Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

They said it: “atheism is simply the absence of belief that any deities exist” — a fatal worldview error of modern evolutionary materialist atheism

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Prof. Dawkins of the UK, a leading evolutionary materialist and atheist

It is an open secret that a major motivation for the commonly encountered, too often angry  rejection of  the design inference is a prior commitment to Lewontinian evolutionary materialistic atheism; a common thread that unites a Sagan, a Lewontin, many members of Science institutions and Faculties of Universities, and of course many leading anti-design advocates like those associated with the US-based National Center for Science Education [NCSE], as well as leading “science” [–> atheism] blogs and Internet forums and the like.

Such atheists also often imagine that they have cornered the market on scientific rationality, common-sense and intelligence, to the point where professor Dawkins of the UK has proposed a new name for atheists: “brights.”

By contrast, he and many others of like ilk view those who object to such views as “ignorant, stupid, insane or . . . wicked.” (Perhaps, that is why one of the atheistical objectors to UD feels free to publicly and falsely accuse me of being a demented child abuser and serial rapist. He clearly cannot see how unhinged, unreasonable, irrational, uncouth, vulgar and rage-blinded his outrageous behaviour is.)

For telling instance, in Lewontin’s notorious 1997  NYRB article, Billions and Billions of Demons, we may see:

. . . to put a correct view of the universe into people’s heads we must first get an incorrect view out . . .   the problem is to get them to reject irrational and supernatural explanations of the world, the demons that exist only in their imaginations, and to accept a social and intellectual apparatus, Science, as the only begetter of truth [[NB: this is a knowledge claim about knowledge and its possible sources, i.e. it is a claim in philosophy not science; it is thus self-refuting]. . . . To Sagan, as to all but a few other scientists, it is self-evident [[actually, science and its knowledge claims are plainly not immediately and necessarily true on pain of absurdity, to one who understands them; this is another logical error, begging the question , confused for real self-evidence; whereby a claim shows itself not just true but true on pain of patent absurdity if one tries to deny it . . ] that the practices of science provide the surest method of putting us in contact with physical reality . . . .

It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes [[another major begging of the question . . . ] to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute [[i.e. here we see the fallacious, indoctrinated, ideological, closed mind . . . ], for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. [And, if you wish to try the now routine turnabout false accusation of quote mining, kindly cf. here at UD as well as the above linked.]

The ideologically motivated atheistical, evolutionary materialist a priori is plain.

No wonder Philip Johnson rebutted Lewontin thusly, in his November 1997 reply:

For scientific materialists the materialism comes first; the science comes thereafter. We might more accurately term them “materialists employing science.” And if materialism is true, then some materialistic theory of evolution has to be true simply as a matter of logical deduction, regardless of the evidence. That theory will necessarily be at least roughly like neo-Darwinism, in that it will have to involve some combination of random changes and law-like processes capable of producing complicated organisms that (in Dawkins’ words) “give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.”  . . . .   The debate about creation and evolution is not deadlocked . . . Biblical literalism is not the issue. The issue is whether materialism and rationality are the same thing. Darwinism is based on an a priori commitment to materialism, not on a philosophically neutral assessment of the evidence. Separate the philosophy from the science, and the proud tower collapses. [[Emphasis added.] [[The Unraveling of Scientific Materialism, First Things, 77 (Nov. 1997), pp. 22 – 25.]

Consequently,  if we are to put the design inference issue on a level playing field so it can be objectively assessed as a valid scientific inference, we have to first address the fatal flaws of reasoning in the underlying thought that clothes materialistic atheism in the holy lab coat. (And of course,  given its sacrificial, protective purpose, it should be no surprise that I have never seen or owned an expensive lab coat.)

So, “scientific” atheism must now go under the microscope:

1 –> The first problem is to accurately define. For that, it is instructive to first cite the well known online Stanford Enc of Phil, in its article on Atheism and Agnosticism by J J C Smart of Monash University:

‘Atheism’ means the negation of theism, the denial of the existence of God. I shall here assume that the God in question is that of a sophisticated monotheism. The tribal gods of the early inhabitants of Palestine are of little or no philosophical interest. They were essentially finite beings, and the god of one tribe or collection of tribes was regarded as good in that it enabled victory in war against tribes with less powerful gods. Similarly the Greek and Roman gods were more like mythical heroes and heroines than like the omnipotent, omniscient and good God postulated in mediaeval and modern philosophy. As the Romans used the word, ‘atheist’ could be used to refer to theists of another religion, notably the Christians, and so merely to signify disbelief in their own mythical heroes. [First published Tue Mar 9, 2004; substantive revision Mon Aug 8, 2011. Acc: Nov 12, 2011.]

2 –> This is of course exactly what is traditionally understood, and it is what the etymology of the underlying Greek, “a + theos,” would suggest: the denial of the reality of God.  But, if one turns to the reliably evolutionary materialist Wikipedia, we will see that in its article on Atheism, there is now a commonly encountered evidently rhetorically loaded redefinition, as appears in the title for this post:

Most inclusively, atheism is simply the absence of belief that any deities exist. Atheism is, in a broad sense, the rejection of belief in the existence of deities. In a narrower sense, atheism is specifically the position that there are no deities. Atheism is contrasted with theism, which in its most general form is the belief that at least one deity exists . . . . Atheists tend to be skeptical of supernatural claims, citing a lack of empirical evidence.

3 –> The last statement, of course, strongly reflects the Lewontinian a priori assertion of materialism, and the underlying notion that to have a supernatural as a possibility would make our cosmos into a chaos. Indeed as Lewontin went on to say: “To appeal to an omnipotent deity is to allow that at any moment the regularities of nature may be ruptured, that miracles may happen.”

4 –> Back of this, lies Hume’s basic hyper-skeptical error, in effect that there has been a uniform experience that firmly establishes the laws of nature and so we may dismiss any claimed supernatural exceptions as beyond reasonable belief. This boils down to begging the question in various ways, as first of all, we precisely do not and cannot have a global observational basis for the laws of science, they are inductive — thus fallible — generalisations. [Cf. Charles Babbage and Alfred Russel Wallace. (Yes, THAT Wallace, the co-founder of modern evolutionary theory and advocate of intelligent evolution.) Also cf a typical contemporary essay here.]

5 –> Similarly, for a miracle to stand out as being beyond the general course of the world, there must be just such a general course, i.e.  a world in which miracles are possible is one in which there will be general regularities amenable to scientific investigation. Informed theists will then tell us that, that the Author of that general course may, for His own good reasons, occasionally intervene at a higher level, in no wise detracts from the reliability of that general course. That is, Lewontin et al have erected and knocked over a ridicule-loaded strawman caricature of theism. (Newton knew better, 300 years ago in his General Scholium to Principia.)

6 –> Moreover, give that there are in fact millions who across centuries, testify to living encounter with God, and to being transformed thereby — including a generous slice of the leading lights of our civilisation across time [just try the likes of a Pascal, a Maxwell, a Kelvin or an Aquinas, for a quick list], to dismissively reject the possibility of miracles or the credibility of witnesses thereto inadvertently puts the human mind itself under suspicion.

7 –> For if so many millions are deluded, then the mind becomes highly questionable as an instrument of inquiry. That is, the atheist who imagines that those who oppose him are delusional, in the teeth of the numbers and quality of the people in question, saws off the cognitive branch on which he too must sit.

8 –> But, the very definition of atheism as “absence of belief in god or gods” that is now so commonly being pushed as the “real” definition, has deeper problems. For, it is usually offered as an argument that the atheist is simply taking a default view: YOU must prove your theism, I hold no position. (Cf. here too, just for fun.)

9 –> This is fallacious and misleading, indeed, a fatal worldview error. Why is that so?

a: It improperly shifts — and indeed ducks — the burden of warrant on comparative difficulties that any serious worldview must shoulder. If it is to be serious as a worldview.  (And, let me add {Nov14}: we all have worldviews— clusters of core beliefs, views and attitudes that define how we see the world; the question is whether we have thought them through to their idea-roots, connexions, degree of warrant, and forward to conclusions and consequences for us and our societies.)

b: An easy way to see all of this, is to notice how the very same atheists usually want to dress up their atheism in a lab coat.

c: For instance, as Lewontin tried to argue in his 1997 NYRB article, the a priori materialistic scientific elites want the general public to look up to them as the fountain of knowledge and wisdom, and to come to believe that science is “the only begetter of truth.”

d: But, this is NOT a scientific claim, it is a claim about the grounds that warrant knowledge, indeed an assertion of monopoly power over knowledge. Such is therefore properly a philosophical knowledge claim, i.e an epistemological claim.

e: Lewontin is trivially self-refuting.

f: But the claim is also illustrative of how claims at worldview level are inevitably linked to one another.

g: And, the denial or rejection of belief in God is plainly not an isolated claim, it sits in the centre of a cluster of evolutionary materialistic beliefs.

h: Indeed, Lewontin himself goes on to assert that the significant elites believe that “science” is the surest means to put us in touch with “physical reality” [= all of reality, for the materialist],  and that he and his ilk are committed to a priori, absolute materialism.

i: That is the context in which we see that science itself is being radically ideologised by question-begging redefinition. The declarations of the US National Science Teachers Association are particularly revealing on this, once we recognise that for “naturalistic” we can freely read “materialistic”:

The principal product of science is knowledge in the form of naturalistic concepts and the laws and theories related to those concepts . . . . Although no single universal step-by-step scientific method captures the complexity of doing science, a number of shared values and perspectives characterize a scientific approach to understanding nature. Among these are a demand for naturalistic explanations supported by empirical evidence that are, at least in principle, testable against the natural world. Other shared elements include observations, rational argument, inference, skepticism, peer review and replicability of work . . . .

Science, by definition, is limited to naturalistic methods and explanations and, as such, is precluded from using supernatural elements in the production of scientific knowledge. [[NSTA, Board of Directors, July 2000. Emphases added.]

j: This ideologises science and science education, tearing out of the heart of science any serious concern to seek the empirically warranted truth about our world, and to recognise the inescapable limitations of empirically based inductive methods in that pursuit which mean that science must be open-ended and provisional in its fact claims and explanations.

k: In short, the intellectual duty of care to critically assess the scientific materialism at the heart of the relevant form of atheism we face,  cannot be ducked so easily as by using the rhetorical tactic of putting up a question-begging redefinition of atheism.

l: This means that scientific atheists must warrant their evolutionary materialism,  they must warrant their redefinition of science based on imposition of so-called methodological naturalism, and they must warrant their commonly held view that science monopolises genuine, objective knowledge.

10 –> Evolutionary materialistic atheism, therefore, has a too often ducked challenge to warrant its worldview level claims, on (a) factual adequacy,  (b) logical coherence, and (c) explanatory balance and power [being elegantly simple, but not simplistic and certainly not ad hoc].

11 –> That means it needs to take seriously the implications of the empirically reliable principle that functionally specific complex organisation and associated information [especially digitally coded, symbolic information] — once we can directly observe the causal process — are inductively strong signs of design.

12 –> Similarly, it has to seriously address the issue of the best explanations for the credibly fine tuned cosmos we inhabit, which on evidence sits at a precise operating point that facilitates Carbon chemistry, aqueous medium cell based life that uses digital information to guide its self-replication and to synthesise the key nanomachines of metabolic life processes.

13 –> Likewise, it has to address the signs of design that are evident in the living cell, starting with the use of complex, functionally specific digital codes and algorithms to guide critical biochemical processes of life such as protein synthesis.

14 –> The need to account for the increments in complex functionally specific, integrated often irreducibly complex organisation and associated information to account for the dozens of body plans of multicellular life, including our own, is an extension of this challenge.

15 –> Similarly, such materialistic atheists need to credibly account for the reliability and trustworthiness of the human mind, in light of the Haldane challenge that has been on the table since the 1930’s (and of course modern extensions to that challenge):

“It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms.” [[“When I am dead,” in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209. ]

16 –> Last but not least, given the force of the amorality confessed to and/or directly implied by leading materialistic atheists such as Dawkins and Provine,  atheistical, evolutionary materialists need to very carefully ponder the issues that were long since put on the table by Plato in The Laws, Bk X, 2350 years ago, in 360 BC:

[[The avant garde philosophers, teachers and artists c. 400 BC] say that the greatest and fairest things are the work of nature and of chance, the lesser of art [[ i.e. techne], which, receiving from nature the greater and primeval creations, moulds and fashions all those lesser works which are generally termed artificial . . . They say that fire and water, and earth and air [[i.e the classical “material” elements of the cosmos], all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art, and that as to the bodies which come next in order-earth, and sun, and moon, and stars-they have been created by means of these absolutely inanimate existences. The elements are severally moved by chance and some inherent force according to certain affinities among them-of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, or of soft with hard, and according to all the other accidental admixtures of opposites which have been formed by necessity. After this fashion and in this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only . . . .

[[T]hese people would say that the Gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.– [[Relativism, too, is not new; complete with its radical amorality rooted in a worldview that has no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT. (Cf. here for Locke’s views and sources on a very different base for grounding liberty as opposed to license and resulting anarchistic “every man does what is right in his own eyes” chaos leading to tyranny.)] These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might [[ Evolutionary materialism leads to the promotion of amorality], and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions [[Evolutionary materialism-motivated amorality “naturally” leads to continual contentions and power struggles; cf. dramatisation here],  these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others [[such amoral factions, if they gain power, “naturally” tend towards ruthless tyranny; here, too, Plato hints at the career of Alcibiades], and not in legal subjection to them . . .

__________

It seems there are a few questions for scientific atheists to answer to, before we should take their attempt to monopolise science as anything beyond an ideological agenda.

It would be quite interesting to see their answers. END

Comments
P: The model is not mine -- that's why I speak of Eng. Derek Smith. Please read the notes, and you may want to look at the linked cybernetics work. This one is for real, towards building the beasties. And, when an argument is self-referentially incoherent, as are physicalist evolutionary accounts of mind, they are self-refuting and inescapably false. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
November 16, 2011
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All models have unanswered questions. Your model adds a layer that doesn't really explain anything and which fails to explain some easily observable phenomena. The monist model doesn't explain the experience of consciousness, but it does handle observable brain changes resulting from learning, and it explains the results of drugs and brain injuries. Assertion of a disembodied mind has little or no Biblical support, since the only references to eternal life also assert the resurrection of the body. Why is that?Petrushka
November 16, 2011
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P, I am pointing to interaction, and I am pointing to a self referential incoherence that consistently dogs physicalist models. Such models fail logically and must be false. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
November 16, 2011
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You aren't responding to my question. Where is memory located and why, if it is disembodied, is it affected by drugs that block the formation of changes in neural connections?Petrushka
November 16, 2011
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An interesting bit of trivia: Using MRI scans you can tell the difference between a person who has learned a second language as a child and a person who learned a second language as after the age of 12. Even if both appear to be equally fluent. Is there something about the theory of a disembodied mind that explains or predicts that?Petrushka
November 16, 2011
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Petrushka: As the model illustrates [via two-way, looped interaction . . . ], mind-brain interaction and resulting mutual influence is not the pivotal issue, the self-referential incoherence of physicalist notions of mind is, cf here. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
November 16, 2011
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A related question is why, in animal experiments, can we see physical changes in neural connections as a result of learning, and why do these richer connections correlate with learning. That is, why do drugs that block the formation of these connections also seem to block the formation of permanent learning?Petrushka
November 16, 2011
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It's a cute diagram, but unresponsive to my question. Were is memory stored, and why does the disembodied mind not remember experiences under the influence of specific drugs?Petrushka
November 16, 2011
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Tone, please Zoe.kairosfocus
November 16, 2011
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Petrushka, why not look here in context at the interaction implications of the Smith Model, for starters? All models of mind have had to reckon with the bodily involvement since the first man got hit on the head or got drunk. That was a long time ago, before the likes of a Plato or an Aristotle, or an Aquinas or a Descartes. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
November 16, 2011
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WJM; Well said, and thanks. Ironically, above, I had pointed out just how one can go about grounding a worldview, complete with a cluster of links. Try 9(a) in the original post, the tipsheet at 5 [with onward link on basics] that deals with the issue of grounding a system of argument and warrant, and again at 12.1 Ignored in the rush to smear and dismiss the man. In sum, all human systems of reasoned thought must be finite, so they are grounded in first plausibles. These are basic, and the question is whether they are properly so. Thus, the tests of factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power, neither ad hoc nor simplistic. And, there are self-evidently true basic beliefs, which once one understand are seen to be so, must be so, and if denied the result obviously is absurd. On such one can build a sound worldview, including a basis for the scientific enterprise as a systematic frame for inductive albeit provisional knowledge. Cf here for a toolkit, here for the self evident basic beliefs technique, here on scientific methods, and here for a case in point. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
November 16, 2011
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Also, why would an organ as large as our brain be required for something to animate our bodies? Couldn't an immaterial mind just as easily manipulate something with a much smaller brain? (Say a snake or a donkey?)ScottAndrews2
November 16, 2011
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I'm curious why, if mind is disembodied, why a drug can prevent the formation of memory. Even a five year old can understand that if the mind is not the brain, that it should retain memories of things experienced, even if the brain is temporarily disabled. What is it that experiences and remembers?Petrushka
November 16, 2011
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Evolutionary Atheists, and those of their ilk, can rant on about Gish all they like, the salient irrefutable point that Gish brings out, is this: "The fossil record MUST PROVIDE the critical evidence for or against evolution, since NO* other scientific evidence can possibly throw light on the actual history of living things. ALL other evidence is circumstantial and can be more effectively explained (warranted) in terms of the Creation model. The time scale of human observation is far too short to permit documentation of real evolutionary change from lower to higher kinds of organisims at the present time. The vital question, therefore IS* Does the record of past ages, now preserved in the form of FOSSILS, shown any such changes have occured? The answer, UNEQUIVOCALLY is: The fossils say NO! There has been NO* evolution in the past any more than in the present. This important FACT* is conclusively demonstrated and documented by Dr. Gish in this book." "EVOLUTION: the fossils STILL say NO!" Emphasis added. It boggles the mind, that these so-called scientists, who vehemently seek to defend this LIE* of evolutionary materialism, will resort to any unscientific means, to keep Almighty God out of the Universe He Created, and sustains, the evidence for which, is overwhelmingly supportive of such Creation, in a multiplicity of varied and extremely complex ways, right here on Planet Earth, that any intellectualy honest person, could not fail to recognize! But, such is the mind-set of rampant atheism, couched, vaneered, and convoluted in a maze of pseudo-scientific jargon!Zoe
November 16, 2011
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The structure of justification (warrant) in defending any propositional 'truth' claim IS* coherence, coherence is our only criterior for truth. Reason, the ability to think rationally, objectively, logically, is necessary for 'revelation' i.e., evidence, facts to be to be coherent. The ID, Uncommon Descent premise, is grounded IN* such foundational, rational, and logically derived aspects, that are woefully lacking in Evo Mat, as displayed in its adherents, whose priori commitment to atheism is a fallacy of illogical, incoherent, nonsense, pseudo-science to its blatant intellectual dishonest height! No matter how many of the false science 'theories' they come up with, the pain simple FACTS* of MILLIONS of FOSSILS, repeatedly speak in their eloquent silence, LOUDLY*, that WE* were all Created, that why, we ALL* appear FULLY FORMED, no 'transitional' forms will ever be found, as we did NOT* evolve, we were Created!Zoe
November 16, 2011
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Eigenstate said:
First, no warrant is neeeded for the premise. .... So, really, asking for warrant for this premise in practical terms just elicits a good laugh.
But, I didn't say one was needed for any practical purpose, nor did I ask you for it in "practical" context, but rather in a "is your worldview logically justified and consistent" context. I think we can agree that people can believe in all sorts of internally contradictory, foolish nonsense and it not impact them in any real, negative, practical way. Apparently, you don't feel the need to check your worlview/beliefs for rational warrant, consistency, and coherency. You (again, apparently) feel free to believe isolated views, such as metaphysical materialism, atheism, and that humans can deliberately discern true statements about phenomena, without internally checking to see if those isolated beliefs are logically consistent.
Unless one believes a human can supply an infinite regress of warrants (and I’d love to hear you explain the practicalities of that, if so!), you have to start somewhere.
This is something of a straw man. Whether or not one can provide an infinite regress of warrant for their views is entirely irrelevant to providing a sufficient warrant that shows that particular beliefs are rationally consistent with each other (can be derived from the same warrant, or do not necessarily contradict each other). IOW, it is sufficient warrant to demonstrate time and motive for a suspect to have committed a crime; one needn't go back and trace his actions and thoughts back to when he was born. After this, you go on to make a lot of self-serving (to your views) truth claims about what the real world "is", and how it operates, and what humans are and do (from birth, no less), and their necessary functions and interactions, which really have nothing to do with the question at hand, because those statements depend on the capacity in question: your ability to deliberately discern true statements about phenomena. Using what you believe to be "true statements about phenomena" to justify your capacity or authority to make "true statements about phenmena" is circular reasoning. I asked for a rationally consistent warrant for the assumption, not a description of the functionality of the assumption, or a story about how humans come to that assumption or are born with it. If your answer is that you do not have worldview warrant for that assumption, then we have come to an understanding, and KF is ultimately right - you don't provide worldview warrant for your views because part of your worldview is that no such warrant is necessary. If some of your beliefs or views are ultimately rationally inconsistent with each other, that doesn't matter to you (correct me if wrong); what matters is that they at least appear to be functionally successful in your life (by whatever "success" model you apply). Which would hold true for any belief system - as long as it seemed to provide functional success (however the individual interprets "success") for the individual holding it. IOW, the fundamentalist Muslim, the atheistic/materialist scientist, and the guy in the looney bin (under your argument) don't have to rationally justify their views; what matters is that they feel like they are functionally successful. Correct?William J Murray
November 16, 2011
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Eigenstate, "atheism is a negation" It is a fallacy. Firstly, because it is claimed to be a well informed negation, which it is not in contrast to agnosticism. And secondly, atheism posits that the only measure of things is self. An unavoidable consequence of this is a clash of different self's. A society initially containing a majority of atheists of good intentions, deteriorates into chaos more quickly than a religious society can do for obvious reasons. Fyodor Dostoevsky looked into morality and its substantiation quite deeply. Questions of morality and ethics concerned him a lot because he himself went through periods of agnosticism and even denials of God. He once wrote in his diary that most of his contemporary atheists were so superficial that he could not even compare the strength of their atheism with that of his own at certain times in his life. When he was young, he got involved in some anti-government activities for which he was prosecuted and sentenced to death. He was pardoned by the Tsar a moment before the execution which was replaced with five years' imprisonment. If there is no God, there is no moral restraint, was the conclusion Dostoevsky came to. When he talks about these things he talks from immense personal experience. I totally agree with William J Murray on this. The point is that usually atheists do not analyse their world views hard enough. A lot of them are just spontaneous or non-systematic atheist who just do not care about these things. Of all categories of people, convinced atheists have the least right to question the validity of the views of others' because they themselves do not believe in anything objective, be it purpose, meaning, morality, conscience, ethics.Eugene S
November 16, 2011
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PaV, Excellent that you have picked up on free will. Schroedinger himself got trapped into this. However, to my knowledge his way out of this was pantheism, i.e. the other extreme as opposed to vulgar determinism. If we think further, there is no man either, just a collection of particles with no particular lasting meaning...Eugene S
November 16, 2011
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WJM: Perhaps, Wallace's discussion of miracles here may help break the deadlock. Let me clip his initial discussions of "supernatural" and "miracle":
[[p. 112]] The Supernatural and Modern Thought. It is now generally admitted, that those opinions and beliefs in which men have been educated generation after generation, and which have thus come to form part of their mental nature, are especially liable to be erroneous, because they keep alive and perpetuate the ideas and prejudices of a bygone and less enlightened age. It is therefore in the interest of truth, that [[p. 113]] every doctrine or belief, however well established or sacred they may appear to be, should at certain intervals be challenged to arm themselves with such facts and reasonings as they possess, to meet their opponents in the open field of controversy, and do battle for their right to live. Nor can any exemption be claimed in favour of those beliefs which are the product of modern civilisation, and which have for several generations been unquestioned by the great mass of the educated community; for the prejudice in their favour will be proportionately great . . . There have been times when popular beliefs were defended by the terrors of the law, and when the sceptic could only attack them at the peril of his life. Now we all admit that truth can take care of itself, and that only error needs protection. But there is another mode of defence which equally implies a claim to certain and absolute truth, and which is therefore equally unworthy and unphilosophical--that of ridicule, misrepresentation, or a contemptuous refusal to discuss the question at all. This method is used among us even now, for there is one belief, or rather disbelief, whose advocates claim more than papal infallibility, by refusing to examine the evidence brought against it, and by alleging general arguments which have been in use for two centuries to prove that it cannot be erroneous. The belief to which I allude is, that all alleged miracles are false; that what is commonly understood by the term supernatural does not exist, or if it does, is incapable of proof by any amount of human testimony; that all the phenomena we can have cognizance of depend on ascertainable physical laws, and that no other intelligent beings than man and the inferior animals can or do act upon our material world. These views have been now held almost unquestioned for many generations; they are inculcated as an essential part of a liberal education; they are popular, and are held to be one of the indications of our intellectual advancement; and they have become so much a part of our mental nature, that all facts and arguments brought against them are either ignored as unworthy of serious consideration, or listened to with undisguised contempt. Now this frame of mind is certainly not one favourable to the discovery of truth, and strikingly resembles that by which, in former ages, systems of error have been fostered and maintained. The time has therefore come when it must be called upon to justify itself . . . . at the very beginning of the subject, we find that we have to take objection to Hume's definition of a miracle, which exhibits unfounded assumptions and false premises. He gives two definitions in different parts of his essay. The first is--"A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature." The second is--"A miracle is a transgression of a law of nature, by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent." Now both these definitions are bad or imperfect. The first assumes that we know all the laws of nature--that the particular effect could not be produced by some unknown law of nature [[p. 115]] overcoming the law we do know; it assumes also, that if an invisible intelligent being held an apple suspended in the air, that act would violate the law of gravity. The second is not precise; it should be "some invisible intelligent agent," otherwise the action of galvanism or electricity, when these agents were first discovered, and before they were ascertained to form part of the order of nature, would answer accurately to this definition of a miracle. The words "violation" and "transgression" are both improperly used, and really beg the question by the definition. How does Hume know that any particular miracle is a violation of a law of nature? He assumes this without a shadow of proof, and on these words, as we shall see, rests his whole argument. The True Definition of a Miracle. Before proceeding any further, it is necessary for us to consider what is the true definition of a miracle, or what is most commonly meant by that word. A miracle, as distinguished from a new and unheard-of natural phenomenon, supposes an intelligent superhuman agent either visible or invisible;--it is not necessary that what is done should be beyond the power of man to do. The simplest action, if performed independently of human or visible agency, such as a tea-cup lifted in the air at request, as by an invisible hand and without assignable cause, would be universally admitted to be a miracle, as much so as the lifting of a house into the air, the instantaneous healing of a wound, or the instantaneous production of an elaborate drawing. My definition of a miracle therefore is as follows:--"Any act or event implying the existence and agency of superhuman intelligences," considering the human soul or spirit, if manifested out of the body, as one of these superhuman intelligences. This definition is more complete than that of Hume, and defines more accurately the essence of that which is commonly termed a miracle . . .
One does not have to agree with all that Wallace says, to see that he has some serious points, right out of the starting gates, and that his essay will well repay a serious reading. (I must note in particular, that he aptly summarises the precise pattern of behaviour that we can see above from objectors; including the attitude and assumptions that have latterly led to the absolutisation of the doctrine now known as methodological naturalism in science.) Further to this, I need to underscore that -- ever since Plato -- the proper contrast for empirical study is not "natural vs supernatural," but as you have hinted at, "natural vs ART-ificial." The artificial, or intelligently caused, is eminently suitable for empirical investigation on tested reliable signs, such as functionally specific complex organisation and associated explicit or implicit information [FSCO/I]. (Onlookers, kindly note the link to a context that warrants this summary claim.) The commonly encountered rhetorical insistence on a debate over natural vs supernatural is meant to appeal to precisely the attitude Wallace identifies and rebuts in the essay linked and clipped above. Design theory -- as can be seen here in more details -- is about the objective study of empirical signs of art, not signs of the supernatural, and it is applicable to designers that are a part and parcel of our common world, whether humans or beavers, etc. Someone will ask: What about supernatural designers? Doesn't ID want to infer that the designer is Supernatural? From the very beginning of the modern design theory movement (read the epilogue here in TMLO by Thaxton et al in 1984, the very first ID work, a technical study of OOL on thermodynamics and related areas) it has been explicitly, repeatedly affirmed that the empirical evidence amenable to scientific investigation on origin of life does not warrant a conclusion as to whether the designers of the FSCO/I in the living cell comes from within or beyond the cosmos, though of course both are possible candidates. What it does warrant is an inference to design. But, as has been repeatedly said at UD, a molecular nanotech lab several generations beyond where Venter et al are, could do the job. Where an inference to design by a designer beyond the [observed] cosmos is made, is on the other side of ID. Namely, design of a cosmos finely tuned and set up at an operating point that facilitates C-chemistry, cell based aqueous medium life. A good place to start with on this is the fact that C and O depend on a particular nuclear resonance of +/- a few percent for their status as the third and fourth most abundant elements, and that water depends on a cluster of properties rooted in the core laws of the physics of our cosmos that allow a compound of H and O to have astonishing and unique properties. Multiply by the credible evidence that our cosmos had a beginning, and the logic of a necessary causal factor implicated by that coming to be, and we have to seriously and soberly consider design by an intelligence beyond the cosmos, who would have organised our cosmos to facilitate the sort of life we have. All of which BTW, are pointed out in summary and linked onward in the much derided, strawmannised and dismissed original post. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
November 16, 2011
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Timbo: Sorry, but you are indulging in enabling behaviour. I have been repeatedly falsely accused of lying/willful and/or reckless deception (including in the post in that I have responded to on points, to which you replied as just above) -- by someone who, when he turned to substance, failed to pass the test of being able to soundly diagnose what is happening when one strikes a match -- and have a full right to require satisfaction. Unless, you imagine that it is fine to make such false accusations. Good day. KFkairosfocus
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@PaV
I’m not a trained philosopher, so I can easily misstep here. However, IIRC, St. Thomas Aquinas makes a distinction between “substance” and “prime matter”. They’re not equivalent or identical. I think it goes something like this: substance imposes its form on prime matter. (Maybe some onlookers can help us be precise here) If so, then it’s possible to have an “immaterial substance”, i.e., more or less, a being with a form, but that does not participate in prime matter (and, hence, no extension in time and space). These would, of course, be angelic beings. Thomas Aquinas was the “Angelic Doctor”! So, I don’t see “mind” as a “square circle”. Not a problem for me.
The problem, is, even the distinctions you are offering trade on stolen concepts. "Indentical" and "equivalent" are undefined for "non-prime matter". We have no non-prime referents in which we might ground our semantics here. Or if we do, I'm not aware of them, and for all the reading I've done on Aquinas, he's not got any "super-empirical super-experience" in which to ground the "non-prime" side of a prime-matter/non-prime-matter contrast or equivalence. Like the Square in Flatland, you may be grasping onto the dynamics of Spaceland (cubes, spheres and other 3D solids that may intersect the 2D plane of Flatland, but for what we have in view, you are telling me about referents which we have no context for apprehending. If you can show us Spaceland (and if you aren't familiar with the story, you can just skip this part and move in, don't want to waste your time), or a "cube" and a model for rendering a cube intelligible, semantically load-bearing, then you, and by extension old Aquinas, perhaps, have something really extraordinary to contribute there. But as it is, non-prime matter is conspicuously identified by what it is NOT, what it is distinguished from -- see our use of "immaterial" and "non-prime". Aquinas might have characterized that as a "privation of experience", a lack of positive semantics for "immaterial substance", and thus the reliance on stolen concepts to convey the appearance of meaning, rather than actual dereferenced objects or attributes in supernature (it's tempting to bog down the prose here in pointing out all the semantic troubles, but note here that "objects" and "attributes" are similarly problematic as "terms of supernature"). Nevertheless, I understand you don't see "immaterial substance" as a "square circle". Strictly speaking, I don't either -- that's a contradiction by terms, and the problem I was going for was really not contradiction, but just "undefinedness" of those terms, meaninglessness.
Where I would differ with you about mind is that you see “mind” as something physical—an eigenstate, if you will, and, seemingly, nothing more. But, in the fuller context of your statements, I would further have to say that you see a kind of one-to-one mapping of “mind” to some particular “mental state” = eigenstate = some kind of physical expression of the brain and its neural components. One question that immediately arises, then, is this: how, then, is the “mental state” of a giraffe any different from that of a human; or, better put, how does the “mental state” of a human differ from that of a giraffe? How are they qualitatively different?
Right, and I even object (mildly) to the use of "mapping" there. It's not an isomorphism or "physical correlation". A mind-state IS a brain-state, as I understand it. One phenomena with two ways here we describe it, serving different purposes (biological vs. mental/conceptual). As for qualitative differences with a giraffe, humans share the same raw materials with giraffes -- a synapse is materially the same for both human and giraffe -- and the distinctions obtain in the configuration of those materials, and thus the resulting capacities and functions. Humans, of course, are unique (so far as we can tell) across all species, including giraffes in having an evolved capacity for meta-representational cognition. That's a profound qualitative difference (I'm setting aside the quantitative differences, here, like the sheer mass, which even for an adult animal so much bigger than a human is less than half the size of a human's brain at ~650g), something akin to the difference between a hand calculator with hardwired registers and a modern PC with remappable registers and further indirection available through flexible computer languages and compilers, etc. Both are "silicon circuitry", but the qualitative capabilities are dramatic, and beyond just quantitative advantages. Meta-representation changes the whole game in terms of the complexity, flexibility and most important, indirection include self-representation self-meta-representation, and arbitrarily deep levels of said indirection.
To better get at what I’m trying to point out, let me put this last question in a different form: when you were four-years-old, you had conversations with your parents, just as we do with four-year-old children now. But the big difference is this: you’re conscious of your conversation with the 4-year-old, whereas the 4-year-old probably is not. He may or may not have any recollection of it. When the 4-year-old says “It’s hot today,” this has to be pretty much the same “eigenstate” as exists in your mind when you make the same statement—which follows from a one-to-one mapping of abstraction and a physical eigenstate. But I can, more or less, anticipate how you will respond to all of this, so I’ll pass on to what I believe to be more germane. That is, what drives this supposed one-to-one mapping to change from one “mental state” (=eigenstate) to another? IOW, if I smoke marijuana, the chemical effects of the drug change my “eigenstate” and so I find myself giggling more easily. So, the causality is this: change the chemistry, which in turn changes the eigenstate, which changes the “mental state” I possess. Obviously marijuana is a “physical” substance. But, now, let’s turn it around. I’m a Zen Buddhist, and I—consciously—use meditation to place myself in a place of deep calm. Whereas before I may have been fidgety, now I am calm. What, then, induced this change of “eigenstates”? IOW, it’s as though the “mind” has added a substance that has the effect of changing the eigenstate of the brain and its neural components. I wonder how you respond?
Yes. This is an area where monist avoids a huge challenge for dualists. There is no "mapping" to keep synchronized, or mechanism to wonder about in terms of the mechanics for synching "non-prime" states to "immaterial substance" states, and back again. The mind state IS the brain state, so THC in your marijuana exerts a physics-governed effect on the chemistry of your brain, and that produces physical effects, effects that are not TRANSLATED (as in the dualist model) or mapped to the immaterial mind, but effects which ARE mind effects. This is why getting stone effects the way you think-as-mind, not just how your brain functions, chemically, leaving the immaterial mind unaffected (as it necessarily must be in a dualist model, barring any supernatural analogous effects of THC on a supernatural mind). That doesn't mean you don't have desires and will, as competing and interacting features of your brain (using that here instead of "mind" to keep things clear that I'm in "monist" mode). THC may not "change your mind" on some object of desire; it's an effect, just not sufficient to be dispositive on that issue. But then again, maybe it is. You chill out and the drug effects play a chemical role that interacts with the other electro-chemical interactions going on in there anyway, and that combination changes your mind in some what. That thing you wanted, you want less, now, perhaps. Maybe that desire is marginally encroached by the "whatever" effects of your doobage.
I’ve had profound experiences of deja vu; but, I assure you, what happened in the chemistry lab room was NOT deja vu. When I was attending UCLA, I had a dream about being at USC, and in a tennis stadium that did not exist at the time of my dream. But three years later, I was in the tennis stadium I dreamed of, and had a very powerful experience of deja vu. That’s what I think deja vu is: it’s an experience of what is later to happen, and, I believe, we usually receive it in a dream.
I'm not about to get myself committed to a remote (in space, time, and medium) diagnosis of your experience, as I wouldn't be qualified even if those barriers weren't a factor, but I will note that this subject, by its very nature, makes "I assure you" highly problematic. I may be just as sure some other experience than my frequent deja vus are NOT deja vu events, but when I do have deja vu, I can "assure you" with all the earnesty you muster here, that I've seen this all before when I'm having that deja vu event. The misfires and problems in this area are "transcendentalish". They mess with, and corrupt your calibration and "self-assuring" machinery. They are problematic precisely because they are compelling in there... apparent authenticity. Which is just to say that once you look into problems of this kind, responses like "I am SURE", and "it could NOT have been... it was so REAL" or "so different", etc., should be warning signs for possible error. That is the nature of the phenomena; the subject has the problem in the first place PRECISELY BECAUSE it elicits such confidence in its veridicality. Bottom line: this is an area where very strong skepticism about the self and the self's ability to "self-discern" is warranted. Problems like these obtain because they "fake their self-assuring credentials" very well.
I’ve also dreamed about a place I would live in ten years before living there. And I dreamed about it not once, nor twice, but, in fact, so many times that I hated going to sleep. I should also add that the experience I had in the chem lab room was not the first such experience. I had an even more powerful one when I was 8-years-old. Now, I don’t want to go on-and-on about all of this because of the personal nature of it all; but these things happen.
Indeed. I have many of the same kinds of experiences in my own past to recall and relate. Perhaps the difference between us is just the strength of the skepticism each applies to the veridicality and doubtful nature of these events.
So, no, it wasn’t deja vu; deja vu is rather ordinary and common. This was something entirely different, and very real.
Not saying it wasn't real -- I don't have a reliable way to judge on that matter. Although I wonder if you do, either. I don't doubt that deja vu is more common than any of the episodes you describe, but one of the salient features of deja vu is its impression of being "very real".
Now, changing the subject a little, and getting a little off-topic, let me mention something to you just because you seem inquisitive enough: you may want to learn a little about the Miracle of Fatima. It happened in October, 1917, in Fatima, Portugal. The sun was seen to spin around its center, and then to move side-to-side in the sky; and, then, finally to plunge itself towards earth—growing larger by the second. Suddenly, the sun went back to its normal position. This was witnessed by many people—Catholics and atheists alike. And after the sun returned to its normal position, the clothes people were wearing, and the ground in that area, though having been completely soaked by the morning rain, were found to be completely dry. Real physical changes, and no naturalistic explanation for them.
Thanks. Several years before I abandoned Christianity, I spent a long time preparing and studying the Catholic Church (I was raised in a Protestant Evangelical home), getting ready, I expected, to "swim the Tiber" and begin RCIA. The Miracle of Fatima was one of the topics commended to me by other Catholics, along with the alleged miracles of Padre Pio. I eventually reached a point in working towards Rome that triggered the realization for me that none of this was tenable, credible or supportable under critical review, and without being belligerent about it, Fatima was something like William Lane Craig was to me as a questioning Protestant: something people thought would help, but actually served as a very effective faith diminisher.
How about this: St. Rosalia. She gave herself completely to God, having left her home at a young age. She lived in a cave. She died alone in 1160. Her body was found in 1625. Now, how in the world did her body stay incorrupt for almost 500 years? I think these are a few thorns in the side of materialist thought; but, of course, they don’t add up to being a proof of the supernatural. Well, sorry for getting a bit long-winded. I’ll try to be more concise the next time. And, I await any response you’d like to give.
Not familiar with St. Rosalia other than in passing as the one whose body didn't decay. I'll have to Google that up for some night time reading on the iPad. I'm a skeptic, but I've always (including as an atheist) an interest in such stories, claims, accounts. True or false, they tend to be captivating bits of history and culture, plus as an atheist and skeptic I have an added element of interest in thinking through what might explain such claims in more plausible/mundane terms.eigenstate
November 15, 2011
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eigenstate:
“Substance” doesn’t mean anything to me, or any one I have asked who will respond, that doesn’t depend on material semantics (e.g. extended in space/time).
I'm not a trained philosopher, so I can easily misstep here. However, IIRC, St. Thomas Aquinas makes a distinction between "substance" and "prime matter". They're not equivalent or identical. I think it goes something like this: substance imposes its form on prime matter. (Maybe some onlookers can help us be precise here) If so, then it's possible to have an "immaterial substance", i.e., more or less, a being with a form, but that does not participate in prime matter (and, hence, no extension in time and space). These would, of course, be angelic beings. Thomas Aquinas was the "Angelic Doctor"! So, I don't see "mind" as a "square circle". Not a problem for me. Where I would differ with you about mind is that you see "mind" as something physical---an eigenstate, if you will, and, seemingly, nothing more. But, in the fuller context of your statements, I would further have to say that you see a kind of one-to-one mapping of "mind" to some particular "mental state" = eigenstate = some kind of physical expression of the brain and its neural components. One question that immediately arises, then, is this: how, then, is the "mental state" of a giraffe any different from that of a human; or, better put, how does the "mental state" of a human differ from that of a giraffe? How are they qualitatively different? To better get at what I'm trying to point out, let me put this last question in a different form: when you were four-years-old, you had conversations with your parents, just as we do with four-year-old children now. But the big difference is this: you're conscious of your conversation with the 4-year-old, whereas the 4-year-old probably is not. He may or may not have any recollection of it. When the 4-year-old says "It's hot today," this has to be pretty much the same "eigenstate" as exists in your mind when you make the same statement---which follows from a one-to-one mapping of abstraction and a physical eigenstate. But I can, more or less, anticipate how you will respond to all of this, so I'll pass on to what I believe to be more germane. That is, what drives this supposed one-to-one mapping to change from one "mental state" (=eigenstate) to another? IOW, if I smoke marijuana, the chemical effects of the drug change my "eigenstate" and so I find myself giggling more easily. So, the causality is this: change the chemistry, which in turn changes the eigenstate, which changes the "mental state" I possess. Obviously marijuana is a "physical" substance. But, now, let's turn it around. I'm a Zen Buddhist, and I---consciously---use meditation to place myself in a place of deep calm. Whereas before I may have been fidgety, now I am calm. What, then, induced this change of "eigenstates"? IOW, it's as though the "mind" has added a substance that has the effect of changing the eigenstate of the brain and its neural components. I wonder how you respond?
I’ve had similar experiences. One area of interest for me is deja vu, as I have a history of “more than usual” incidences of deja vu, from what I can gather anecdotally from friends, colleagues, family.
I've had profound experiences of deja vu; but, I assure you, what happened in the chemistry lab room was NOT deja vu. When I was attending UCLA, I had a dream about being at USC, and in a tennis stadium that did not exist at the time of my dream. But three years later, I was in the tennis stadium I dreamed of, and had a very powerful experience of deja vu. That's what I think deja vu is: it's an experience of what is later to happen, and, I believe, we usually receive it in a dream. I've also dreamed about a place I would live in ten years before living there. And I dreamed about it not once, nor twice, but, in fact, so many times that I hated going to sleep. I should also add that the experience I had in the chem lab room was not the first such experience. I had an even more powerful one when I was 8-years-old. Now, I don't want to go on-and-on about all of this because of the personal nature of it all; but these things happen. So, no, it wasn't deja vu; deja vu is rather ordinary and common. This was something entirely different, and very real. Now, changing the subject a little, and getting a little off-topic, let me mention something to you just because you seem inquisitive enough: you may want to learn a little about the Miracle of Fatima. It happened in October, 1917, in Fatima, Portugal. The sun was seen to spin around its center, and then to move side-to-side in the sky; and, then, finally to plunge itself towards earth---growing larger by the second. Suddenly, the sun went back to its normal position. This was witnessed by many people---Catholics and atheists alike. And after the sun returned to its normal position, the clothes people were wearing, and the ground in that area, though having been completely soaked by the morning rain, were found to be completely dry. Real physical changes, and no naturalistic explanation for them. How about this: St. Rosalia. She gave herself completely to God, having left her home at a young age. She lived in a cave. She died alone in 1160. Her body was found in 1625. Now, how in the world did her body stay incorrupt for almost 500 years? I think these are a few thorns in the side of materialist thought; but, of course, they don't add up to being a proof of the supernatural. Well, sorry for getting a bit long-winded. I'll try to be more concise the next time. And, I await any response you'd like to give.PaV
November 15, 2011
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@William J Murray I see I botched the formatting on that last reply to you. Sorry, hope you can make out who's saying what -- that post took too long to compose for the time I had and I just pushed "Submit" as I was late running out the door.eigenstate
November 15, 2011
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KF, you need to get over yourself. Eigenstate is producing some fascinating material in his discussions above with WJM, and this discussion should be an illustration to you as to how to debate like an adult. Your endless faux emotive self righteous exclamations are boring and narcissistic.Timbo
November 15, 2011
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@PaV
First, you haven’t said anything about “free will”. That’s fine. Maybe we can work on the “mind” part and then switch over(which I do towards the end here). Second, “mind” as an “immaterial substance” suits me just fine; and, I suppose, when you say “we are not aware of any such physic”, you’re really saying that there’s no physical entity that is “mind”, nor, are there any ways of measuring for its existence.
I put that poorly, I guess. Perhaps I should have said "I am aware of no such metaphysic", or even better "I am aware of no such superphysic", where "superphysic" points to "how things work in a supernatural economy" in some analogous sense to how physics works in a natural economy. The thrust of that is just that "immaterial substance" strikes me the same why I imagine "square circle" or the "smell of the color nine" strikes you. It's not grounded, semantically. "Substance" doesn't mean anything to me, or any one I have asked who will respond, that doesn't depend on material semantics (e.g. extended in space/time).
If that’s the case, supposing I’ve interpreted you correctly, then aren’t we in the very same situation as we are with “gravity”? IOW, we don’t “see” gravity directly, but only its effects. Likewise, we don’t see a “mind”, but we do see its effects—my response to you being such an effect.
Only in a casual sense, and here I think this signals that you must have misunderstood me -- I phrased that part above poorly, originally, as I said. "Mind" is the label we use for the concept we have of the activity of the brain. That's entirely physical, so far as I can see, as is any abstraction, abstractions being particular kinds of concepts we maintain physically in our minds (where mind is just descriptive of the activity of a brain). So we don't "see" mind for casually practical reasons. The electrical activity we call "mind" in our brains (and beyond, we think with more parts of our body than our brain, relying on our entire nervous system) isn't readily visible, even if we do something gruesome and open up a subject's skill. But it's as physical as your shoe, even so, as natural as the electrons running through your iPod (just in much more exotic configurations). So we DO see mind, in the strict, phenomenal sense. It's measurable, testable, extended in space/time, bound by physics, subject to entropic effects and energy demands, and all that.
Again, if I’ve understood you correctly, then when you say of “mind,” in the “rigorous” sense, that it is “a complex set of electro-chemical patterns that occur in the brain,’ you’re describing a physical substance that finds itself in a particular “eigenstate” (hence your username!)? Do I have that correctly? I wonder if this doesn’t get us back to “free will”? If the “mind” is but a particular eigenstate of this physical substrate you describe, then, since electro-chemical patterns follow mechanistic laws, the output of the “mind” could be argued to be determined, and hence that there really is no such thing as “free will”. I’m rather sure this would be your position. Do I have it down correctly?
Very good, "eigenstate" in context. *salutes*. I hopefully cleared that up, above, but yes, the implication is that there is no such thing as "free will", where "free will" signifies the unbounded, libertarian sense of the term.
But, then, how do we explain such things as “creativity”, or “beauty”? How do we explain “love”, and the fact that generation after generation people fall in “love”? How do we explain ESP? or “out of body” experiences? (In fact, I should mention Fr. Robert Spitzer’s new book; I think the title is: “New Proofs of Existence . . .”, which deals with multiverse theory and such. He says that atheists have a hard time with “out of body” experiences, especially the one of the man born blind who, when “out of his body” was able to “see”.) And, of course, other kinds of metaphysical experiences*.
Well, an "out of body experience", where someone could be verified to achieve some kind of "remote viewing" that defies our knowledge of physics would indeed be a challenge to my understanding of physics (by definition). I'm not aware of any such examples, but I certainly would have a hard time with that if such a capability could be demonstrated. On creativity, beauty, etc., these aren't substantially different in practice in terms of their outworking (a beautiful woman is as beautiful to me as a materialist as she would have been when I was a Christian, for example). The models that accounts for these concepts and sensations, where accounting is available, are materialist models, of course. I'm loathe to launch into a run down the rabbit hole of "what is beauty on materialism?" here at this particular point in this thread, but the bottom line is that we incorporate "strange loops" as Douglas Hofstadter would call them that cloud our intuitive understanding of mind. Science affords us a measure of distance from ourselves, a degree of objectivity, through which we can gain insight into intuitions we have of "beauty" as some ethereal, non-material or supernatural abstraction. It's the same trick we learn the mind plays on itself (for good and useful reasons) in "disembodying itself", the sense that the "I" is something discrete, immaterial, connected in some dualist way to the brain, but fundamentally distinct from it.
I’ll just leave it here for right now, and wait for your response and clarifications. *[E.g., when I was 19 and in the chemistry building, I was talking to the stockroom clerk and then, suddenly, found myself looking in a direction almost 90 degrees to my right. I then saw a young woman through an open door whom I had never seen before in the chemistry department. She walked straight in to the stockroom and began to speak---at which time I went back to looking at the stockroom clerk who had been speaking the whole time. When I got hold of my senses, I looked 90 degrees to my left, and, lo and behold, I saw that same young woman, through the same door I had somehow seen just twenty seconds earlier. She walked in and said, word-for-word, what I had already heard her say twenty seconds earlier. How do you explain this?]
I've had similar experiences. One area of interest for me is deja vu, as I have a history of "more than usual" incidences of deja vu, from what I can gather anecdotally from friends, colleagues, family. I can't tell from your account here if that's related, although I will point out that "deja vu" means "already seen" in French, which is resonant with your story. Anyway, without delving into the fascinating science of deja vu, researchers gaining a clearer and clearer view on this compare it to an optical illusion, but for the memory. It's a kind of misfire. When a misfire like this happens at such a low level, it's exceedingly convincing, and thus also unnerving (to me, anyway). The overwhelming sense of "recall", but that's the misfire (or so goes the science thinking). When I experience it, the "recalledness" is illusory, and it's just a false impression overlaying an otherwise mundane "first time" experience. That may not apply to you at all. Humans are quite capable of and prone to all manner of hallucinations, lucid dreams, and various and assorted mental misfires, and it doesn't make them crazy. Brains are like that, by our observation, scientific and otherwise. That combined with a conspicuous lack of corroborating evidence for "reappearances" -- say a security video that supports the experience of the "two women who were the same woman, (timeshifted?) you recounted here, "brain foibles" appear to be both highly plausible and common as explanations (for my deja vu moments, too) and much more compelling as explanations over "time travel" or "spooky action at a distance for macro-objects", etc.eigenstate
November 15, 2011
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@William J Murray,
1. The natural in “methodological naturalism” is used to distinguish it from “supernatural”, which is (for our purposes, anyway) defined as that which is not observable (meaning, is itself not observable and has no observable, predictive effects). 2. As in the case of gravity and entropy, as long as a predictable effect (or set of effects) is observable, then we regard the unobserved “thing it itself” (inasmuch as we can observe things themselves) as scientific in that our model of “what it does” is constructed of observable, predictive effects. Our terms (gravity, entropy) become placeholders for the set of effects being described. 3. Effects generated by intelligent, deliberate agencies (humans, hypothetical intelligent extraterrestrials) fall within the domain of scientific scrutiny (as in cryptography, forensics, archaeology, etc.) Even if the specific intelligent agency is unknown to us (as in the above cases, or in the case of finding artificial alien artifacts on other worlds), as a placeholder term for a set of predictable or recognizable effects, “intelligent design” is a scientific concept (within the bounds of methodological naturalism) whether or not one agrees that the current metric for discerning ID effects (FSCO/I > 1000 bits) from non-ID effects is accurate. </blockquote. I'm fine with this as a working summary.
If we are agreed to this point, then I don’t see why it would be unscientific to refer to a class of effects that bear the markers of intelligent design and appear to be as fundamental as gravity or entropy (in generating, among other things, a finely-tuned cosmos), and in the same sense that we call a set of effects “gravity”, we refer to that fundamental set of effects “god”. In this sense, god is not being referred to as a “supernatural” entity, but as entirely “natural” under your definition (which includes intelligent agencies and their effects).
I'm quite open, epistemically, to the prospects of a god being apprehended in naturalist terms. If Zeus were real, physically real, and we could model his "lightning bolt" technology, even if (as in current physics) we don't understand all the fundamentals of its internal dynamics, there's no problem. It's just science working as science, modeling out a phenomenon that's extraordinary in terms of culture and social effects, but perfectly vanilla and ordinary as a matter of scientific investigation and epistemology. "Natural" in that sense is just descriptive, covering, by definition, "that which is amenable to mechanistic modeling, and generates predictions from that which can be empirically tested". If it satisfies that condition, be it gravity or god, it's "natural" as a matter of epistemology. Which, if that is not clear, is basically to agree with your paragraph here. The kicker for this is the "asymmetric identification" of god or a Designer. In science, the "marks of intelligence" are not free-standing, brute facts. These observations, which we surmise may be best attributed to an intelligent agent, are always justified as the effects of intelligence by connecting them with the known, or scientifically plausible agents that caused them. That is how model building works. So, if we have an arrowhead-like thing we find in the deepest strata, we are more skeptical that intelligence designed that object to be "arrow-like" insofar as we can't place any such capable resources any where near that far back (say in the pre-Cambrian). If we find that same arrowhead from a site dated to 50,000 years ago, and co-located with hominid bones and other artifacts, we have a much stronger basis for concluding the arrowhead was "intelligently designed". That's important, because it points to the symmetry in matching the available "agent resources" with the putative "designed thing". The "designedness" is NOT just an intrinsic feature of the shape, markings and other features of the arrowhead, it is the juxtaposition of those features WITH the putative designer as available and capable. There is no design inference I am aware of that stands with out this balance, the matching of an effect with an available, capable designer. That doesn't mean we need to know the serial number of the alien soldier some would surmise as the "planter of DNA" in somebody's panspermia, hypothesis. Just knowing that humans exist here is some ground for understanding similar capabilities in terms of intelligence, computing and other technology exist. We have no idea who those aliens might be, but the prospect of such aliens is plausible (never mind that there is no evidence whatsoever for such a visit and "planting" for the moment).
In the beginning, you explained that “supernatural” means anything that is unobserved, and produces unobserved or unpredictable effects.
No, that wasn't my position. A daughter isotope decay event is a perfectly unpredictable event, but that doesn't make it supernatural. In our models, we can achieve arbitrarily high degrees of predictability statistically (larger ensembles of decay events will produce increasing more smooth decay curves), but that doesn't make the statistical aggregate natural and the quantum event "supernatural", by virtue of the latter's unpredictability. It's best to stick with what I did say, I think, and adhere to the requirement that the phenomenon or dynamic be amenable to mechanistic models.
If we agree that most supernatural agencies are considered to be intelligent or at least deliberate, and most claimed interactions with “the supernatural” posit that the supernatural agency was in fact observable in some sense (sight, sound, smell, feel), and many such experiencers refer to what would be predictable effects of such encounters, I’m not sure what specific phenomena ever claimed by anyone to have been encountered, or to exist, would qualify as “supernatural” under this exclusionary rule (including ghosts, demons, psi effects, angelic visitation, OOBEs, etc.).
I think that's right. "Seeing a ghost" cannot be a supernatural event, by definition. If the experience is veridical, the "seeing" is a natural experience -- light, photons, distance, movement, etc. If it's a hallucination it's not "seeing", but "imagining of seeing". But if one sees a ghost, the seeing part is physical interaction, perfectly amenable to physical model building and scientific epistemology. 'Supernatural" begins a problem when the part that gets added to it (if it gets added) that supposes this natural phenomena relates an entity that has "supernatural existence" or "supernatural qualities", too in ADDITION to whatever physical manifestations it provides to natural observers. In principle, though, the "supernatural" part ("part" again being a stolen concept from the real world, but we need some handle to grasp on to, here), of a ghost is perfectly inscrutable -- incoherent -- in terms of science and natural knowledge, but if the physical interactions of a ghost are available to natural observers, then those natural interactions make that part of the ghost just as natural as the shoes on your feet.
Even if people claimed that god answers prayers, “god” as an unseen, intelligent force isn’t excluded from scientific investigation by rule as long as there are predictable sets of effects that can be scientifically investigated; thus positing “god” as an unseen, intelligent force that generates predictable, intelligently designed effects towards a goal can be a scientific hypothesis or even theory, given any success for the model.
If you have a research program that tests the model -- pray, observe novel and specific effects from prayer, repeat -- you have identified a pattern, a dynamic that we can incorporate into our natural knowledge base. If every time a believer said the required chant, it rained at that location, 24 hours later, no matter where, and across millions of trials, without fail, you'd have a solid empirical case for a "something" at work (provided you can't find more mundane reasons for triggering the rain associated with the assembling for the liturgy, etc.) as a natural process. It's as predictable as gravity, as I've cast it here. What you call it doesn't do anything for the physics, any more than calling "gravity" "God" would change gravity. The natural process is what it is. If you call the rain-from-chant process "god", that's fine by me. The problem in your suggestion is that intelligence is not, by definition, thoroughly predictable. If it's modelable like that -- press a button, get a biscuit -- you have a machine. It's mechanistic by definition. You can call that "god" if you like, but it's a finite state machine, if you have that kind of mapping between input and outputs. The "inscrutability of intelligence" becomes the disabling epistemic problem, if you don't have the agent available for inspection (and in many cases -- like for humans -- it's problematic even if you DO have the agent available for examination). Any intelligent design model has to compete with other models. And that's exceedingly difficult, because there is no framework for entailment for such actors. If you posit an intelligence with a will that is sufficiently powerful to, say, design DNA, that putative designer is also by virtue of that inscrutable in terms of "what this part of the model entails". If that's not clear, think back to mechanical models that don't incorporate intelligent agents. Einstein's GR model ENTAILED a specific perihelion procession for the planet mercury. There was no question regarding "whether relativity would really want to do that". It followed directly and unavoidably from Einstein's mathematical model. That's crucial, as that is the basis for adopting GR over competing/older models. It makes unavoidable, specific, novel predictions, and can be judged against them empirically. This blog is a veritable pantheon of arguments (from ID proponents, usually) as to why we cannot produce entailments from a model that incorporates such an intelligent agent, ESPECIALLY on who is not available for examination and discrete testing, and never has been.
It seems to me that there is no reason other than a priori atheism to prevent the divine foot per se as long as the divine foot is producing observable, predictable effects (in the same categorical sense that other intelligent agents produce observable, predictable effects).
Ahh, but none of what you discussed invoked the divine. There is no divine foot in the door in your prayer example. It's a recitation or supplication of some kind, and some correlated natural effect. It's no more "divine" that quantum entanglement -- "spooky action at a distance". We can call it "god" or "Steve", doesn't matter the label, and as the natural evidence accumulates for some kind of intelligence, something we can observe, test and incorporate into models (we can do this with humans, for example, so we are comfortable that this is plausible), we have an increasingly strong case for having identified a new form of intelligence, or even a "god", depending on what kind of capabilities and powers this agent demonstrates. This is the natural discovery of god, and there is no barrier in scientific epistemology against that, from me, Dawkins, Lewontin, or anyone else. God would be just as real and natural as the nose on your face, and so much to the credit of science for developing and vetting that knowledge, if that were to happen. What breaks the epistemology is to inject an agent that defies or remains inscrutable to that epistemology. If God can be observed, tested, modeled, predicted, falsified, validate on natural tems, great. The epistemology is working as we desire. If the model gets perverted so the model can't be tested, and the model's predictions are not entailed, specific, novel or discoverable at all, ya got nothin'. And that's what the introduction of an omniscient, omnipotent deity would do. It's maximally destructive to scientific epistemology. Even an iota of that in the model renders the model useless.
Can you provide me with a specific example of what would be supernatural and excluded from scientific investigation, and can you explain why such a concept of god is necessarily excluded via your explanation? An omniscient, omnipotent, inscrutable god is the strongest example. It also happens to be a pervasive candidate for what people attempt to insert into the investigation. By definition, such a being has all (logically consistent) options open to it, and is maximally available and maximally capable. So, God is the indefeasible, unfalsifiable answer for literally ANY phenomena. Such a character literally annihilates all natural knowledge if it's not excluded from the explanatory universe. That which explains everything explains nothing, and a God that is the explanation for any putative phenomena, any phenomena at all, is perfectly no explanation at all, a complete defeater for any natural knowledge. As above, knowledge is eliminative, and an omni-god is maximally unfalsifiable. If you let such a being onto the explanatory playing field, even a little, tiny bit, for a moment, your epistemology is destroyed. Nothing can be eliminated, so nothing can be known.eigenstate
November 15, 2011
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ESt: I have already had occasion to point you to the definition- by- smear offered up by your side, of the term you used. Do I again need to point out that the first two specifications are about willful deceit, i.e. lying? Sorry, that crosses a serious line and must be properly dealt with. I am not going to put up with wink wink nod nod double-talk games. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
November 15, 2011
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I have responded on points below.kairosfocus
November 15, 2011
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Onlookers, For record, I will comment on select points from the remark by Eigenstate at what is now 16.1 above. (As I have already notified at 16.1.1, ESt needs to deal with a far more serious matter of basic civility in public discussion before further embarking on substantive matters.) On select points: 1: your problem is with “scientific evolutionary materialism”. Why are you invoking atheism? . . . The immediately following reference to a Buddhist friend of course ducks the pivotal point known to all of us involved, that evolutionary materialistic, "scientific" atheism -- which has atheism- as- proposition as a keystone principle -- is the relevant and dominant form of atheism in the civilisation. And, right from the heading of the post, I made that focus explicit. In short, this is a loaded red herring, led out to a convenient strawman. 2: “Atheism” IS the wider entity. Materialism, your real target is the part of the wider whole (atheism-compatible worldviews). Atheism- as- proposition, the denial of the existence of God, is a keystone component of the evolutionary materialistic worldview. And, in fact the presentation of that denial in passive, rhetorical default form, has for decades been used to try to dodge intellectual responsibility to ground any worldview. (Which is the point that has been twisted into rhetorical pretzels above. Notice, too, after these side tracks, we are nowhere closer to a serious effort towards warranting this form of denial of the existence of God, and the wider evolutionary materialist frame of thought.) 3: you have now decided it was synechdoche, except for confusing the wider part (atheism) with the key narrower part (materialism), making it a kind of “reverse-synechdoche”, if read charitably. Evidently, ESt does not realise or wish to acknowledge that synecdoche works in several ways, part for whole, whole for part and more. I gave but one example. Nor is this a "now you have decided," as the very first in-brief response I gave was to point to this aspect, i.e. at minimum, we should begin from the understanding that in discussion wholes are often referred to by parts and parts by wholes etc. So, it would be best to read the context which makes it quite plain that the matter is about "scientific," evolutionary materialistic atheism; right from the outset. Indeed, in the headline. But a loaded red herring led out to a strawman is ever so tempting. 4: the term I actually used — “Gish Gallop, Kairosfocus Remix™ (please don’t forget the trademark symbol). I don’t suppose Gish believe he is spewing lies faster than a sparrow flies, but I do identify a great many of them as falsehoods, and demonstrable ones if he would bother to slow down enough to actually examine and be examined in what he is saying. So, to for you. This is of course the precise point where I have demanded explanation or retraction. Let us remind ourselves, on the definition by smear proffered by the so-called Rational Wiki:
The Gish Gallop is an informal name for a debating technique that involves drowning the opponent in such a torrent of half-truths, lies, and straw-man arguments that the opponent cannot possibly answer every falsehood that has been raised. Usually this results in many involuntary twitches in frustration as the opponent struggles just to decide where to start. It is named after creationism activist and professional debater Duane Gish.
The second item in the list is lies, and the first is half-truths, another form of lying. And, lies are willfully calculated deceptions. So, if one is in mere error -- and in fact the evidence above is that I am NOT in error -- but does not intend deceit, s/he is not a liar. It seems therefore that the underlying admission here is that ESt has falsely accused me of lying, by direct implication, and that he now realises the cannot back it up. But he is unwilling to acknowledge that he falsely and recklessly accused me of lying [by very direct implication], so he now wishes to redefine to make it out that this was not so. ESt now shifts to a subtler form of accusation, intellectual irresponsibility. On this, I simply state that I have laid out the case step by step with links where one can examine for oneself. ESt has asserted but has yet to substantiate error or recklessness in error, much less deceitfulness. Indeed, the real truth seems to be that because he differs with what I have had to say, and seems to assume that those who differ with the new schoolmen in the holy lab coats are "ignorant, stupid, insane or wicked," I must be guilty by virtue of mere disagreement with the party line. After all, how could one see the mass of evidence and fail to agree if he has the intellectual horsepower to take it on, save something is wrong morally? The answer is obvious, from the original Post: there is an a priori imposition of materialism at work, as Lewontin and others such as the US NAS and NSTA have freely acknowledged; and as is routinely evident. Johnson's retort that the materialism comes first the science thereafter is telling. 5: I assume you believe what you spew in such volume and rambling form is true, but I don’t see your machine gun fire being any more true than what Gish gets galloping on. ESt needs to realise that saying a smear over and over again drumbeat style does not make it so, either of me or of BA or of Gish for that matter. I have shown exactly the step by step methodical reasoning process from the very headline of the original post, and have linked where one can go for more. But no, instead of acknowledging this is a logically structured post, it is ever so much easier to chant out "rambling" over and over. This is childish, rude and irresponsible. It is also defiant in the face of evident facts laid out step by step already. So, we know the whole post above is a turnabout false accusation done defiantly in the teeth of the truth that is there for all to see. 6: I think just here in this thread you took pains to point out how I (or someone else?) did not respond to one particular point in your galloping items, and identified that as some apparent problem for your opponents. That’s just nuts. Translated: ESt has no intention to address the key matters on the merits, he is just here to call names and dish out abuse. Okay, he has a 24 hour clock ticking to shape up or ship out. 7: I believe you believe what you are posting is true, so that would not be lying on your part. I believe the same thing about Gish. You’ve missed the thrust of the criticism. The idea you should consider is that you have a form of posting that is intrinsically hostile to forum discussion, in the same way the Gish Gallop is hostile to constructive or thoughtful debate. Diversionary, again. As already noted the first two points in the definition of the Rational wiki definition by smear, are about lying. But this clip can be taken as definitive proof that ESt cannot show willful deception. And, we have seen that he cannot address the issue on the merits cogently. All that he has said substantially here, is I don't like your style. I need not go on to say much about the personalities that immediately follow. Save that we can note how far we now are form actually dealing with the substantive matters, into the third step of the trifecta fallacy: ad hominems and poisoning the atmosphere by soaking the strawman with ad hominems and igniting. 8: “random walk” was hyperbole, I admit. But exaggeration of a very real problem. In short, a grudging acknowledgement of loaded inaccuracy. 9: Here you are playing to the crowd (hint: whenever you are tempted to use the word “Onlookers”, you are fighting a negative impulse) by suggesting that some item or other in your galloping stream was avoided, and avoided due to some weakness or error on the part of your opponent’s ideas. Again, instead of actually addressing the merits [has it been missed that when I speak to onlookers, I generally am going to lay out a case on the merits so the onlooker can see the balance for him or her self?), ESt diverts to trying to pretend that to address the onlookers in what is in effect a debate is somehow a wrong thing to do. 10: Methodological naturalism does NOT reduce to philosophical naturalism or materialism, by implication or any other vehicle. Philosophical materialism is a WIDENING of methodological naturalism, naturalism applied much more broadly than to just scientific questions. Again, and for variety, let us lay aside Lewontin's letting of the materialist cat out of the scientific bag; so, let us take up the NSTA remarks in the original post, noting that for "naturalistic" we can easily read "materialistic":
The principal product of science is knowledge in the form of naturalistic concepts and the laws and theories related to those concepts . . . . Although no single universal step-by-step scientific method captures the complexity of doing science, a number of shared values and perspectives characterize a scientific approach to understanding nature. Among these are a demand for naturalistic explanations supported by empirical evidence that are, at least in principle, testable against the natural world. Other shared elements include observations, rational argument, inference, skepticism, peer review and replicability of work . . . . Science, by definition, is limited to naturalistic methods and explanations and, as such, is precluded from using supernatural elements in the production of scientific knowledge. [[NSTA, Board of Directors, July 2000.]
The problem here is that once materialistic a prioris are applied, science is under censorship to materialism and so cannot properly claim to be an unfettered search for the truth about our world in light of evidence and on objective principles of investigation. Of course, we explain naturally occurring regularities by natural laws based on forces at work. Similarly, we explain stochastic patterns by chance based processes and the resulting distributions of outcomes. And, we explain other things just as routinely as being on inductive investigation, characteristic of the work of designers, e.g. complex specified information and associated organisation or arrangement of components. It is no accident that it is only when such inferences to necessity, chance and art are inconvenient for the materialists that the last is forbidden. As of course Lewontin so plainly admits. And, his attempt to justify this by suggesting that a theistic view would reduce the world to chaos, is historically and philosophically unwarranted, as the original post also points out. Which is being side-stepped by ESt. 11: That is NOT known [i.e that that which begins to exist has a cause]. Science provides a strong basis for doubting that we have ANY examples of anything “beginning to exist” Let's start with a box of matches. Remove one, close, then strike. Did or did not the flame begin to exist? Does or does it not have a cause? Of course we observe conservation of energy and/or mass, but that is strictly irrelevant to whether or not things begin to exist, or can cease from existing. And, in response to why something begins, we find that there are going to be necessary causal factors that enable that existence, without which the entity will not begin or will cease from existing if they are withdrawn. For instance fire fighters work by cutting off one or more of air, or heat or fuel. 12: We can certainly identify causal patterns with our observations and build models that try to approximate and predict the dynamics of matter and energy, but we have ZERO experience with matter or energy being created or destroyed, or anything “beginning to exist”. A zygote that becomes a baby that becomes an adult human does not “begin to exist” in an existential sense, but rather is a shorthand we apply for the collecting and aggregation of already existing matter and energy. From a little error at the beginning, great errors do grow. That mass and/or energy are conserved under current circumstances, has nothing to do with whether or not a great many things begin to exist and are caused. A Zygote begins to exist, and it certainly has a cause. 13: A body decaying and decomposing we may say “ceases to exist” as a configuration of matter and energy we call “body”, and we can identify processes that predictable effect further decomposition until the body is no longer recognizable as a body, but nothing ceases to exist in any fundamental sense. This Plato did not know . . . This is of course a diversion from the issue that one who dies, ceases bodily existence and the body thereafter returns to the dust. The dig at Plato is a way to avoid having to deal with what he did know and dis address seriously, in light of the likes of Alcibiades et al. __________________ GEM of TKIkairosfocus
November 15, 2011
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Welcome aboard, wallstreeter.Upright BiPed
November 15, 2011
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