating the battleship requires the existence and use of the commodity we call intelligent design, and if (2)you agree that such a commodity can be - in principle - quantified. So, in other words: First, do you agree in principle that a battleship cannot reasonably be expected to exist without the direction of intelligent design? Second, do you agree in principle that the difference between a battleship and any other known, inorganic, naturally-occurring objects or phenomena is obvious? Third, if you agree to (1) and (2), and excluding biological examples, do you agree that it is reasonable to expect that the commodity necessary to generate the battleship (and other such phenomena), but is not necessary to generate naturally-occurring formations, is a quantifiable commodity?William J Murray
January 21, 2013
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And the additional part of the question is how to infer design in organisms. That's why I asked above (#29) for example of human beings intelligently designing organic beings. While it's true that we see ID all around us, I am not so certain that we see around us the ID that really matters: ID of living things. I could be made more certain with examples of this second kind of ID, unless the argument is that the second kind of ID is irrelevant for hypothesizing general ID of biological information. If so, I'd like to know why it's irrelevant.LarTanner
January 21, 2013
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KF,
Would they infer that the item is a natural artifact, or a designed one, and why? What’s the difference between the rock slide and the apparent space craft, and can this be reduced to a quantitative metric? Why or why not?
This is exactly the question I am asking you to answer!LarTanner
January 21, 2013
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PS: And just to make the matter even clearer, let us suppose there is a similar expedition on the Moon, and in a similar rock-slide they find, not an apparent vessel, but what looks like an indicating instrument [of moving coil type], one that is definitely not of Terran manufacture. What should they conclude, why, and can the way they are thinking be reduced to the sort of quantitative metric that has been raised? Why or why not? Would their conclusion be for practical purposes of any less certainty than that of their comrades on Mars? What would the Drudge Report headlines for that week say about all this?kairosfocus
January 21, 2013
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LT: As predicted (notice, WJM . . . ). Let us change the imagery slightly, just to make sure the point is patently clear: it is 2060 AD, and the first joint EU-China-Japan-India expedition to Mars is searching nooks and crannies of the Red planet. They come across a rock-slide and at the foot of it, partly buried, is an evident space vessel; with what seem to be heavy armour plating, weapon turrets and ports etc. Would they infer that the item is a natural artifact, or a designed one, and why? What's the difference between the rock slide and the apparent space craft, and can this be reduced to a quantitative metric? Why or why not? KFkairosfocus
January 21, 2013
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T: The truth is, a 500 bit threshold for inferring design on FSCO/I is extremely conservative. So much so in fact that there are no good counter-instances. All this stuff about false positives is in the teeth of that inconvenient little fact, given also that our solar system's resources could sample about one straw's bulk to a haystack 1,000 LY on the side, to the set of possibilities. If you drew straws from such a set and came up short, I am prepared to bet you would say that the outcome was rigged. And, indeed even in cases where false positives do happen, we use the rule of thumb that multiple tests make the test far more powerful. In this case, that is very possible, all over the living cell. Moreover, some of the entities in the cell do classify as machines, nanotech machines using molecular technology, but digital data storage for one key instance, is digital data storage. (And prongs in a Yale type lock are storing data in a very comparable way to the bases in a DNA chain!) KFkairosfocus
January 21, 2013
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WJM@37-
ID is supposed to be the best explanation for the existence of a battleship. Do you dispute that?
What a strange thing to say! I did not know ID was supposed as the best explanation for either a single battleship or for battleships generally. If someone were to ask me to explain the existence of battleships, I might suggest they explore the history of naval warfare. Battleships are systems of technologies. They are by-products of political and economic forces. The ultimate explanation, I think, must be one of many agents throughout design, development, production, and implementation processes; and one that also includes larger historical forces surrounding all these agents. So, is ID an explanation of a battleship? Yes, no dispute there. Is ID the best explanation of a battleship? No, it's too reductionist: there are several intelligent forces at play along with unintelligent temporal and social forces. But I still think "battleship" is to vague to be really useful in showing the power of ID. What I would like to know, and I imagine many onlookers would too, is what specifically in the battleship or about the battleship has been defined in the ID sense. I ask because on the biological side it has never been clear to me what it means to say that biological information is one thing that that was intelligently designed. What feature specifically shows "design" and, by so showing, what does that tell us about how it may have been designed?LarTanner
January 21, 2013
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Kantian Naturalist: Re your reply in #4, I agree that "we can infer that this *artifact* is designed" is circular. The proper formulation would have to be: "We can infer that this *object* is an artifact rather than the result of blind natural processes." Many of your other remarks in in #4, and later, are pertinent as well. But I'd like to make a more general statement about the context of this argument, a context you may or may not be aware of, depending on how much ID-TE and ID-atheist bickering you have monitored. Atheists, and even more often, TEs, have responded to design arguments with a general statement, which they appear to regard as a universal rule: "Inferring design is fine when you know that a designer of a particular kind exists (e.g., you can infer that a chipped rock is an arrowhead because you know that arrow-making cultures exist), but it is not permissible when you don't know anything about the putative designer -- his nature, his motives, or even that he exists." Now, this rule strikes me as invalid, because I can easily think of cases where it fails. Many times ID folks have asked TEs: "Well, if we found an object very much like Mt. Rushmore or Stonehenge or the Pyramids on Mars, wouldn't we be able to infer that the object was the product of design rather than of blind natural laws and chance, even though we knew nothing (as yet) about the designer, or even whether designers other than human beings existed in the universe?" And the TEs always do everything in their power to avoid directly answering that question. They will yap about the design resembling human designs -- but that doesn't get around the general principle that they have enunciated, since we don't have any prior knowledge that the *designers* resemble human beings, and their rule requires prior acquaintance with *designers*, not with similar *designs*. Or they will yap about how, given the number of planets in the universe, there are bound to be intelligent beings somewhere who could have designed such structures. But again, if we don't *know* that such intelligent beings exist (and we don't), then by the TE rule we can't make such arguments. Their very strict rule makes out that we have to be *sure* that other designers exist and that we know something about *the character or motives* of such designers. So they have no "out." They have only two options, given the "Rushmore on Mars" scenario. They must say either: 1. You are right; we could infer design in such a case; our *general rule* is therefore invalid. (But we still think it would apply in the case of organic beings ...) 2. We cannot infer design in such a case. We cannot rule out the possibility that the images of Jefferson, Washington, etc. were carved in the face of a Martian mountain by erosion, earthquakes, cosmic rays, etc. So the TEs are in the unenviable position of either (1) abandoning their arbitrary rule (which they erected to keep design inferences out) or (2) of saying something absolutely stupid. It seems to me that if the TEs would stop focusing on trying to *win the argument* against IDers, and start focusing on trying to address the issues, they would stop advancing silly general rules of reasoning -- which they aren't equipped to offer anyway, being bench scientists with an embarrassingly poor understanding of philosophy, including philosophy of science -- and focus on the concrete. They could stress, for example, the difference between organic systems and sculptures, machines, etc. That line of argument would be much more productive for them. And it's really where they want to head anyway -- to argue that systems that reproduce with mutations and therefore vary by generation are different from things constructed according to a plan. But their silly view that they can cut off the argument with a general rule about design inferences that they haven't properly thought out -- that just wastes everyone's time. I mention this so that you see that some of your remarks here might well conjure up years of frustration in arguments with philosophically dense TEs. That said, I would respond to a couple of your answers from various replies. In 18 you wrote: "I think that if one were to leave a pile of cotton on a seemingly lifeless and barren moon or planet, and then returned later to find that it had been turned into cloth, anyone would just see it as having been purposefully transformed by some intelligent beings." Right! You would; I would; and so would any TE, if the TE was being honest, and not trying to score points in a debate with ID people. But what would be your *justification* for your conclusion? It would surely be "Piles of cotton don't turn themselves into woven cloth by chance plus natural laws; intelligence is needed." You would therefore infer that an intelligent agent had been at work. If you thought that cotton could turn itself into woven cloth without an intelligent agent, you would be forced to give, not an inference, but a probability estimate, e.g., "There is a .0005 probability that this occurred due to blind natural causes, and a .9995 probability that this was due to an intelligent agent." But you haven't done that. You've acted as if we can just *know*, without canvassing all the improbable just-so stories about how cotton *might* have turned into woven cloth, that an intelligent agent was responsible for the product. And you've concluded that, even though, to the best of your knowledge, the intelligent agent cannot have come from earth and you have no prior evidence of other intelligent agents in the universe. So you've inferred design without any prior knowledge of the existence of, or characteristics of, the designer. Nothing you have added changes the epistemological situation. You say we would go out and look for evidence of an alien race who might have made the woven cloth. But suppose you don't find any such evidence? Put another way, suppose you find a television set on Pluto, and not the slightest remnant of any civilization on Pluto -- no ruined dwellings, and not even a rusty old wrench. Nothing. Nada. Zip. So what is the inference? That the television set was made by a series of geological processes, that accidentally smelted, shaped, welded, fastened, arranged, etc. the parts into a television? No, the inference is that an intelligent agent produced the set -- an intelligent agent whose existence we have no knowledge of *other than through the existence of the set itself*. And that's precisely the point of the design inference -- that we can move from object to a designer of the object. You also wrote, in 16: "In short, I don’t see how we could so much as detect, let alone avoid, either false positives or false negatives when it comes to objects found on alien worlds." The fact that we will *sometimes* get false negatives and false positives, depending on the individual case, doesn't mean that there are *no* circumstances in which the inference will be reliable. For example, if I come to my computer to type this reply to you, and when I boot up, instead of my normal desktop, I get a screen saying: "You're shafted, buddy! I deleted all your programs, and all your data, and you can't get on the internet, and further, here are some pictures I took of you in indecorous positions, which I intend to put up on YouTube later today," I can be sure -- surer than any jury is when it sends a man to his death -- that the alterations in my computer weren't caused by random fluctuations at the power plant which imprinted new programming on my computer. I don't have to worry about "false negatives" or "false positives" when I make such a design inference. Nor would I have to worry about "false negatives" or "false positives" if I found, say, a multi-panel pictorial narrative carved into the mountains of Mars. I could be sure that it wasn't weather or volcanoes that produced it. The design inference would be valid. And I wouldn't have to have any prior knowledge of the nature or even of the existence of the carvers. In fact, my only knowledge that the carvers existed would come *from* the carving. Now of course, whether all of this justifies design inferences when we start talking about organic beings is another matter. But I think I've established that the general rule of the TEs -- that we can *never* infer the existence of a designer under *any* circumstance unless we have sure knowledge of the existence of that designer and of some of his characteristics prior to stumbling on the object in question -- is simply a wrong rule. Sometimes we can, in complete ignorance of the existence of the designer or of his characteristics, infer that something is designed, and did not arise through chance and blind natural laws. If you could concede that much, then I could breathe a sigh of relief that you have not sunk from your usual philosophical acuteness down to the level of philosophically philistine TEs.Timaeus
January 21, 2013
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as to:
Graham2 (56): Im appalled by the readiness of the ID crowd (and others) to blithely accept the supernatural. The idea of an intelligence just floating round in space does such violence to all that we have learnt from Science, that you would have to have some stupendously strong evidence to accept it.
Would that 'stupendously strong evidence 'include the success of the entire scientific enterprise itself? (Please see post #64 as well as Stanley Jaki - The Origin Of Science): If you disagree that the success of modern science itself argues very forcefully for the truthfulness of the Christian Theistic presuppositions that birthed modern science, then please provide your empirical evidence, from quantum mechanics (out best 'scientific' description of reality), that naturalism is true and to thus 'scientifically' overturn what is readily apparent to us ID proponenets.,,, The trouble for you in all this would be that quantum mechanics reveals a basis for reality that blatantly defies our concepts of time and space, a blatant defiance which is certainly amicable to believing this universe is dependent on a Being who is not limited by time and space in the first place.,,, No Elvis, considering that 'naturalism', as has been traditional defined, is shown to be false by quantum mechanics, it is you that must come up with 'stupendously strong evidence' to tell us why we should not presuppose design. Moreover, contrary to your belief that belief in Design is irrational, the fact is that Design thinking 'hardwired' into us: Design Thinking Is Hardwired in the Human Brain. How Come? - October 17, 2012 Excerpt: "Even Professional Scientists Are Compelled to See Purpose in Nature, Psychologists Find." The article describes a test by Boston University's psychology department, in which researchers found that "despite years of scientific training, even professional chemists, geologists, and physicists from major universities such as Harvard, MIT, and Yale cannot escape a deep-seated belief that natural phenomena exist for a purpose" ,,, Most interesting, though, are the questions begged by this research. One is whether it is even possible to purge teleology from explanation. http://www.evolutionnews.org/2012/10/design_thinking065381.html Out of the mouths of babes - Do children believe (in God) because they're told to by adults? The evidence suggests otherwise - Justin Barrett - 2008 Excerpt: • Children tend to see natural objects as designed or purposeful in ways that go beyond what their parents teach, as Deborah Kelemen has demonstrated. Rivers exist so that we can go fishing on them, and birds are here to look pretty. • Children doubt that impersonal processes can create order or purpose. Studies with children show that they expect that someone not something is behind natural order. No wonder that Margaret Evans found that children younger than 10 favoured creationist accounts of the origins of animals over evolutionary accounts even when their parents and teachers endorsed evolution. Authorities' testimony didn't carry enough weight to over-ride a natural tendency. • Children know humans are not behind the order so the idea of a creating god (or gods) makes sense to them. Children just need adults to specify which one. • Experimental evidence, including cross-cultural studies, suggests that three-year-olds attribute super, god-like qualities to lots of different beings. Super-power, super-knowledge and super-perception seem to be default assumptions. Children then have to learn that mother is fallible, and dad is not all powerful, and that people will die. So children may be particularly receptive to the idea of a super creator-god. It fits their predilections. • Recent research by Paul Bloom, Jesse Bering, and Emma Cohen suggests that children may also be predisposed to believe in a soul that persists beyond death. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2008/nov/25/religion-children-god-belief An atheist said the following in response to Dr. Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism: 'Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind.' Yet, as noted previously, we find,,, Children are born believers in God, academic claims - Telegraph - November 2008 Excerpt: "The preponderance of scientific evidence for the past 10 years or so has shown that a lot more seems to be built into the natural development of children's minds than we once thought, including a predisposition to see the natural world as designed and purposeful and that some kind of intelligent being is behind that purpose," http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/3512686/Children-are-born-believers-in-God-academic-claims.html 'Believers' gene' will spread religion , says academic - January 2011 Excerpt: The World Values Survey, which covered 82 nations from 1981 to 2004, found that adults who attended religious services more than once a week had 2.5 children on average; while those who went once a month had two; and those who never attended had 1.67. Prof Rowthorn wrote: "The more devout people are, the more children they are likely to have." http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/8252939/Believers-gene-will-spread-religion-says-academic.html Why do atheists have such a low retention rate? - July 2012 Excerpt: Only about 30 percent of those who grow up in an atheist household remain atheists as adults. This “retention rate” was the lowest among the 20 separate categories in the study. https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/why-do-atheists-have-such-a-low-retention-rate/ Thus either the atheist is right and 'naturalism' (at least a 'naturalism that includes God) is producing a true belief, and that true belief is Theism, since atheists have a 'praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind', or Dr. Plantinga is right and there is no guarantee that the results of 'naturalistic' Darwinian evolution (a naturalism that excludes God) will produce true beliefs about the nature of reality! Which is it? Either answer is a self defeater for atheistic evolutionary naturalism!bornagain77
January 21, 2013
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Graham2 (56): Im appalled by the readiness of the ID crowd (and others) to blithely accept the supernatural. The idea of an intelligence just floating round in space does such violence to all that we have learnt from Science, that you would have to have some stupendously strong evidence to accept it. I concede that Evolution is asking a lot, but it pales into insignificance next to what you have to swallow to accept the supernatural.
Maybe your world view springs from a misplaced down-to-earth-attitude. The idea that the existence of God would add a strange twist to an otherwise ‘normal’ universe. This is a false attitude. What’s lacking is appropriate wonder. We are here in a universe that we cannot explain. Everything we read about biology shows us madding complexity. Nothing is normal. Why would the existence of God make matters weird? Our life is a bizarre enterprise anyway. We exist ... so anything is possible. Allow me to quote R.G. Ingersoll: “My opinion of immortality is this: First. I live, and that of itself is infinitely wonderful. Second. There was a time when I was not, and after I was not, I was. Third. Now that I am, I may be again; and it is no more wonderful that I may be again, if I have been, than that I am, having once been nothing.” WJM: Very clear argument!Box
January 21, 2013
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To clarify #65: "If you cannot get a person to commit to the obvious example .... then there is no reason to bring the the argument to any phenomenon under dispute with that person." There is reason, of course, to debate many people concerning the more involved arguments, and there is reason to debate contested phenomena, but there is no reason to bring any of that into a debate with a person unwilling to concede even the obvious. One cannot successfully argue with those unwilling to concede the obvious; in a sense, this thread is "outing" those individuals who refuse to concede the obvious, and who refuse to examine and accept the obvious ramifications thereof, while offering a chance to have an honest debate (with those who are willing) about the simple, fundamental principle of ID detection.William J Murray
January 21, 2013
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KF @ 66: I'm content in this thread to put on display the full glory of that "unwillingness to concede" even the most obvious and trivial points, and the ramifications thereof. As the title says, it's a simple argument; easy to follow, easy to see what's going on, easy to parse and judge, even for a layman. In no way should this be construed as a knock on, or a disapproval of more involved arguments and explanations; but others here do that far better than I ever could.William J Murray
January 21, 2013
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Graham @ 54 said:
WJM: I honestly have no idea if its possible in principle.
This is an interesting statement. Let's explore this a bit. Earlier you asked if I could quantify the difference between happiness and sadness, but that question belies the actual point I was making in asking my question, which it seems I've clarified. The appropriate question would be if I believed that, in principle, happiness could be meaningfully quantified from sadness, whether or not such a quantification could be used in the future to make a significant determination if someone is sad or happy. Not an absolute determination, but one of "best explanation". IOW, do I think in principle that we would be able to map the quantifiable differences between "happiness" and "sadness" in order to offer a "best explanation" of certain behavioral phenomena as being the result of "happiness" or "sadness"? I don't think that would really be all that hard. We all do it as laymen every day. We observe the telltale signs of sadness or happiness, and in many cases employ strategies to move someone from sadness to happiness. So the answer is that yes, I would expect that, at least in principle, the difference between happiness and sadness could be quantified, both physically (perhaps by brain mapping and various biochemical signatures) and psychologically (by examining behavior that corresponds to happiness and sadness). There may be many ways to quantify the difference in several different areas of research, but I see no reason why such a difference couldn't be scientifically quantified. So my question to you is: why wouldn't you expect that such a "bleeding"obvious difference be, in some way, quantifiable? What would be the basis for assuming that an obvious difference would not be available for quantification, when as a matter of course we expect that all obvious differences we encounter be - in some way - quantifiable, even including different psychological states, emotions, and beliefs? Why would you think that any difference is not quantifiable in some way, much less a "bleeding" obvious difference?William J Murray
January 21, 2013
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WJM: In this era of polarisation, there will not even be willingness to concede that much, some handy distraction or distortion will be used. But, we can show to onlookers, that something is very wrong, and for that the key issue is the materialist a priori, now being confused with science and reason itself. KFkairosfocus
January 21, 2013
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Mung @ 51&52: Yes, I've read signature in the cell - I still have it in my bookcase. A single thread that leaves out the biological aspect doesn't represent an abandonment of the biological argument. I'm not saying I don't follow the biological argument; my point is that for many that argument is impenetrable and really just boils down to which side one allies themselves with. So, in this thread, I take the argument back a step to the most obvious and trivial aspect of the ID position and invite intellectually honest challengers debate and, if willing, follow the logic available from what is obvious. If you cannot get a person to commit to the obvious example from which the biological argument is derived - that a battleship is a factual case of ID; that it is both obviously designed and that the obviousness of that categorical distinction (whether it floats or not, and whether we know what it is for or not, and whether or not we even know those things are guns) lends itself to the reasonable expectation that this categorical difference can be meaningfully (if not absolutely) quantified, then there is no reason to bring the the argument to any phenomenon under dispute.William J Murray
January 21, 2013
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It is impossible to practice science presupposing 'random' naturalistic causes for everything.,,, The Great Debate: Does God Exist? - Justin Holcomb - audio of the 1985 debate available on the site Excerpt: The transcendental proof for God’s existence is that without Him it is impossible to prove anything. The atheist worldview is irrational and cannot consistently provide the preconditions of intelligible experience, science, logic, or morality. The atheist worldview cannot allow for laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, the ability for the mind to understand the world, and moral absolutes. In that sense the atheist worldview cannot account for our debate tonight.,,, http://theresurgence.com/2012/01/17/the-great-debate-does-god-exist Philosopher Sticks Up for God Excerpt: Theism, with its vision of an orderly universe superintended by a God who created rational-minded creatures in his own image, “is vastly more hospitable to science than naturalism,” with its random process of natural selection, he (Plantinga) writes. “Indeed, it is theism, not naturalism, that deserves to be called ‘the scientific worldview.’” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/books/alvin-plantingas-new-book-on-god-and-science.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all The Historical Alliance of Christianity and Science - Kenneth Richard Samples Excerpted quote: "Modern science was conceived, and born, and flourished in the matrix of Christian theism. Only liberal doses of self-deception and double-think, I believe, will permit it to flourish in the context of Darwinian naturalism." ~ Alvin Plantinga http://www.apu.edu/cris/pdfs/historical_alliance.pdf Alvin Plantinga - Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r34AIo-xBh8 The Absurdity of Inflation, String Theory and The Multiverse - Dr. Bruce Gordon - video http://vimeo.com/34468027 And Dr. Gordon's astute observation in his last powerpoint is here: The End Of Materialism? * In the multiverse, anything can happen for no reason at all. * In other words, the materialist is forced to believe in random miracles as a explanatory principle. * In a Theistic universe, nothing happens without a reason. Miracles are therefore intelligently directed deviations from divinely maintained regularities, and are thus expressions of rational purpose. * Scientific materialism is (therefore) epistemically self defeating: it makes scientific rationality impossible. Jake: Math prodigy proud of his autism - 60 Minutes - CBS News - video http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7395214n&tag=re1.channel Quote of note at the 12:00 minute mark of the preceding video; 'The whole randomness thing, that's like completely against all of physics' Jake Barnett - Math Prodigy Indeed, it is impossible to remove 'mind and free will' as starting assumptions from our best description of reality; i.e. quantum mechanics. The 'Spirituality' of Mathematics https://docs.google.com/document/d/13VBciybSK3D7uJoz6ltldPPSvhL4HJaJAmCmOMkmQxg/editbornagain77
January 21, 2013
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William J Murray posted this:
The idea that there is no discernible or quantifiable difference between some products of ID and what nature produces without it, or that such a determination is irrelevant, is absurd.
Without a clear explanation of what you mean by "some products of ID" and "what nature produces without it" (or more importantly how you think "nature" does, doesn't or can't produce), your application of adjectives like "irrelevent" and "absurd" is, well, irrelevant.timothya
January 21, 2013
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F/N: The empirically grounded, observationally based warrant for the proposition that chance variation and differential reproductive success account for origin of body plans is ______________. The empirical warrant for concluding that chemicals in a pond, comet or moon of Jupiter etc spontaneously formed a metabolic automaton with embedded, code based self replication facility is ______________ . Absent solid grounds for this, and given the solid grounds for seeing FSCO/I as a reliable sign of design, it is empirically warranted and quite scientific to infer that life forms and original cell based life were designed. This is not equivalent to inference that said designer was supernatural. However, the further observation that the physics and parameters of the observed cosmos reflect a pattern closely set up that fosters such life points to a cosmos-building designer intent on life in the cosmos, per Fred Hoyle (a lifelong agnostic) and others. KFkairosfocus
January 21, 2013
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F/N: G2 should try to explain to Newton, Boyle, Kepler, Kelvin, Maxwell, Pasteur, Planck and co up to a Townsend, a Sanford, a Carson, a Collins or a Hoyle, that acceptance of the supernatural equals rejection of science. Instead, he is exposing for all to see his ideological materialist a priorism and scientism. KFkairosfocus
January 21, 2013
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